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Determinate Sentencing in California:
The New Numbers Game
APRIL KESTELL CASSOU*
BRIAN TAUGHER**
It is easy to overreact to California's new determinate sentence law. I The
less familiar one is with actual release figures for convicted felons, the more
alarmed one becomes at what appear to be drastically lowered prison
sentences; 2 while the more familiar one is with parole, prison discipline,
and sentencing, the more dismayed one becomes at the tremendous new
complexity attending these decisions. 3 Fortunately, however, patient study
of the new law forces even the most skeptical to conclude that it is ultimately
comprehensible. It can be learned by jurists and prison administrators not
otherwise qualifying for membership in Mensa4 and its net effect on time
* B.A., 1969 University of San Francisco; J.D., 1971 University of San Francisco,
School of Law. Instructor of Legal Research, University of San Francisco, School of Law;
formerly California Deputy Attorney General and Consultant on the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act to the Center for Judicial Education and Research, Berkeley, California.
** B.S., 1969 Georgetown University; J.D., 1972 University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law. Chief Counsel to the Community Release Board and Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Principal draftsman of Assembly Bill 476.
1. SB 42, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §1, at-, as amended by AB 476, CAL. STATS. 1977,
c. 165, §1, at -. We will refer to the original law as SB 42, to the amendments as AB 476, and to
the final version as the determinate sentence law.
2. Compare CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 149, §1, at 1216 with CAL. PENAL CODE §213 (penalties
for first degree robbery formerly five years to life, now two, three or four years). Compare
CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 1968, §1, at 3509 with CAL. PENAL CODE §190 (penalties for second degree
murder formerly five years to life, now five, six or seven years). Compare CAL. STATS. 1967, c.
151, §1, at 1217 with CAL. PENAL CODE §264 (penalties for forcible rape formerly three years to
life, now three, four or five years).
3. Compare CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 990, §1, at 1959-60 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170-
1170.6, 2930-2932, 3000-3057.
4. Mensa is an organization of people having extremely high IQ's.
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that inmates serve in prison cannot be as readily predicted as proponents and
opponents believe.
The new law will force courts to share with correctional and paroling
authorities the experience of complete procedural upheaval similar to that
which the correctional agencies survived in the avalanche of new law
following Morrissey v. Brewer.5 Both authors of this article participated in
a special state Attorney General's task force6 that helped affected state
agencies implement the constantly shifting and expanding procedural rights
that flowed from that case. At that time we found it useful to prepare a
pragmatic survey of the post-Morrissey law that was a basic summary
providing background reading and perspective on the more exotic problems
developing in specialized subsections of the parole system.7 Following the
passage of Senate Bill 42, and exposition of the determinate sentence law as
it existed at that time was prepared for use at the 1977 Criminal Law
Institute for Superior Court Judges. 8 This article includes discussion of the
latest amendments to the determinate sentence law, and should be useful to
anyone who becomes enmeshed in the intracacies of the new law.
This article contains a detailed survey of the new law, Senate Bill 42 (SB
42) as amended by Assembly Bill 476 (AB 476). The article will discuss the
background and history of the new law, its changes to theories of crime and
imprisonment, its creation of a new sentencing and paroling structure, and
its retroactive application. We have attempted not only to describe the new
law, but also to catalogue some of the potential problems that may be
encountered. We have avoided a philosophic assessment of the law, concen-
trating instead on practical analysis and criticism.
THE END OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
A. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
By the time California adopted indeterminate sentencing in 1917, 9 the
system was by no means a novelty. Between about 1876 and 1922, forty-
four states had adopted parole in some form, and thirty-seven states had
adopted some form of indeterminate sentencing.'" In California, the enact-
5. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). This case required due process in parole revocation hearings.
6. This task force was known informally as the Morrissey 8, being originally composed
of two deputies from each of the California Attorney General's offices. The same basic group
has inherited the task of assisting clients in the implementation of the new law.
7. See Cassou, The Morrissey Maelstrom: Recent Developments in California Parole and
Probation Revocations, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 43 (1974).
8. See A. CASSOU, SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN SENTENCING MADE BY THE CALIFORNIA UNI-
FORM DETERMINATE SENTENCING ACT OF 1976 (SB 42) (1977) (prepared for and distributed by
the California Center for Judicial Education and Research, Berkeley, California).
9. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 527, §1, at 665 (formerly CAL. PENAL CODE §1168). An indetermi-
nate sentence does not specify a definite period of incarceration for an inmate at sentencing.
Rather, a prisoner's progress toward rehabilitation while in prison may be taken into account
when determining the actual period an inmate should serve.
10. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION OF PRO-
POSALS IN FOUR STATES 5 (Mar. 1976) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal); Lindsey, Historical
Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 9, 70 (1925).
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ment of indeterminate sentencing legislation was preceded by parole legisla-
tion first adopted around the turn of the century."I Looking at the national
trend, the California Supreme Court enunciated what would be a core tenet
of parole:
The legislative policy manifested in the act was to provide. . . a
system. . whereby, notwithstanding fixed terms of sentence, a
hope was to be held out to prisoners that through good conduct in
prison and a disposition shown toward reformation, they might be
permitted a conditional liberty. . . . Service of an arbitrary fixed
term which has relation to the matter of punishment cannot of
itself furnish a proper or just standard by which it may be fairly
determined whether or not a prisoner has repented of his crime
and evidenced a disposition to redeem himself, and may with
safety to society be granted a parole under which to attain com-
plete reformation . . . . [T]he purpose of the legislature in creat-
ing a parole system. . . is to permit the liberation of a prisoner on
parole at the earliest period when permitted by law and when on a
consideration of the merits of each individual case, parole ought,
in the judgment of the board, to be granted.' 2
In 1918, the California Supreme Court applied these rehabilitative goals of
parole legislation to the new indeterminate sentence law: 13
It is generally recognized by the courts and by modern penologists
that the purpose of the indeterminate sentence law, like other
modern laws in relation to the administration of the criminal law,
is to mitigate the punishment which would otherwise be imposed
upon the offender. These laws place emphasis upon the reforma-
tion of the offender. They seek to make the punishment fit the
criminal rather than the crime. They endeavor to put before the
prisoner great incentive to well-doing. . .. [T]he purpose is to
strengthen his will to do right and lessen his temptation to do
wrong. 14
The indeterminate sentence law was off to a rather idealistic start and over
the years met with numerous statutory modifications that tended to broaden
the parole board's 15 powers. The original part-time board that had set terms
and paroles was replaced by a State Board of Prison Directors. 16 In the
1930's that board's discretion in setting and revoking paroles was the
subject of several modifications that continued the broadening of the board's
11. See CAL. STATS. 1913, c. 591, §1, at 1048.
12. Roberts v. Duffy, 167 Cal. 629, 634, 636, 637, 140 P. 260, 262-63 (1914) (emphasis
added), also cited in In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1037, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524, 528 (1976).
13. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 527, §1, at 665-66 (formerly CAL. PENAL CODE §1168).
14. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-93, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918) (emphasis added).
15. "Parole board" is used as a generic term to refer to the Adult Authority and the
Women's Board of Terms and Parole or any of their predecessors.
16. See generaUy CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 527, §1, at 665-66.
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powers.' 7 The California Legislature again reorganized the correctional
system in the 1940's, 18 and the provisions for minimum terms and minimum
eligible parole dates became extremely complex. 19 In 1944, the Adult
Authority was created and was granted broad powers to study individual
cases. 2" Reflecting contemporary faith in the social sciences, it was to be a
panel of experts that would draw upon psychiatric and other diagnostic aids,
and order the parole, transfer, or discharge of inmates. 21 The next two
decades saw many adjustments and refinements of the Adult Authority's
broad power. 22
The Adult Authority's actual practices, as they evolved under its expan-
sive power, were a far cry from the lofty rhetoric of the courts and statutes.
Indeterminate terms tended to become extremely broad, 23 effectively re-
legating legislative responsibility for punishment to a relatively anonymous
parole board. Instead of practicing a true parole system in which some
penitents were released to complete their terms in the community, the parole
board became the actual sentencing agency for all felons who went to
prison, with full control over the felon's term and release on parole. The
court had little control over the length of the sentence; it merely sentenced
the defendant to prison "for the term prescribed by law." 24 The parole
board would then fix a "term" somewhere between the statutory minimum
and maximum (often a span of one year to life),25 and release the prisoner on
parole after a few years. After release, a prisoner's parole could be revoked,
and each time a higher term and new parole date would be set. Prosecutors
17. CAL. STATS. 1937, C. 543, §1, at 1555-60; CAL. STATS. 1935, c. 603, §1, at 1700-06; CAL.
STATS. 1933, c. 814, §1, at 2156-61; CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 483, §1, at 1053-59; CAL. STATS. 1929,
c. 872, §1, at 1930-35.
18. See CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 106, §15, at 1083.
19. See CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 106, §15, at 1109-14.
20. CAL. STATS. 1944, 3d Ex. Sess., c. 2, §1, at 13-17, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1953, c.
1666, §25, at 3396. See also CAL. STATS. 1953, c. 1458, §5, at 3058-59.
21. See generally CAL. STATS. 1953, c. 1458, §5, at 3058. The board was to be a panel of
experts in sociology, corrections, law, law enforcement, and later, education. CAL. STATS.
1944, 3d Ex. Sess., c. 2, §1, at 15, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1953, c. 1666, §25, at 3396.
22. For another example of legislative change, see CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 2256, §§54-71, at
3934-36. One of the more significant legislative changes to the old law was Penal Code Section
5076.2, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1160, §2, at 2875-76, a section retained under the new system. In
the face of criticism that the Adult Authority was arbitrary in its policies and secretive in its
procedures, the legislature for the first time required the agency to publish its procedures in
accordance with the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. See CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§1 1371-11445. The result was Title 15, Division 2 of the California Administrative
Code, called the Parole Board Rules. The Parole Board Rules became effective June 1, 1976. 15
CAL. ADM. CODE div. 2 (Register 76, No. 19, 5-8-76). At the same time, the Department of
Corrections was required to publish its rules. CAL. PENAL CODE §5058; 15 CAL. ADM. CODE,
div. 3 (Register 76, No. 19, 5-8-76). As we shall discuss later, the Parole Board Rules codified
the efforts of Raymond Procunier, then Chairman of the Adult Authority, to cure defects in the
system by way of administrative change. The rules of the Community Release Board are
published in the same portion of the Administrative Code, and are very useful to anyone dealing
with a problem in this area.
23. Most prisoners were eligible for parole in between six and 20 months, and had a
maximum term of life. The law was aptly described as indeterminate. For a listing of minimum
and maximum terms and parole eligibility, see 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §2225 (Register 76, No. 21,
5-22-76).
24. See CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 990, §1, at 1959-60 (formerly CAL. PENAL CODE §1168).
25. See notes 23 supra.
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and defense attorneys had little influence on the release decisions since their
charging practices and plea bargains only affected the maximum term and
minimum parole eligibility. Because very few prisoners were released on
their minimum eligible parole date26 and even fewer actually served the
maximum term,27 the result was to vest in the parole board-the "board of
experts"-virtually total discretion over the remaining period of each pris-
oner's sentence.
This vast discretion made the parole board the scapegoat of the criminal
justice system. Since courts, prosecutors, and legislators had no control over
the release of prisoners, anything that went wrong was obviously the fault of
the parole board, which had been either too lenient or too harsh. The parole
board itself grew wary, gradually adopted the practice of deferring a deci-
sion until the board developed the feeling that the prisoner was "ready to go
home." But the press would periodically report a sensational new crime
committed by a parolee, or less often, the plight of a prisoner whom the
parole board had failed to release. Doubt was cast on the ability of the parole
board to choose accurately the optimum time of release. As these doubts
grew, numerous attacks on the system were launched.2 8
B. The Beginning of the End
Although the courts had for years maintained a "hands off" attitude
toward the parole and correctional systems, 29 1972 brought a reversal of this
traditional policy. In that year, two landmark cases initiated separate trends
which, taken together, played a large role in ending California's indetermi-
nate sentence law.
The first and initially most important trend was begun by Morrissey v.
Brewer.30 That case expanded into the postconviction process the procedur-
al protections enunciated several years earlier by Goldberg v. Kelly. 31
Morrissey required that parole be revoked only in accordance with the due
process clause, a requirement designed to protect the integrity of the fact-
26. See generally CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, CALIFORNIA PRISONERS (1969) for a compi-
lation of statistics concerning release dates.
27. See id. at 81.
28. See, e.g., Parson-Lewis, Due Process in Parole-Release Decisions, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1518 (1972); Comment, The California Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the
Parole Decision as a Problem in Administrative Discretion, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 360 (1972).
29. Prior to 1972, courts gave great deference to the parole board's powers, granting
inmates only the right to be considered for parole. See In re Wilkerson, 271 Cal. App. 2d 798,
803, 77 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (1969). See generally In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 646, 498 P.2d 997,
1002, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749, 754 (1972); In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 300, 425 P.2d 200, 203,
57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1967); In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 87, 357 P.2d 1080, 1086, 9 Cal. Rptr.
824, 830 (1960).
30. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
31. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that "a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing" is required by due process before welfare benefits may. be cut off. Id. at 264. The
procedural rights required by Goldberg include presenting one's own witnesses, appearing
personally, confronting witnesses, cross-examination of witnesses, adequate notice, represen-
tation by one's own counsel but no right to assigned counsel, a decision based on the evidence
at the hearing, a statement of reasons but not necessarily "formal findings of fact" and an
"impartial decision maker." Id. at 266-71.
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finding process by granting the parolee the right inter alia, to a hearing with
notice, disclosure, witnesses and a record. 32 Once Morrissey had imposed a
variety of due process procedures upon revocations of parole, 33 every
discretionary decision in the prison system came under attack.34 Within a
period of about three years, the half-century old indeterminate sentence law
was judicially rewritten to require a variety of due process procedures for
such matters as: rescinding an unexecuted grant of parole;35 increasing a
term or revoking parole even for a new felony conviction; 36 requiring
disclosure of records and reports; 37 granting parole; 38 revoking narcotics
outpatient status;39 and holding revocation hearings when the parolee faced
new criminal charges 4° or had received an out-of-state commitment. 41
The thrust of these decisions was to force the recordation and judicial
reviewability of decisions by correctional42 and parole administrators that
had been only minimally examined prior to this decade. Their combined
impact might ultimately have effected a more enlightened and controlled
implementation of the broad powers of correctional and parole adminis-
trators. But the gradual evolution of these powers under the due process
clause was swallowed up in the revolution wrought by SB 42.
The second line of cases, which indirectly led to the determinate sentence
law, did not originally affect the discretion of these correctional and parole
administrators as did Morrissey and its progeny under the due process
clause, but instead attacked the uncertainty and broad range of indeterminate
terms as being cruel or unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amend-
32. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
33. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,791 (1973) (granted a limited right to attorney in
parole and probation revocation). See also In re Love, 11 Cal. 3d 179, 185-87, 520 P.2d 713, 716-
17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92-93 (1974) (discussed limited right to attorney in parole revocation;
granted a due process right to disclosure of parole officer's report prior to revocation of parole).
34. California appears to have been on the brink of taking the same direction that the
United States Supreme Court ultimately mandated anyway. See People v. Youngs, 23 Cal. App.
3d 180, 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 (1972).
35. See also Gee v. Brown, 14 Cal. 3d 571, 575, 536 P.2d 1017, 1019, 122 Cal. Rptr. 231,
233 (1975); In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470, 474, 503 P.2d 1326, 1330, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318,322 (1972).
36. In re Winn, 13 Cal. 3d 694,698,532 P.2d 144, 146-47, 119 Cal. Rptr. 496,498-99 (1975);
In re Croix, 12 Cal. 3d 146, 150, 524 P.2d 816, 819, 115 Cal. Rptr. 344, 347 (1974).
37. In re Olson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 783, 790, 112 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584 (1974).
38. In re Sturnf-,I-1 Cal. 3d 258, 265-69, 521 P.2d 97, 101-04, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365-69
(1974).
39. In re Bye, 12 Cal. 3d 96, 103-10, 524 P.2d 854, 859-64, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387-92
(1974).
40. In re Coughlin, 16 Cal. 3d 52, 58, 545 P.2d 249, 253, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337, 341 (1976); In
re Dunham, 16 Cal. 3d 63, 67, 545 P.2d 255, 258, 127 Cal. Rptr. 343, 346 (1976).
41. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1976); In re Shapiro, 14 Cal. 3d 711, 721, 537
P.2d 888, 894, 122 Cal. Rptr. 768, 774 (1975).
42. Due process has been tentatively extended into the prison itself. Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308 (1976) (disciplinary proceeding); Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539,557 (1974). For
some prison decisions, the applicability of due process depends on whether there is a "state-
created right." See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976) (transfer proceeding);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 299 (1976) (transfer proceeding). Some of the old prison and
parole prerogatives were conceded in administrative regulations. See, e.g., 15 CAL. ADM. CODE
§2358(a) (Register 76, No. 21, 5-22-76) (limiting consideration of criminal activities to crimes
that resulted in conviction); 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §3316(c) (Register 76, No. 19, 5-8-76) (at
disciplinary hearing held after acquittal in court, court's finding must be accepted as proof that
defendant did not commit the act).
10
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ment to the United States Constitution. Venturing into an area long avoided
by the courts, the California Supreme Court, in In re Lynch, 43 and In re
Foss,44 attempted to develop a theory of "proportionality" of criminal
terms.45 The court applied a three-part test to determine whether a criminal
punishment was cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense. The test'
required that: (1) consideration of the punishment in the case at hand be
made in relation to the particular offense and offender; (2) a criminal term
be compared with punishment in this state for other, more serious offenses;
and (3) a criminal term be compared with the punishment imposed in other
states for the same offense. 46 These cases caused almost immediate havoc in
the already disorganized hierarchy of statutory terms. As individual chal-
lenges under Lynch-Foss wended their way through the courts, minimum
terms and particularly minimum eligible parole dates were cut down in
haphazard fashion, 47 causing the courts to be deluged by even more indi-
vidual appeals and writs. 48 Pandora's box had been opened.
C. Reform: Legislative, Administrative or Judicial?
1. Legislative Beginnings: The Inception of SB 42
By late 1974, dissatisfaction with the indeterminate sentence law was
spreading.49 In addition to increased judicial scrutiny, much scholarly work
was being done on the validity of the old penal system and the possible
forms a new one might take.5" "Determinate" sentencing was an idea raised
with increasing frequency. The goal of compulsory rehabilitation of crimin-
als was seen by some as illusory. The uncertainty of indeterminate sentences
was thought to be counterproductive by impeding rehabilitation of the
individual and by contributing to violence in the prisons. The pressure for
change was reflected on three fronts-legislativej administrative and judi-
43. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 (1972).
44. 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
45. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 919-20, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078-79, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654-55
(1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (1972).
46. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 425-29, 503 P.2d 921, 930-33, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226-29
(1972); see In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 919-20, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078-79, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649,654-55
(1974).
47. In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 553 P.2d 590, 601, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 441 (1976),
unsuccessfully attempted to evaluate the problem and resolve it once and for all.
48. Hardest hit was the legislature's tough new scheme for the punishment of recidivist
drug offenders and dealers. CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1407, §3, at 2987.
49. For a summary of recent literature criticizing the Adult Authority and the indetermi-
nate sentence law, see Comment, Senate Bill 42-The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 133 (1977). The summary and analysis of the determinate sentence law in
this comment was written before the enactment of AB 476 and is thus no longer accurate.
50. See, e.g., D. FOGEL, ". . . WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF. . .": THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR
CORRECTIONS (1975); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); J.
MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS (Vant. ed. 1974); NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS (1973); THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT AND CORRECTIONS (1967); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
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cial. In the legislative area, two consultants5' to the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Penal Institutions52 began researching and outlining a new system of
sentencing and parole in September 1974.53 By October, they sent a
memorandum containing a proposal called "Outline of Proposed Sentencing
Scheme" 54 to the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Penal
Institutions. This draft proposal differed from the ultimate version of the
determinate sentence law in a number of notable respects. Under the propos-
al, the Adult Authority would have remained, and both the Adult Authority
and the courts would have retained far broader discretion than the final
version of the law permitted. The sentence ranges within which the Adult
Authority would have operated were narrower than under the old law, but
not significantly, since under the draft proposal most sentences would have
been in a range of 5 to 25 years, 3 to 25 years, 3 to 15 years or 3 to 10 years.
While parole eligibility would still have occurred at one-third the minimum
term as it did under the old law, the Adult Authority would have had the
duty to parole inmates on a schedule calculated from an inmate's minimum
eligible parole date. Reasons for denial of parole would have included
violent or otherwise disruptive behavior in prison.
Trial court sentencing would also have remained flexible. The judge
would have been given the new responsibility of choosing and setting the
maximum term for the particular offender. He would have been required to
state reasons for his choice, follow criteria to be devised, and might even
delay minimum parole eligibility for exceptional reasons. The sentence
imposed by the judge would have been subject to appellate review by a
special section of the court of appeal to determine whether it was disparate
from cases of a similar nature, and whether that disparity was toward too
harsh or too lenient a sentence. 55 While such a regimen guided and limited
discretion, it was clearly not the mathematical marvel of mechanical rules
we have today.
The winter of 1974 and spring of 1975 saw SB 42 take the basic shape it
would ultimately retain even after the later, drastic changes wrought by AB
476. On December 5-6, 1974, the Senate Select Committee on Penal
Institutions conducted hearings on the indeterminate sentence law. 56 While
51. SB 42 was primarily written by Raymond Parnas, a law professor at the University of
California at Davis and non-lawyer Michael Salerno.
52. The bill was authored by Senator John Nejedly and Senator Howard Way (now
chairman of the Community Release Board). Listed as co-authors of the bill were Assembly-
men Murphy, Sigler, and McVittie. See SENATE FINAL HISTORY, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
1975-76, at 35-36.
53. Parnas, A Case for Fixed Prison Terms, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 27, 1977, § Forum, at
I.
54. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Bill Hoover of Senator Nejed-
ly's staff and Mike Ullman of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee who helped provide a
picture of this legislative history.
55. Memo from Raymond Parnas to Senator John Nejedly (Oct. 25, 1974) (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
56. Testifying at these hearings were members of the 7th Step Foundation, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Correctional Counselors Association, the Committee for Prisoner's
12
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individual desires for a new system varied, the overwhelming majority of
witnesses testified against the indeterminate sentence law and against the
manner in which the Adult Authority had previously implemented it.57 After
these hearings, fundamental modification of SB 42 began, and the ground
work was done on ranges and norms for individual crimes and on defining
which penal sanctions in the various codes would require change. 58 On
January 30, 1975, a five-page press release was issued by the Chairman of
the Senate Select Committee outlining the shape of SB 42. This version of
the bill proposed to abolish the Adult Authority and abandoned the broad
ranges of prison terms. It established court-imposed sentences in the drastic-
ally narrowed ranges of 16 months, two or three years; two, three or four
years; three, four or five years; five, six or seven years. Good-time credits59
were provided for prisoners and a fixed parole period for parolees was
created. The new law was to be fully retroactive. Perhaps the only important
element in this proposal that would not survive into present law was a
provision for lengthy retention of dangerous offenders. 60 The new bill was
introduced on March 4, 1975.6l On March 17, 1975, the author of the bill
sent a letter and twelve-page staff analysis of the new bill to superior court
judges, district attorneys, public defenders, chiefs of police, and sheriffs. 62
The legislative efforts to reform the indeterminate sentence law were off to
an enthusiastic start.
2. Administrative Reforms
The major administrative development that temporarily sidetracked SB 42
was the implementation of a new policy by the recently appointed Chairman
Humanity and Justice, the Prisoners' Union, the Friends Committee on Legislation, the Co-
ordinating Council for Prisoners' Organizations, the Southern California Prison Coalition, Join
Hands, Prison Visitors, and the Taxpayers' Coalition for Prison Investigation. Others testifying
included a pyschiatrist (Dr. Lee Coleman), the president of the American Justice Institute
(Richard McGee), several ex-felons, several employees of the Department of Corrections, and
a group of Los Angeles Superior Court Judges. Hearing on the Indeterminate Sentence Law
Before the Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions, Dec. 5-6, 1974.
57. Among the handful speaking against the newly developing determinate sentence
structure were the Los Angeles Superior Court judges. Id. at 176. These judges had met with
the Select Committee's staff the previous month and their opinions had been rudely dismissed.
It is notable that the Los Angeles Superior Court judges had such a small voice in shaping the
new law, since that court traditionally plays an active role in shaping criminal justice legislation.
Letter from Raymond Parnas to Judge Raymond Choate (Nov. 25, 1974); letter from Judge
Raymond Choate to Senator John Nejedly (Dec. 2, 1974); letter from Judge Raymond Choate to
Raymond Parnas (Dec. 2, 1974); letter from Judge Charles Woodmansee to Senator John
Nejedly (with handwritten notes) (Dec. 2, 1974) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal). Parnas,
A Case for Fixed Prison Terms, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 27, 1977, § Forum, at 1.
58. Felony Sentencing Structure, Dec. 17, 1974 (unpublished unauthored paper dated Jan.
1975) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
59. The term "good-time credits" is used in this article to refer to the credits for good
behavior and participation that reduce a prisoner's term as provided in Penal Code Sections
2930-2932.
60. Senator John Nejedly, Press Release, Jan. 30, 1975, at 4 (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal); SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 28, 1975, §273, at 108-14.
61. SENATE FINAL HISTORY, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1975-76, at 35.
62. Letter from Senator John Nejedly to all California Superior Court Judges, District
Attorneys, Public Defenders, Chiefs of Police and Sheriffs (with attachments) (Mar. 17, 1975)
(copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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of the Adult Authority, Raymond Procunier. In February 1975, he announc-
ed plans to meet the criticism of reformers by administratively making
changes in the system.63 In April, Chairman's Directive 75/20 was issued
creating a structure for setting parole dates based on listed ranges and
factors. Following this directive, numerous hearings were conducted to
abolish the practice of deferring a decision on parole and to establish instead
fixed parole dates for almost all inmates. At the time, these reforms were
received with hostility by proponents of SB 42 who sought an opinion from
the Legislative Counsel that they were illegal. 64 The Adult Authority could
not win. Its old methods were under attack; yet attempts to correct the
system administratively were equally condemned, as critics complained that
the administrative reforms could easily be undone by some later board.65
Work continued on SB 42 despite the Adult Authority's reforms. In
March 1975, the Attorney General (chief law enforcement officer of the
State and the Adult Authority's own attorney) announced his support of SB
42.66 After passage in the Senate, talks on the bill continued in the Assembly
Committee on Criminal Justice where SB 42 was sent in May 1975. That
committee was skeptical of the proposal, preferring to see how the Adult
Authority's reforms would work out.67 In August 1975, the author of SB 42
sent to the committee a lengthy final letter urging passage of the bill. In this
letter he claimed that the Adult Authority's reforms were legally defective,
cited the support of the Attorney General, as well as the support of various
judges, district- attorneys, and defense counsel, and argued that the new
terms would not be shorter than median times currently being served. 68
The staff of the Criminal Justice Committee and the American Civil
Liberties Union of Northern California, however, continued to have reserva-
tions. Specifically, they were concerned that: future legislative sessions
might dramatically increase statutory sentences; the new Community Re-
lease Board might be just as subject to political pressure as the Adult
Authority had allegedly been; procedural safeguards might not be adequate
in the area of parole and good time credits; and retention of dangerous
63. Williams, New Parole Policy; Procunier Takes Mystery Out of Indeterminate Sen-
tences, Sacramento Bee, Feb. 28, 1975, §B, at 1, col. 1.
64. Parnas, A Case for Fixed Prison Terms, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 27, 1977, § Forum, at
1, 8; Op. CAL. LEGIS. COUNSEL No. 5448 (Mar. 18, 1975); Younger Urges Overhaul of Sentenc-
ing, San Francisco Examiner, Mar. 25, 1975, §City/State, at 4, col. I.
65. Memo from Select Committee Staff to Senator John Nejedly (commenting on new
Adult Authority policy) (Mar. 20, 1975) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal). Fixed Prison
Terms?, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 16, 1975, §A, at 4, col. 5.
66. Attorney General Evelle Younger, Press Release, Mar. 25, 1975; letter from Deputy
Attorney General Michael Franchetti to Senator John Nejedly (Mar. 26, 1975) (copies on file at
Pacific Law Journal). Lemhke, Younger Backs End of Sentence Policy, Los Angeles Times,
Mar. 26, 1975, §, at 27, col. 1.
67. Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice Bill Digest (Aug. 6, 1975) (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
68. Letter from Senator John Nejedly to members of the Assembly Criminal Justice
Committee (with attachments) (Aug. 4, 1975) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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offenders might not work. 69 Finally, charges were made that the median
time served in California's prisons under the indeterminate sentence law
were high in comparison with most other states.7° It was felt that it would be
inappropriate to formalize sentence ranges reflecting those already allegedly
harsh medians.7 ' As a result of these questions, passage of SB 42 was halted
in August of 1975. Although the author of the bill threatened to drop it
entirely, it was converted into a two-year bill.
3. Case Law Developments
The judicial branch also entered the fray in 1975. Apparently recognizing
the impossibility of individually reviewing the constitutionality of every
felony punishment that may have been challenged under the Lynch-Foss
line of cases, the California Supreme Court sought a more efficient means of
reviewing the multitude of appeals and writs spawned by those cases.
Seizing upon the first prong of the Lynch-Foss test, the requirement that a
punishment for a particular offense and offender be tested 72 before constitu-
tionality could be judged, the court in People v. Wingo 73 and People v.
Romo74 held that the constitutionality of an indeterminate prison term would
not be reviewed until the Adult Authority had a reasonable opportunity to fix
the actual term.75 Thus, there would be no judicial review of a potential
maximum term if in fact a lower actual term was set by the Adult Authority.
From this holding, it was a short step to In re Rodriguez,76 which required
the Adult Authority, the only body with jurisdiction to apply the punishment
to the individual offender, to fix promptly a prisoner's term that will be
proportionate to the prisoner's culpability, and thus not constitutionally
excessive. 77 Once set, this "primary term" as it was called by the court,
could never be increased and was to be proportionate to the particular
offense and individual offender, not to subsequently occurring factors. 78
69. Letter from Brent A. Barnhart, Legislative Representative, American Civil Liberties
Union of Northern California to Michael Salerno (Sept. 10, 1975); Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice Bill Digest (Aug. 6, 1975) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal).
70. Letter from Brent A. Barnhart, Legislative Representative, American Civil Liberties
Union of Northern California to Michael Salerno (Sept. 10, 1975) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
71. See note 69, supra.
72. The three-prong test required: (I) consideration of the punishment in the case at hand
in relation to the particular offense and offender, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 429-31, 503 P.2d 921, 933-35,
105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 229-31 (1972); (2) comparison of punishment in this state for other, more
serious offenses, id. at 431-36, 503 P.2d at 935-38, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231-34; and (3) comparison
of punishment in other states for the same offense, id. at 436-37, 503 P.2d at 938-39, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 234-35.
73. 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975).
74. Id. at 189, 534 P.2d at 1015, 121 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
75. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 183, 534 P.2d 1001, 1012, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 108
(1975); People v. Romo, 14 Cal. 3d 189, 193,534 P.2d 1015, 1018, 121 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114(1975).
76. 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
77. Id. at 650, 537 P.2d at 392, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 560. The term set by the Adult Authority
could be reduced but not increased. CAL. PENAL CODE §1168, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1969, c.
990, §1, at 1959; see CAL. PENAL CODE §3020, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §1, at-;
CAL. PENAL CODE §2940, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §1, at -.
78. See In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 652, 537 P.2d 384, 393, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 561
(1975).
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The only real novelty in Rodriguez was the degree of inflexibility the
decision imposed on term-fixing, a change amounting to judicial rewriting
of the indeterminate sentence law. The Rodriguez opinion was filed in late
June 1975, and in September, as a response to Rodriguez, the Adult
Authority set forth in Chairman's Directive 75/30 ranges and factors to bring
some uniformity to the setting of the newly invented "primary" terms. 79
These cases are interesting because at the time they were widely but
incorrectly viewed as judicial approval of the Adult Authority's reforms.
The combined impact of Rodriguez, the Adult Authority's reforms and the
reservations of the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice was effectively
to stop the progress of SB 42. The bill was dead, though not interred, in
August 1975.80
D. The Revival and Passage of SB 42
The death knell of the indeterminate sentence law occurred in January
1976, with the filing of the opinion inIn re Stanley.81 Written, ironically, as
an attempt to preserve some aspects of indeterminacy, this case was used by
proponents of SB 42 to overthrow the indeterminate sentence law. As will
be noted below, Stanley was widely, and perhaps intentionally, miscon-
strued. Stanley did not hold the Adult Authority's whole new parole system
unconstitutional. It did not invalidate the Adult Authority's attempt to
lessen disparity in indeterminate sentencing by administrative means. It held
Chairman's Directive 75/20 illegal in failing adequately to account for one
factor that the Adult Authority had argued was already implicit in the rules,
the factor of post-conviction rehabilitative conduct. 82 Far from eliminating
the new system of ranges and guiding factors, the court encouraged the
Adult Authority in this direction, given a corrected rule.8 3 The rules were
then corrected, review began, and by June 1976 the Parole Board Rules
were published in Title 15 of the California Administrative Code, 84 covering
terms and parolees, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights, Rodriguez,
Stanley, Morrissey, and any other controlling guidelines that could be
found. Despite the Adult Authority's efforts to overcome the shortcomings
of its reforms, enthusiasm for SB 42 began to revive. The day after the
79. See id. at 652, 537 P.2d at 393, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 561. Both authors of this article
worked with the Adult Authority and the Department of Corrections in their desperate attempt
to rehear the 40,000 cases for whom Rodriguez now required a prompt term-setting. Personnel
and physical resources were scarcely adequate for so monumental a task. The year ended with
the project of codifying these reforms into the Administrative Code. See 15 CAL. ADM. CODE
§§2000-2725 (Register 76, No. 21, 5-22-76).
80. See SENATE FINAL HISTORY, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1975-76, at 36. Determinate
Sentence Bill Backers Say He Will Drop It, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Aug. 15, 1975, §1, at I,
col. 2. Indeterminate Sentence Reform Dead for Year, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Aug. 21,
1975, §1, at 1, col. 2.
81. 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1976).
82. Id. at 1038-39, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 529-30.
83. Id. at 1038-42, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 529-32.
84. 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §§2000-2725 (Register 76, No. 21, 5-22-76).
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opinion in Stanley was filed, the author of SB 42 issued a very aggressive
press release attacking the Adult Authority's attempts at administrative
change, citing Stanley as holding the attempts illegal, attacking the skepti-
cism of the Chairman of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee and
strongly urging passage of SB 42.85
The Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions initiated discussions
with the Governor's Office during the next few months, emphasizing previ-
ous contentions that the Adult Authority's policy was "illegal", "possibly
unconstitutional" and vulnerable to change at the whim of the board. 86 The
Governor became interested and agreed to support the legislation if law
enforcement groups found the bill acceptable. These groups, led by the
Attorney General and the District Attorney of Alameda County, had become
concerned in recent years with the increasing willingness of the California
Supreme Court to rewrite sentencing law and with the reforms of the Adult
Authority.87 Moreover, these groups felt that the legislature would be more
responsive to future proposals to increase terms than the Adult Authority
bureaucracy had been. 88
Talks went forward with the Prisoner's Union, the Attorney General, the
Governor's Office, the Judicial Council and many others.89 SB 42 was
rewritten on April 22, 1976, to reflect some of the concerns of these
groups. 90 By June, there was a growing feeling that the bill would eventual-
ly pass, but the next two months saw a series of hasty moves and counter-
moves by various factions to obtain advantages on details of the bill.
Following a frantic flurry of last minute legislative activity, SB 42 was
passed, sent to the Governor, and on September 21, 1976, was chaptered as
Chapter 1139, Statutes of 1976.91
85. Senator John Nejedly, Press Release (with attachments), Jan. 9, 1976 (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
86. Memo from Select Committee Staff to Senator John Nejedly (Mar. 20, 1975); letter
from Select Committee Staff to Marc Poche (June 17, 1975) (copies on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
87. Speech by D. Lowell Jensen to Small Counties District Attorneys Association in Fort
Bragg, California (Oct. 1976).
88. Id.
89. E.g., Letter from Senator John Nejedly to Chief Justice Donald R. Wright of the
California Supreme Court (Aug. 16, 1976); letter from Evelle Younger to Assemblyman Alan
Sieroty (Aug. 2, 1976); letter from Michael Ullman, Senior Consultant for J. Anthony Kline,
Office of the Governor (July 12, 1976); letter from Senator John Nejedly to Evelle Younger
(June 7, 1977); letter from Evelle Younger to Senator John Nejedly (June 3, 1976); letter from
Senator John Nejedly to Willie Holder (June 1, 1976); memo from Walter Barkdull, Legislative
Liaison, Department of Corrections to J.J. Enomoto and R.K. Procunier (Mar. 11, 1976)
(copies on file at Pacific Law Journal).
90. Memo from Raymond Parnas to Senator John Nejedly (Apr. 23, 1976) (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal). These changes threatened to undermine existing support of liberal
groups, until Assemblyman Art Torres, an important vote on the Assembly Criminal Justice
Committee, informed law enforcement groups that he would not support the bill unless a list of
demands were met. He was largely successful in obtaining these concessions. Letter from Art
Torres to D. Lowell Jensen (May 18, 1976) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
91. SENATE FINAL HISTORY, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1975-76, at 36; Finally, Sentences
with Periods, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 2, 1976, §2, at 6, col. 1; Fixed Prison Sentences OK'd,
Los Angeles Times, Sept. 1, 1976, §1, at I, col. 5; 29 Crime Bills Signed By Brown, San
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In looking at the legislative history of SB 42, it is important to remember
that most of the detail work on the bill was done during the few months
immediately before passage. Considerations of time and political exigencies
effectively precluded thorough review by judges, attorneys and others who
must implement the bill. As copies of the bill began to circulate in the fall of
1976, cries of dismay began to be heard from those who were only dimly
aware of what had happened in Sacramento.
E. AB 476 "Cleans Up"
A major impetus for amending the new law before it became operative,
but after it was legally effective, 92 was fear of the consequences of the
retroactivity provisions. In the two years of the bill's journey through the
legislature, it had not been possible to predict the effect of SB 42 on the
prison population, and controversy immediately began over whether the law
would relase a swarm of hardened criminals due to retroactive application of
the new, drastically lower maximum terms. 93 In the face of these charges,
the Department of Corrections estimated the SB 42 would result in the
release of far fewer inmates than many were projecting. 94 Statistics on
median time served before first parole showed the overall median for 1976
to be 34 months under the Adult Authority's system. 95 The author of SB 42
used the figures in an attempt to calm fear of the retroactivity provisions. He
argued that SB 42 and the Adult Authority's release policies were close
enough to prevent a flood of new releases. 96
Nevertheless, concern about the release of inmates remained as more
people were compelled to read SB 42 with a view toward practical im-
plementation. Some problems with the bill involved basic comprehensibili-
ty, some involved forgotten code sections that retained indeterminate
terms, 97 and some involved procedural requirements so complex that it
Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 21, 1976, §1, at 1, col. 6. Final Assembly vote was 60 Ayes, 17 Noes.
Concurring Senate vote on Assembly Amendments were 25 Ayes, 9 Noes.
92. A separate bill, SB 15, had to be passed to clarify the intent of the legislature that the
new law not become operative until July 1, 1977. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §351.5, at -.
93. Future Prison Population Uncertain, Sacramento Bee, Sep. 12, 1976, §A, at 13, col. 4;
Perlman, Fixed-Term Law Stirring Controversy, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 18, 1976, §1, at I,
col. 1; National Council on Crime and Delinquency, California to Abolish Indeterminate
Sentencing; Legislature Says Purpose of Prisons is Punishment, CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEWSLETTER
No. 18 (1976). The Chief of Police of Los Angeles, released a document entitled "The Great
California Prison Break Has Been Planned," which purported to demonstrate through various
statistical and rhetorical devices that "conservatively speaking" some seven thousand felons
would be released in July, 1977. E. Davis, The Great California Prison Break Has Been Planned
(copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
94. Letter from Walter Barkdull, Legislative Liaison, Department of Corrections, to
Senator John Nejedly (Nov. 18, 1976) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
95. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SECTION, RESEARCH UN-
IT, POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION, NUMBER AND TIME SERVED IN PRISON BEFORE FIRST
PAROE, MALE FELONS PAROLED 1970 AND 1976 (1977) (copy on file at Pacific law Journal),
96. Letter from Senator John Nejedly to all state legislators (Aug. 25, 1976) (copy on file
at Pacific Law Journal).
97. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §148.1, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1137, §1, at-;
CAL. PENAL CODE §480, T enacted, CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, §78, at 238; CAL. PENAL CODE
§594, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 582, §1, at 1403; CAL. PENAL CODE §597.5, as enacted,
1978 / Determinate Sentencing
threatened to be physically impossible to implement the substantive matters
involved. 98 The Secretary of the Health and Welfare Agency, the parent
agency of the Department of Corrections, created a committee of interested
parties to devise technical corrections needed in the bill.99 This committee
labored throughout October, November and December of 1976, reviewing
various proposals for so-called technical amendments, which were proposed
primarily by the agencies having the responsibility for implementing the
new law.100 The committee bogged down in arguments over what was
technical and what was substantive, leading to intervention by the Gover-
nor's Office. By December 1976, the Brown Administration had drafted
amendments that several months later formed the basis for AB 476. 1I
By this time it was clear that "technical" amendments would not suffice
and that major substantive elements of SB 42 were under attack. Judges
attacked the complexity of the trial court procedures, 102-charging that they
were time consuming and would result in far more trials than had been
necessary under prior law. Led by the District Attorney of San Diego,
prosecutors attacked the bill as "lenient."°10 In February 1977, the Attorney
General attacked the bill he had supported, stating that the terms were too
low, the enhancements should be mandatory, the limitation sections were
too extensive, and the retroactivity provision was unacceptable. 104
This controversy led the Brown Administration during January and early
February of 1977, to examine charges that the new law was too lenient.
Statistical projections hinted that although overall, the median time served
would be close to prior time actually served, some violent and repeat
CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1075, §1, at 2634; CAL. PENAL CODE §653(h), as amended, CAL. STATS.
1975, c. 1132, §1, at 2803; CAL. PENAL CODE §2772, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 106, §15,
at 1101; CAL. PENAL CODE §2790, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 363, §1, at 1650; CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §11483, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 693, §1, at 1322, all of which were
corrected by various provisions of AB 476.
98. An example was CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b), as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139,
§273, at -. Hearing procedures for holding the multiple or violent offender beyond the date
calculated in subdivision (a) were so limited in time, that no more than several hundred inmates
in a population of 20,000 could have been considered.
99. SB 42 Committees, 7 CAL. DEFENDER 2 (1976).
100. See memo from Brian Taugher to J. Anthony Kline, Legal Affairs Secretary, Office of
the Governor (Oct. 4, 1976); memo from Joseph M. Cavanagh, Assistant Departmental Coun-
sel, Department of Corrections to Mark Christiansen, Departmental Counsel and Nelson P.
Kempsky, Deputy Director, Department of Corrections (Nov. 2, 1976); memos from Brian
Taugher to the Obledo Committee (Dec. I & 10, 1976); memo from Joseph M. Cavanagh to
Nelson P. Kempsky (Nov. 19, 1976) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal).
101. Reasons for Amendments and Proposed Legislation (unpublished papers dated Dec.
27, 30 & 31, 1976) (copies on file at Pacific Law Journal); Egelko, Brown Sentencing Proposals,
Sacramento Union, Dec. 27, 1976, §B, at 6, col. I; Egelko, Bid to Prevent Many Paroles
Expected, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 28, 1976, §1, at 3, col. I.
102. Leyde, New Prison Sentence Procedure Looks Complex, Salinas Californian, Dec. 22,
1976, at 16, col. 1; Perlman, Fixed Term Law Stirring Controversy, Los Angeles Times, Nov.
18, 1976, §1, at 1, col. 1.
103. Miller, District Attorney Answers Editorial, San Diego Evening Tribune, Oct. 6, 1976,
§B, at 2, col. 4. Judges also attacked the bill as lenient. Memo from Judge Douglas R.
Woodworth to all judges in San Diego County (Nov. 5, 1976) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal); Perlman, Fixed Term Law Stirring Controversy, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 18, 1976,
§1, at 1, col. 1.
104. Memo from Evelle Younger to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and members of the
California Legislature (Feb. 16, 1977) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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criminals would serve less time due to some of the enhancement and
limitation provisions of SB 42.105 Accordingly, the first version of AB 476,
introduced on February 10, 1977, amended all enhancements and limita-
tions as well as numerous less important provisions.106
The original version of AB 476, itself 73 pages long, was well received
by judges and prosecutors, but was vehemently denounced by what was
loosely referred to as the "liberal coalition." 10 7 This controversy heightened
anxiety over the bill, since it meant that further compromises would have to
be achieved in the few remaining months before the new law would become
operative. The April 12 version of AB 476108 reflected extensive negotia-
tions with members of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee. The San
Diego District Attorney, leading a group of prosecutors, threatened to
withdraw support. for the bill, and particularly disliked the changes in
sentencing procedures, prior prison terms, consecutive sentences and vicari-
ous liability for weapons enhancements. 109 After meetings with the prosecu-
tors, the Assembly leadership and the Governor's Office, a number of these
suggestions in compromise form were incorporated into the April 19 ver-
sion. 110 Several last minute amendments in the Assembly were reflected in
the May 2 version, and the Assembly passed the bill by an overwhelming
majority after the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee obtained a commit-
ment from the author of the bill that no changes would be accepted in the
Senate.
Piqued by this commitment, the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 6,
1977, accepted wholesale amendments from any and all comers to
"toughen" the bill, 1 ' much to the surprise and chagrin of even some law
enforcement representatives. That version not only drastically amended
additional terms for arming with or use of weapons, causing personal
injuries, prior criminal history and consecutive sentences, but also substan-
tially increased base ranges for many crimes, and was obviously unaccept-
able to the Assembly. In a panic caused by the fact that the new law's
operative date was only three weeks away, law enforcement groups and the
105. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, APPLICATION OF UNIFORM DETERMINATE SENTENC-
ING ACT TO SEVEN OFFENSE GROUPS (Jan. 1977). For an explanation of the new terminology, see
text accompanying notes 134-150, infra.
106. Introduction of the bill was referred to by the drafters of SB 42 as law and order
politics violating "prior commitments and the integrity of the negotiating table." See Parnas, A
Case for Fixed Prison Terms, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 27, 1977, §Forum, at 1, col. 1.
107. This included such groups as the State Public Defender's Office, the Prisoner's Union,
the A.C.L.U. of Northern California, the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and various
prisoner's rights groups.
108. The March 17 version of AB 476 contained primarily the Legislative Counsel's clean-
up of provisions missed in the first version.
109. See Letter from Edwin L. Miller, Jr. to Kenneth L. Maddy, Chairman, Assembly
Criminal Justice Committee (Apr. 15, 1977) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
110. Compare AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, with AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 19, 1977.
111. The magnitude of the changes accepted by the Committee indicate the truly
"wholesale" nature of the amendments.
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Governor's Office pursuaded the Senate Judiciary 'Committee to rescind
most of the amendments on June 14, 1977.112
AB 476 moved through seven versions in a little over four months and
was put in final form on June 24, 1977.113 By sheer number, the bulk of its
changes were technical, picking up forgotten penalties, 114 changing agency
names, 115 and repealing outdated sections. 116 As will be discussed in more
detail below, however, key changes were made in sentencing 17 and in
retroactive calculations" 8 aimed at giving greater time in prison to the
multiple, violent offender. As to sentencing, more discretion was given to
the trial judge in the sentencing hearing. 119 Provisions for prior prison
terms, 120 arming with or use of weapons,12' causing bodily injury' 22 and
consecutive sentences 123 were clarified or expanded in scope, and the
provisions limiting prison terms were decimated. 124 In parole, a badly
drafted interface between the Department of Corrections and district attor-
neys on the matter of in-prison crimes was clarified, 125 and a longer total
period of parole supervision was made possible subsequent to a revocation
of parole. 126 In retroactivity, a more realistic time frame was created for
hearing the cases of more serious offenders subject to increased time under
Penal Code Section 1170.2(b). Under AB 476, the result was by no means a
simple system, but those who chafe under the ambiguities in the newly
amended law might, for perspective, contemplate the final version of SB
42.127
One of the unappealing quirks of AB 476 resulted from its passage as
urgency legislation. The bill was signed by the Governor on June 29, 1977,
and made operative July 1, 1977.128
As urgency legislation, a two-thirds vote had been required for its pas-
sage, thus assuring that the bill represented a reasonable consensus of the
legislature. 129 A six-month delay to allow a more leisurely implementation
of the drastically complex new provisions was rejected, as subsequent
changes could then have been made by the usual majority vote. Courts,
112. Compare AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 6, 1977, with AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 14, 1977.
113. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 24, 1977.
114. See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §§1, 3.5, 3.6-3.8, 4, 6, 8-10.
115. See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §§2, 23, 24, 26, 31.
116. See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §§25, 36, 43.
117. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5, 1170, 1170.1, 12022, 12022.7.
118. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b).
119. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.
120. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5.
121. See CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.
122. See CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7.
123. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1.
124. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1.
125. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(c).
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d).
127. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, at .
128. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §100, at-.
129. CAL. CONST., art. IV, §8(d).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
attorneys and the agencies involved therefore entered this new era scrambl-
ing for copies of the final version of the new law. Initiating the widely
anticipated flood of litigation over the new law, two suits out of San Diego
and Fresno attacked the constitutionality of the entire retroactivity provision
of the new law as violating the separation of powers. 130 With this back-
ground, perhaps it is now time to discuss what the determinate sentence law
says.
SUMMARY OF THE NEW LAW
Before the specific provisions of the determinate sentence law are ana-
lyzed, it is first important to understand the new law as a whole. In this
section we will address the scope of changes made by the determinate
sentence law. This section will also provide an introduction to the terminol-
ogy used in the new law, and a general overview of the new law's organiza-
tion. After the summary is presented, the article will discuss the theory of
determinate sentencing and the manner in which prison terms are now
calculated. The remainder of the article consists of a detailed discussion of
each section of the new law. The discussion of each section will be divided
into an exposition of the law and a commentary on the history, practical
application, and potential problems of each section.
A. Dispositions Not Affected
In order to understand the scope of the new law, it is important to realize
that not all provisions of the old law have been changed. For example,
neither misdemeanor sentences nor alternative dispositions for felonies, 131
such as probation, are directly affected by the new determinate sentencing
scheme. The new law also does not affect the sentences for the most serious
felonies, such as first degree murder. 132 The sentences for these felonies
remain life terms; however, new paroling procedures are provided for
inmates convicted of these offenses. 133
One of the most notable changes engendered by the determinate sentence
law is the requirement of computing prison terms. In this area, the mechan-
ics become somewhat complex and it is important to understand the ter-
minology that the new law introduces. A prison term under the new law is
determined by adding the base term and any enhancements that are pleaded
and proved.
B. Base Terms
Except for crimes with life terms'34 and several others 35 of little conse-
130. See Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 169-70, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383,386 (1977).
131. See text accompanying note 171, infra.
132. See text accompanying note 181, infra.
133. See text accompanying note 558, infra.
134. See text accompanying note 181, infra.
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quence, all crimes punishable as a felony carry sentences of a determinate
"range." Each range 136 specifies three possible periods of incarceration.
The judge must choose the middle term in the range as the base term unless
circumstances in aggravation (upper term) or mitigation (lower term) are
found to be true by a preponderance of the evidence and are stated on the
record. 137 Once the base term is chosen, enhancements may be added to
arrive at the prison term that will actually be imposed.
C. Enhancements
For purposes of discussion, it is convenient to divide enhancements into
two categories, specific and general. Specific enhancements are those spe-
cifically relating to the crime, such as use of weapons. General enhance-
ments relate to other crimes committed by the offender for which the
offender has served prior prison terms or will now serve consecutive sen-
tences.
There are four specific enhancements which, if pleaded and proved, must
be imposed by the judge unless circumstances in mitigation are found to be
true and are stated on the record. These specific enhancements are imposed
for: (1) arming with a firearm or use of a deadly weapon; 138 (2) use of a
firearm; 139 (3) intentionally causing great bodily injury; 14° and (4) causing
great loss of property. 141
There are two general enhancements. The first general enhancement, for
prior prison terms actually served by the criminal, if pleaded and proved,
must be added by the judge unless circumstances in mitigation are found to
be true and are stated on the record. 142 The second general enhancement
135. An example of crimes still retaining the indeterminate sentence are the so-called year
and a day crimes. See text accompanying.note 182, infra.
136. The ranges are: 16 months, two or three years; two, three or four years; three, four or
five years; and five, six or seven years.
137. See text accompanying note 235, infra.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022. Anyone who personally possesses a firearm during the
felony is liable for a one-year enhancement; anyone who personally uses any deadly or
dangerous weapon during the crime is liable for a one-year enhancement.
139. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.5. Anyone who personally uses a firearm during the felony
is liable for a two-year enhancement.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7. Anyone who personally inflicts great bodily injury on a
victim during the felony is liable for a three-year enhancement. Great bodily injury is any
significant or substantial physical injury. This enhancement does not apply to murder, man-
slaughter or assault under Penal Code §245.
141. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6. Anyone who takes, damages or destroys property worth
more than $25,000 during the felony is liable for a one-year enhancement; anyone who takes,
damages or destroys property worth more than $100,000 during the crime is liable for a two-
year enhancement.
142. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5. Anyone who was previously convicted of a felony for
which a prior prison term was actually served is liable for a one-year or a three-year enhance-
ment. The enhancement is three years if the present conviction is for a violent felony listed in
Penal Code Section 667.5(c) and the offense that resulted in the prior prison term is also a listed
violent felony. The listed violent felonies are: murder; voluntary manslaughter; mayhem;
forcible rape; forcible sodomy; forcible oral copulation; lewd acts on a child; any felony with a
life sentence; any felony with great bodily injury; and any felony with use of a firearm. If there
were more than ten years between release from prison on the prior prison term and the date the
new crime was committed, and no felonies were committed during that ten years, the prior
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results from consecutive sentences which may be imposed at the discretion
of the court. 4 3 If a consecutive sentence is imposed for multiple crimes,
144
the reasons must be stated in the record. 14
5
D, Limitations
There are several limitations on the use of enhancements to increase the
base term. In general, the same fact used to add an enhancement cannot also
be used to impose an upper base term, 146 and the enhancements for arming
with or use of weapons or for causing great bodily injury do not apply if the
facts justifying the enhancement are an element of the underlying offense. 147
There are also three additional limitations. First, there is a five-year limita-
tion on total enhancements for consecutive nonviolent offenses imposed by
Penal Code Section 1170. 1(a). 48 Second, there is a "double the base term"
limitation imposed by Penal Code Section 1170.1 (f). The total term cannot
exceed twice the base term unless the crime is a violent one, or there is a
specific enhancement, or a consecutive sentence is being imposed because
the crime was committed while in prison or subject to reimprisonment for
escape. 149 Last, there is a "stacking enhancements" limitation imposed by
Penal Code Section 1170.1(d). Only the largest enhancement for arming
with or use of weapons or for causing great bodily injury shall be added if
more than one of these enhancements is found to be true for the same
crime. 150
E. Sentence Hearing
Under the determinate sentence law, the court now has a new and
expanded role in the sentencing process. At the time set for sentencing,
prison term cannot be used to enhance the term. The enhancement is one year for all other
combinations of present and prior prison terms. If there were more than five years between
release from prison on the prior prison term and the date the new crime was committed, and no
felonies were committed during that five years, the prior prison term cannot be used to enhance
the term.
143. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§669, 1170. 1.
144. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170. 1. For all offenses which occur before commitment to prison,
regardless of the number of proceedings, the aggregate term is calculated by adding the
principal term, all subordinate terms, and any enhancements for prior prison terms. The
principal term is the longest term including any specific enhancements for any of the crimes.
The subordinate term for each consecutive offense not listed in Penal Code Section 667.5(c)
(violent felonies) is one-third of the middle term excluding specific enhancements. The subordi-
nate term for each consecutive offense which is listed in Penal Code Section 667.5(c) is one-
third of the middle term including one-third of any specific enhancements imposed for other
than great loss of property. Prior prison term enhancements are added to the total of the
principal and subordinate terms. For all offenses committed in prison or while on escape, the
method of calculation described above is altered so that the term for the prison or escape
offense begins to run upon completion of the term presently being served.
145. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(c).
146. See text accompanying note 242, infra.
147. See text following note 278, infra.
148. See text accompanying notes 403-404, infra.
149. See text accompanying notes 409-411, infra.
150. If the crime, however, was robbery, rape, or burglary, or an attempt of one of these
crimes, one enhancement for weapons may be added and an enhancement for inflicting great
bodily injury may also be added. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(d).
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many factors must be taken into consideration by the court to determine the
length of the sentence to be imposed. The court: (1) receives any additional
evidence' if either side has filed a statement citing circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation or if the court on its own motion wishes to hear
further evidence; (2) decides whether to grant or deny probation; 52 (3) if
probation is to be granted, decides whether to suspend imposition of sen-
tence or to suspend execution of sentence-the former will require that
sufficient facts be set out in the record to allow a prison sentence to be later
determined should probation be revoked; 153 (4) if a prison sentence is to be
imposed, stays punishment of any counts that would result in multiple
punishment proscribed by Penal Code Section 654; (5) decides whether the
upper, middle or lower term is to be imposed on the principal offense, and
on any offense which will be concurrent; 154 (6) imposes any specific en-
hancements that were pleaded and proved, or finds circumstances in mitiga-
tion that justify staying the enhancement; (7) imposes any enhancements for
prior prison terms that have been pleaded and proved, or finds circum-
stances in mitigation that justify staying the enhancement; (8) imposes any
consecutive sentence, giving the reasons for doing so;155 (9) applies any
limitations on enhancements, staying any punishment that exceeds the
limits; and (10) advises the defendant that he is subject to release on parole
after completion of the prison term.'
56
F. Good-Time Credits
All determinate sentences can be reduced by one-third as a result of good-
time credits. These include credit for refraining from specified misbehavior,
and credit for participating in prison work or prison programs. These credits
may be denied or taken away in specified amounts under specified proce-
dures. 157
G. Community Release Board
The Community Release Board, a new parole board, is created to con-
sider parole for life prisoners, to review each determinate sentence for
disparity, to revoke parole, and to apply the new law retroactively. It will
also perform additional functions regarding review of the length and condi-
151. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(b).
152. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203. The discretionary power to grant or deny probation
remains as one of the court's few remaining means of treating offenders individually. Even that
power has been restricted in recent legislative sessions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.06,
1203.07, 1203.11.
153. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 433(b).
154. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 433(c).
155. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c); CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 425. See
text accompanying note 358, infra.
156. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c).
157. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§2930-2932. See text accompanying note 502, infra.
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tions of parole and denial of good-time credits by the Department of
Corrections.
H. Parole
Release from prison is mandatory (after reduction for good-time credits)
for determinately sentenced prisoners, 158 but discretionary with the Com-
munity Release Board, for life prisoners. 159 New procedures are provided to
guide the Community Release Board in considering and reviewing parole
for life prisoners. 160
Once released, determinately sentenced prisoners must serve one year on
parole, unless waived or shortened by the Community Release Board. 161
Life prisoners must serve three years on parole, unless waived or shortened
by the Community Release Board. 162
Reincarceration after revocation of parole by the Community Release
Board is limited to six months, 163 and time spent in custody for revocation of
parole does not count toward the period of parole. 164
L Retroactivity
The Community Release Board is to apply the new law retroactively to all
prisoners and parolees who committed their crimes before July 1, 1977.165
Penal Code Section 1170.2 provides a mechanical method for calculating
the retroactive sentence, but allows the Board to conduct a hearing with
counsel and impose a longer sentence than that which would be imposed
under the mechanical calculation. 166 Regardless of the retroactive sentence
imposed, the prisoner is entitled to the benefits of the old law, 167 including
the procedures previously in effect and parole dates set. The prisoner will be
released on the earlier of the retroactive term or the parole date set under the
indeterminate sentence law procedures. 168
This summary gives the reader an overview of a system that is tremen-
dously complex. With this general picture in mind, we will now begin to
explore some of that complexity.
158. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(a).
159. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3040.
160. CAL. PENAL CODE §§3040-3041.7.
161. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(a).
162. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(b).
163. CAL. PENAL CODE §3057.
164. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d). A maximum of 18 months or four years, however, is
provided for determinately sentenced prisoners and life prisoners, respectively, regardless of
the number of times parole is revoked.
165. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2.
166. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b).
167. CAL. PENAL CODE §I170.2(c).
168. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170.2(a)-(c).
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NEW THEORY AND TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT
A. Theory
Exposition
Penal Code Section 1170(a)(1) 169 states: "The Legislature finds and
declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment." The
wording is crucial, for the law also indicates that dispositions other than
prison, such as probation, are not directly affected by the new law. 170 This
suggests that the judge retains his options for probation, narcotics commit-
ments, Youth Authority commitments, and mentally disordered sex offend-
er commitments in much the same statutory form as they existed before,
although the indirect effects of the new law on these alternatives may be
serious. 171 Despite the legislature's declaration that the purpose of imprison-
ment is punishment, Rule 410 of the California Rules of Court 172 retains as
the general objectives of alternatives to prison the protection of society,
deterrence, isolation of the offender, uniformity of sentencing, punishment,
and "[e]ncouraging the defendant to lead a law abiding life in the future and
deterring him from future offenses."' 73 The now taboo word "rehabilita-
tion" has been dropped from the lexicon of sentencing language, even
though the concept apparently remains a goal.
Commentary
While adopting punishment as the goal of the prison system may seem
harsh, it is celebrated as the final destruction of the so-called "medical
169. As we commence to summarize the new law, we will cite to code sections rather than
bill numbers. When reference is made to earlier forms of the new law, the bill number,
amendment date, section and page number, and amended code section will be used.
170. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(a)(2). Sections prohibiting probation also remain in full
effect. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11370; CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.06, 1203.07,
1203.11.
171. See generally Allen, Reflections on SB 42, 13 SANTA CLARA B. Ass'N J. 36 (1977). A
variety of cases, statutes and rules have limited "non-penal" commitments to state institutions
following conviction in criminal proceedings to the amount of time which might be served had a
prison sentence been imposed. Time to be served is limited to the maximum prison term which
could have been imposed in felony proceedings. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§726, 731 (Youth
Authority commitment), 6316.1 (mentally disordered sex offender proceedings). See also In re
Anderson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 38, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1977) (mentally disordered sex offenders); In
re Moye, 74 Cal. App. 3d 622, 141 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1977) (commitment to state hospital after
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity); In re Samuel C., 74 Cal. App. 3d 351, 141 Cal. Rptr.
431 (1977) (Youth Authority commitment); CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 453,
1373. No similar provisions have yet been adopted governing commitments of narcotic addicts
to the California Rehabilitation Center. These provisions raise numerous questions about what
is to be included in the maximum term of commitment. For example, is the maximum to be
simply the total time an adult felon could be subject to the jurisdiction of the state, including the
period of parole, good-time credits, and any revocation of parole? Or is each limit to be applied
to the analogous provision for juveniles and mentally disordered sex offenders? Will prosecu-
tors have to change their charging practices in juvenile court in order to plead the basic facts
which might support an enhancement? In short, the indirect effects of the new law on these
collateral proceedings are so extensive that another article would be required to discuss them.
172. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 410(c).
173. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 410(c).
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model."' 74 The new system treats the crime as a free, volitional act. 75 The
"new" theory did not clearly appear in the new law, however, until 1976-
the present wording was formulated in the last month before final passage of
SB 42.176 This shift in theory has created a semantic problem in the new
law. Under the indeterminate sentence law, a "term" included the total time
the state had jurisdiction over the prisoner. The parole date was the date of
release from actual custody, but the balance of the "term" was to be served
on parole. Under the new law, the prisoner must be released upon expira-
tion of his "term" less good-time credits, with parole acting simply as a
variable period of supervision after the end .of the term. 17 7 Parole is no
longer service of the term. AB 476 attempted to deal with this problem by
defining a "sentence" to include the period of parole.178 Thus, the former
concept of "term" becomes the "sentence" under the new law. "Term"
now means the period of actual confinement prior to release on parole. 179
B. New Penalties
Exposition
For most felons, the base term will be chosen from one of four specific
tripartite sentence ranges, which are: 16 months, two or three years; two,
three or four years; three, four or five years; or five, six or seven years.' 8
Two other types of sentences, however, do remain possible; specifically,
174. See generally AMERICAN FRIENDS COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 34-47 (1971).
175. The theoretical shift in the new law was discussed at some length at a June 2-3, 1977,
conference in Berkeley, California, at Boalt Hall entitled Determinate Sentencing and co-
sponsored by the Earl Warren Legal Institute and the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice. Participants from many parts of the nation attended and presented
scholarly papers (copy of report on file at Pacific Law Journal).
176. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 126; SB 42, 1975-
76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 121. An interesting last minute battle
was fought over the new theory's scope, for in a very early version of AB 476 a line was
inserted stating: "This declaration applies to persons sentenced under this section or Section
1168." AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §15, at 17. The declaration
referred both to punishment and to achieving punishment by terms proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense. This promised to create great confusion as to what information
could be considered in the parole of life-termers. For determinate sentences, a parole date is
computed by calculating good-time credits to account for in-prison conduct; but for life
sentences, no such precise computaton is made. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3041. Relating a
"punishment for the crime" theory to those serving life terms as well as to determinately
sentenced inmates would -have further confused the question of how great an effect in-prison
conduct and rehabilitation should play in setting parole for a person serving a life term. The
sentence was deleted by amendment, however, on June 24, 1'977. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular
Session, as amended, June 24, 1977, §15, at 15. See text accompanying note 577, infra.
177. CAL. PENAL CODE §42930-2932, 3000.
178. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000.
179. The new terminology is probably more consistent with most people's understanding of
a prison "term," that is, the amount of time spent in prison. But the new terminology will likely
lead to litigation. For example, Penal Code Section 1203.03(g) formerly credited both in-patient
and out-patient time spent at the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) to the "term" (which
included both prison and parole time). New Section 1203.03(g) credits only in-patient time to the
new "term." Narcotic addicts who spent time at CRC before July 1, 1977, and who are
excluded from CRC will surely attempt to have out-patient time credited to their new prison
"term" which now encompasses prison time only.
180. CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(a)(2). It should be noted that the four enumerated ranges are
not all inclusive as there may be other specifications of tripartite sentence ranges.
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life (with or without possibility of parole) and indeterminate sentences. A
life sentence is imposed for six crimes-first degree murder, kidnap for
ransom, trainwrecking, assault by a life prisoner, sabotage and injury by
explosives.' 81 One should also be aware that indeterminate sentences of one
year-one day have been retained for a few low-grade felonies for purposes
such as ease of extradition.182 An indeterminate sentence is imposed for the
"term prescribed by law" pursuant to Penal Code Section 1168(b).
Commentary
The sentences as they now appear remained relatively stable throughout
the development of SB 42, though there was some shifting downward. For
example, penalties for such common offenses as robbery, burglary, or
various sex offenses drifted downward prior to the passage of SB 42.183
Some of this appears to have involved altering the term for the substantive
offense in light of enhancement sections that add separate additional penal-
ties, so that the typical overall sentence was not actually reduced. In any
event, the drift was not substantial, involving a slip of only one range,
approximately one year.
Under the new law, the defendant is sentenced under one of the existing
three-choice ranges "or for any other specification of three time
periods." 184 Any attempt to increase dramatically the range for a particular
offense could be expected to run into serious constitutional challenge under
In re Lynch,I85 not so much for excessive time but because such an increase
would destroy its relationship to penalties for other crimes. Uniformity of
sentences among offenders committing the same offense under similar
circumstances is now a part of the statute's basic fabric. 186 If forcible rape
were suddenly increased by the legislature to 10, 20, or 30 years while other
181. See CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 16.72(a); CAL. PENAL CODE §§190, 209,219,4500, 12310.
See also Oppenheim, Computing A Determinate Sentence. . . New Math Hits the Courts, 51
CAL. ST. B.J. 604, 606 (1976).
182. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§270 (failure to provide for children), 502.7(f) (defraud-
ing telephone company), 597.5 (dog fighting). AB 476 attempted to make these crimes either
misdemeanors or felonies with terms in the 16 month, two or three year range, but such a howl
of protest resulted from either solution that the present anomolous structure was retained.
There may be other felonies in this indeterminate category whose indeterminate sentences were
not caught in SB 42 or AB 476, especially crimes amended during the 1977 Session, but the
authors are aware of only two. These are found in CAL. PENAL CODE §4011.7 and CAL. CIv.
CODE §1916-3.
183. Robbery: Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §138,
at 69-70 with SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §138, at 54-55 and
CAL. PENAL CODE §213.
Burglary: Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §207, at 97
with SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §207, at 82 and CAL. PENAL
CODE §461.
Sex offenses: Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §§175-
179, at 81-83 with SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 14, 1975, §§ 175-179, at 70-
73 and CAL. PENAL CODE §§286-288b.
184. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(a)(2).
185. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 431-32, 503 P.2d 921, 935-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 231-32 (1972).
186. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(a)(1); CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 410(g).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
forms of rape or child molestation remained at three, four or five years, 187
the reasonable relationship with other comparable crimes required by In re
Lynch would be destroyed.
Comment is also in order concerning conflicting predictions'88 that under
the new ranges, more felons will go to prison for more time, versus
predictions that SB 42 is a legal, mass jail break. So many factors affect the
length of terms under the new law's radically changed sentencing structure
that only future experience can provide any definitive answers. Despite this,
much speculation has been engaged in. Some have argued that to choose
medians under the old law as maximums under the new law benefits only the
hardened offender who upon release will immediately reoffend, sending the
crime rate soaring. Furthermore, it is argued that less time will be served
since those medians are further reduced by good time credits. Others have
pointed out that, ironically, the elimination of low minimum eligible parole
dates will mean that the less serious offenders will serve more time. Further,
should notoriety attend particular crimes, future legislative action is another
unpredictable factor, since a set of higher ranges could be enacted. The
reaction of district attorneys, judges, and public defenders to charging and
plea bargaining (now virtually sentence bargaining) under the new system is
hard to predict. Some penalties do seem higher. 18 9 Enhancement provisions,
freed of many limitations by AB 476, may add substantial actual time for the
multiple, violent offender. 190 Finally, the enhancement for large losses of
property is not merely an expansion of former law, but totally new. 191
Conclusive predictions at this time are simply not possible. 192
With all these qualifications in mind, only a few hesitant, educated
guesses can be made. First, it is almost certain that the total range of time to
be served for any given crime will be dramatically compressed. For exam-
ple, of all releases under the indeterminate sentence law during the period
from 1970 through 1975, for male felons convicted of second degree
murder, one felon had served only 19 months, while another had served 321
187. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§261(3), 264, 264.1, 288.
188. One of the better analyses of this problem is found in Comment, Senate Bill 42 and the
Myth of Shortened Sentences for California Offenders: The Effects of the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1176 (1977).
189. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §664 (penalty of five, six or seven years for attempt) with
CAL. STATS. 1953, c. 713, §1, at 1983. Although the term appears to be reduced, we predict that
actual time served under this statute will increase.
190. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §268, at -(the AB
476 amendments included crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment and prior use of
firearms in the commission of a crime as grounds for imposition of three-year terms). Compare
CAL. PENAL CODE §§12022, 12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §§304, at
-; 305, at -; 305.5, at-; 306, at -. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 with CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 1139, §273, at - (elimination of sentence limitations for violent felonies).
191. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6.
192. One ludicrous note is struck by CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(a)(2), which provides that if
the inmate's preimprisonment credit, from time in county jail awaiting trial, exceeds his term,
he need not even be delivered to the Department of Corrections. His conviction will, however,
be considered a prior term. CAL. PENAL CODE §I 170(a)(2).
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months. Various predictions about practices under the new law for the same
offense vary from 48 to 104 months.'93 Thus, even if median times served
remained the same, the upper and lower ends of the range will tend to shift
significantly toward the middle.
Second, it seems likely that whether more or less time is served on the
average depends upon the extent to which good-time credits are earned or
lost. If all credits over the entire term are earned by every prisoner, median
times will probably fall by about three months. If no credits are earned by
any prisoner, median times will probably increase by the same amount. And
since it seems likely that virtually all good-time credits will be earned by
most prisoners, the new medians may drop slightly.
Third, some judges have expressed the opinion to the authors that they are
now more likely to send marginal offenders to prison. Their attitude in the
past was to favor probation, since the high maximum terms under indetermi-
nate sentencing created the fear that the Adult Authority might actually keep
a marginal offender for an extended time. Now that a property offender can
be sent to prison for 16 months, which with good-time credits is about 10 2/3
months in prison, courts may use the prison sentence instead of a "bullet"
in county jail (12 months in county jail as a condition of probation) so
frequently used now. The actual time served would be about the same in
either case; after being reduced by the good-time credits that can be earned
under either the county jail sentence 194 or the prison term, 195 but the state
prison sentence is at state instead of county expense.
C. New Crime Definitions
Exposition
Some crime definitions have been altered by the new law's pattern of
separating the penalty for the substantive offense from the penalty for
certain factors aggravating the crime or that offender's commission of it.
Some offenses have therefore been changed by extracting from their defini-
tion the elements of being armed with a deadly weapon, using a firearm, or
causing great bodily injury. There is no longer, for example, first degree
robbery, only robbery with potential enhancements for the involvement of
weapons in the crime. 196 Rape, robbery and burglary with great bodily
injury have become simply rape, robbery or burglary, with a potential
separate enhancement. 197 Penal Code Section 209 formerly imposed life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for kidnapping for ransom or
robbery if injury was inflicted. Now kidnapping for robbery has a life term
with possibility of parole, regardless of injury under Section 209.
193. See note 93, supra.
194. CAL. PENAL CODE §4019.
195. CAL. PENAL CODE §2930.
196. CAL. PENAL CODE §§213, 12022, 12022.5.
197. CAL. PENAL CODE §§264, 213, 461, 12022.7.
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As to the offender himself, his prior history is also handled differently.
Rather than including an increased penalty for prior crimes within various
code sections, this factor is embodied in a single section. 198 The impact of
this change may be seen in the repeal of: (1) increased narcotics terms where
prior similar convictions were involved; 199 (2) Penal Code Section 3024's
scheme for minimum terms; (3) the habitual criminal statute;2°° and
(4) petty theft with a prior felony conviction. 20 1
Commentary
While we have become accustomed to certain definitions of crimes, it
would be well to reread them carefully under the new law, for even the
general pattern of change discussed above is not uniform. Special penalties
remain, for example, for battery with serious bodily injury. 202 Attempted
robbery, along with other special attempt crimes, 203 has retained a penalty 204
different from most attempted crimes. Some of these theoretically consistent
changes did not come about smoothly. 20 5
Early versions of SB 42 would have given prosecutors greater capability
to handle the career criminal. Originally, the habitual criminal statute was
retained 2°6 and the bill further created a separate provision for the continued
incarceration of inmates "physically dangerous to the public.' '207 The
proposed Penal Code Sections 1172.1 to 1172.8 would have allowed reten-
tion of those "dangerous" prisoners for two years at a time after application
to the committing court, a hearing, and in some cases, a jury trial. This
proposal was an obvious alternative to other civil commitment provisions
198. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5.
199. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY C.ODE §§11350, 11351, 11352, 11353, 11354, 11355, 11357,
11360, 11361, 11363, 11366, 11368, 11371, 11377, 11378, 11379, 11380, 11382, 11383. For
example, compare CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1087, §§1-3, at 2647-50 with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 11350-I 1352.
200. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §261.5, at-.
201. CAL. PENAL CODE §667. Eight days after this repeal became operative, however, most
of what was in Section 667 was incorporated into Section 666. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 296, at -.
Compare CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1905, §1, at 3896 (petty theft, with prior felony or petty theft
conviction, punishable by one to five years imprisonment) and CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §267,
at - (repeal thereof) with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §266, at - (incorporating most of repealed
elements into another still effective statute). This incredible legislative history leads one to
wonder whether petty thieves with prior criminal records are worth the effort.
202. CAL. PENAL CODE §243. The definition of serious bodily injury in Section 243 sounds
very much like that of great bodily injury in Section 12022.7.
203. See CAL. ADM. CODE §2166.
204. CAL. PENAL CODE §213 (refer to Penal Code Section 18 for punishment where statute
only provides for imprisonment in state prison); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §12310 (great bodily
injury is still an element of the offense covered by this explosives statute).
205. For example, the new law generally deletes prior felony convictions from the defini-
tions of various substantive crimes, but a few anomalies remain. Petty theft with a prior
conviction for petty theft, grand theft, burglary or larceny remains punishable as a felony. CAL.
PENAL CODE §666. Litigation over this section seems likely, since amendments to the section
were not signed by the Governor until after the new law went into effect. CAL. STATS. 1977, c.
296, §1, at -. In another example, Penal Code Section 647(a) still punishes child molesting as a
felony only if the defendant has previously been convicted of violating Section 288.
206. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §261.5, at-.
207. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 131-33.
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inadequate for the restraint of such criminals. 08 The extended incarceration
provision and the habitual criminal statute were, however, swept away in
the August 1975 attempt to get SB 42 through the Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice. 2°9 The rationale for deleting the habitual and dangerous
criminal provisions may have been that enhancements for prior prison terms
could handle the career criminal. Limitation sections, otherwise curbing
maximum time that could be given, did contain exceptions for certain
offenses based upon their nature or the manner of their commission.210
Minimizing even further the effect of these limitations on repeat offenders
was a priority of the authors of AB 476.211 The extended confinement of
dangerous criminals was a vestige of indeterminacy and presumed re-
habilitative concepts not in tune with the new law. Nevertheless, we may yet
see mentally disordered violent offender bills or career criminal bills bring-
ing back a limited version of the indeterminate sentence, as it were, through
the back door.2 2
The maneuvering over the reduction in penalty for kidnapping for the
purpose of robbery under Penal Code Section 209 provides another inter-
esting sidelight. This reduction was from life without possibility of parole to
life with possibility of parole in cases in which the victim is harmed.213 The
reduction in penalty was controversial, and the drafters were afraid that
expressly making the reduced penalty retroactive to offenders currently in
prison would endanger SB 42. Accordingly, they attempted to make it
retroactive through indirect means. Instead of flatly stating in the section
itself that it was retroactive, Section 1170.2(g) was added to the code,
stating that" [i]n the case of any inmate sentenced. . . prior to the effective
date of this section, who would have been sentenced under Section 1168
after the effective date of this section, the Community Release Board shall
provide for release from prison as provided for by this code." After a great
deal of head-scratching, one can conclude that the sole purpose of this
mysterious language is to make the changes in Section 209 fully retroactive,
and the drafters have indicated that that was indeed their intent. Upon advice
208. For example, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act allows establishment of a conservator-
ship for those who are "gravely disabled." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5350-5371. At the
expiration of the 14-day period of intensive treatment, those who can care for themselves, but
who are "imminently dangerous" may be incarcerated for 90 days. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§5300. This may presumably be repeated every 90 days if the requisite overt threat or violent act
is repeated. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5300. Several proposals to allow incarceration and
treatment of the mentally disordered violent offender are pending before the legislature. See
note 212, infra.
209. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 116-19.
210. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at-.
211. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §17, at 21-22.
212. See. e.g., SB 132, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 1, 1977 (retention of
mentally disordered violent offenders); AB 1770, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr.
20, 1977 (retention of mentally disordered violent offenders); AB 1959, 1977-78 Regular Ses-
sion, as amended, June 23, 1977 (retention of mentally disordered violent offenders).
213. This reduction was one of Assemblyman Torres' demands during the spring and
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of the Attorney General, the Community Release Board is applying the
reduced penalty retroactively. 214
D. New Community Release Board
Exposition
The Adult Authority and the Women's Board of Terms and Paroles are
replaced with a nine-member Community Release Board [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the CRB].215 These members are appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate to staggered four-year terms.
Initially, the CRB will include two members of the Adult Authority and two
from the Women's Board. Ultimately the CRB is to reflect "as nearly as
possible a cross-section of the racial, sexual, economic, and geographic
features of the population of the state.''216
The business of the new CRB will be conducted in panels of three with a
majority vote required upon any decision. The panel must include a majority
of full CRB members (gubernatorial appointees) if the decision to be made
involves the parole of an inmate serving a life sentence or the recom-
mendation that a disparate sentence be recalled. 217 CRB hearing officers
(civil service employees) may otherwise be used to hear cases and may
make decisions within policies enunciated by a majority of the total Com-
munity Release Board membership. 218
Commentary
The "reform" provision creating this new paroling agency reeks with
irony. One criticism of the old Adult Authority was that it was capricious,
arbitrary, and subject to the political pressures of the hour. Yet the new CRB
is to represent racial, sexual and other aspects of the population without a
word about competence or independence. Even the old law required minim-
al qualifications for membership, yet there appears to have been no attempt
to include requirements of competence in law, sociology, psychology, or
other disciplines under the new law. From the outset the quibble was
whether to say "racial, sexual, economic, and geographic" or whether to
simply say "demographic" features of the citizenry.219 It is probably naive
summer of 1976. See note 90, supra.
214. See Community Release Board Administrative Directive 771.
215. This was originally to be called the Men's Parole Board, but the drafters of SB 42
unfortunately opted for this inaccurate euphemism. Perhaps it was felt that use of a simple
name such as the "California Parole Board" would have been inconsistent with a system that
calls prisons a "men's colony" or a "conservation center." See CAL. PENAL CODE §§5075-
5082.
216. CAL. PENAL CODE §5075.
217. Unfortunately, the cross-reference in CAL. PENAL CODE §5076.1 to recall provisions in
CAL. PENAL CODE §1170 is partially incorrect. The reference is to (c) and (f), but (c) says
nothing about recall and subsection (d) of Section 1170 is obviously intended to be the reference
instead of subsection (c).
218. CAL. PENAL CODE §5076.1.
219. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §294, at 148(delineating racial, sexual, economic, and geographic features) with SB 42, 1975-76 Regular
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to expect that politics, in the broader sense, plays no role in the sentencing
process, which is essentially a moral, societal judgment. It is perhaps
impossible to guarantee competence and independence, and to exclude
"political influence." But if the drafters of the new law were attempting to
ensure qualified appointments to the CRB and to minimize political influ-
ence, it is hard to see how these concerns are reflected in the final product.
There is no institutionalized attempt to avoid the problems of the Adult
Authority so long inveighed against.
Whatever the Board's composition, one problem involves distinguishing
the duties of full members from the duties of representatives of the CRB.
This has been a troublesome problem since the the passage of SB 42, which
itself simply specified, "The board may employ representatives to whom it
may assign appropriate duties not restricted only to members by law. "220 It
then never said what those duties might be and key duties seemed to require
full member action since Penal Code Section 5076.1 restricted panels to
three members.221 As this ambiguity may well have caused thousands of
invalid hearings before courts interpreted panel requirements, the correction
of this section was in the* first version of AB 476.222 The ability of represen-
tatives to hear and decide cases, as they had in the past, was restored after
having been severely limited in SB 42; member participation, however, was
required for decisions such as granting parole to life-termers or recom-
mending a recall of sentence.
Finally, it is interesting to note that while the CRB has less total power
than its predecessor, its function still looms large. Aside from its control of
parole for inmates serving life terms and its new powers to review judicial
sentences for disparities, it sets parole conditions for all inmates and has full
power to suspend, revoke, and return parolees to prison. 223 It is the adminis-
trative body of last resort in appealing from Department of Corrections'
denial of good-time credit, or the setting of parole length or conditions. 224
Also, it retains the Adult Authority's relationship to the Department of
Corrections on matters of mutual concern. 225 Of course, for a time there will
Session, as amended, Apr. 28, 1975, §294, at 127 (deleting enumerated features) and SB 42,
1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §294, at 148 (reinstating the listed fea-
tures). Of course, there were also questions concerning length of tenure, number of members,
and the eligibility of former Adult Authority members to serve on the new CRB. Compare SB
42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §294, at 147 (providing for seven
members to serve four-year staggered terms) and SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended,
Apr. 28, 1975, §294, at 126-27 (conforming with prior amended version) with SB 42, 1975-76
Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §294, at 147 (providing for nine members and
permitting reappointment of former Adult Authority members) and CAL. PENAL CODE §5075
(requiring two former members each from both the Adult Authority and the Women's Board of
Terms and Parole).
220. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §296, at-.
221. Compare CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §296, at - with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §281,
at -.
222. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §83, at 65-66, as
enacted CAL. PENAL CODE §5076. 1.
223. CAL. PENAL CODE §§3040-3041, 3052-3053, 3060.
224. CAL. PENAL CODE §5077.
225. See CAL. PENAL CODE §5003.5. See also CAL. PENAL CODE §5055.
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be transitional duties in applying the new law to those sentenced under the
old law.2 26 What has been eliminated is the power to parole or fix terms for
most inmates who in the future will be under determinate sentences. Deter-
minately sentenced inmates sent to prison for crimes committed after July 1,
1977, will not be released on their court term, less good-time credits, and
the parole board will not be able to release them on parole earlier. Their
terms will be set by the sentencing court and their parole dates will be
mechanically computed by the Department of Corrections. It is to that term-
setting by the court that we now turn.
NEW SENTENCING STRUCTURE
Most sentencing under the new law will be determinate and will require
the following: (1) a determination of the base term; (2) the addition of
applicable enhancements 227 to the base term; and (3) a determination
whether any limitations affect the ultimate figure computed as the inmate's
final term. The legislature has declared that the punitive purpose of impris-
onment
is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the
offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offend-
ers committing the same offense under similar circumstances...
[and] that the elimination of disparity . . . of sentences can best
be achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in propor-
tion to the seriousness of the offense as determined by the Legis-
lature to be imposed by the court with specified discretion.228
In other words, the legislature is taking over criminal sentencing and the
discretion of the executive and judicial branches is accordingly
circumscribed.
A. Finding the Base Term
Exposition
The judge will undertake the prison term calculation only after con-
sidering and rejecting other alternatives229 such as probation230 or diagnostic
referral.2 31 If the judge decides to grant straight probation, suspending even
the imposition of sentence, then he will be free of the need to specify a
226. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2.
227. The drafters of SB 42 exhibited a true sense of gallows humor by use of the word
"enhancement." Serious thought was given to changing it in AB 476, but it was felt that the
word had gained such currency that it was already too late.
228. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(a)(1).
229. These alternatives include commitment to: the Youth Authority from adult court,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §1731.5; the California Rehabilitation Center as a narcotic addict,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§3050-3051; a state hospital as a mentally disordered sex offender,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6302.
230. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203, 1203.06, 1203.07, 1203.11.
231. CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.03(g). The judge should be aware, however, that while
preprison credit is earned for time spent on a Section 1203.03 referral, good-time credits under
Penal Code Section 1203.03 will not accrue during that time. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(a).
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term.232 Once the judge decides to impose a sentence, whether or not
execution of the sentence is suspended, the computation of the sentence is
now complicated by a miriad of new rules and criteria. The Penal Code now
provides that "[iln sentencing the convicted person, the court shall apply
the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council.' '233 Rules now exist setting
forth the general objectives of sentencing, the criteria affecting probation vel
non, and the criteria affecting probation in unusual cases. 234
In determining the sentence to be imposed, the court's discretion is now
circumscribed by the requirement that the middle term within the applicable
three term range be imposed, unless there are "circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation of the crime." 2 35 A finding of aggravated circumstances
permits the imposition of the upper term236 and, conversely, a finding of
mitigated circumstances permits the imposition of the lower term. Apparent-
ly the court may find these circumstances on its own motion after con-
sidering the ever present Judicial Council Rules on the subject, 237 and
reviewing the record in the case, the probation report, 238 and any Section
1203.03 reports. 239 Further, both the prosecution and the defense may
submit a document called a "statement in aggravation or mitigation"24° to
dispute facts otherwise presented or to present additional facts. This state-
ment must be submitted at least four days prior to sentencing, and at the
sentencing hearing further evidence may be provided.241 Finally, after
following all these criteria, reviewing all this material, and entertaining
statements and hearings, the court must, before imposing sentence, consider
various provisions in the new law that will affect the overall length of the
term. For instance, the court may not use the same fact both to set the upper
term and to enhance the length of that term under one of the six enhance-
ment sections.242 Given ranges of only one year off the middle term for the
crime itself, but enhancements as high as three or even five years, 243 the
decision to use a fact either to impose the upper term or to add an enhance-
232. CAL. PENAL CODE §I 170(b).
233. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(a)(2) (emphasis added); see CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div.
I-A, rules 410, 414, 416.
234. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 410, 414, 416. The Judicial Council is
given broad new duties to collect data, establish rules, and conduct training to promote
uniformity in sentencing. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 170.3-.6.
235. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(b).
236. For a detailed analysis of problems in this area, see Velman, Proof of Aggravation
Under the California Determinate Sentencing Act: The Constitutional Issues, 10 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. - (1977).
237. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 421, 423.
238. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 418 (mandates a presentence report).
239. CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(b).
240. CAL. PENAL CODE §I170(b).
241. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b). Judicial Council Rule 437(c), however, requires advance
notice if new matter is to be affirmatively presented at the sentence hearing for the first time.
See also CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 433.
242. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(b). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5, 1170.1, 12022,
12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7.
243. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7; see CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(d).
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ment can be just as critical as the decision to strike an enhancement or to
give consecutive or concurrent sentences.
Commentary
The basic sentencing provision, Penal Code section 1170, was subjected
to constant change throughtout the development of both SB 42 and AB 476.
Initially, the judge retained discretion to choose any term in the range. He
was simply to consider the Judicial Council Rules and state the reasons for
his choice. 244 .These generous provisions were eliminated in the August
1975 push to try to get SB 42 through the legislature that year and the judge
was required to choose the middle range unless one of the parties "moved
to aggravate" or "mitigate.''245 Limiting the court's choice of terms and
depriving the judge of the ability to set a higher or lower term on his own
motion was a point of controversy in the final version of SB 42.246 Other
changes to the basic sentencing section as SB 42 evolved dealt with: (1) the
timing of the motion to mitigate or aggravate, whether before or at the
sentencing hearing; (2) what information the judge could consider when
ruling on such a motion; and (3) the weight to be given to Judicial Council
guidelines. 247 Under the final version of SB 42, at least five major problems
remained: (1) the judge's hands were tied should the prosecution and
defense agree not to make motions in mitigation or aggravation; (2) it was
unclear whether the probation report and other hearsay material was proper-
ly considered in deciding which term to choose; (3) it was unclear whether
evidence of past conduct could be considered, as opposed to only evidence
directly relating to the crime; (4) the bill's reference to "trial judge" raised
a serious problem as to who could sentence where plea, or trial and
sentencing were bifurcated (such as upon revocation of probation) and
different judges participated in guilt and sentencing phases; and (5) the bill
contained a prohibition against dual use of facts that provoked serious
questions. 248
AB 476 immediately restored the judge's ability to find circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation on his own motion, thus enabling him to impose
an upper or lower term even if the prosecution and defense failed to make
244. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 127-28.
245. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 112.
246. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at -.
247. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 112; SB 42, 1975-
76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 126-27; SB 42, 1975-76 Regular
Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 121-23; SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as
amended, Aug. 26, 1976, §273, at 127-29.
248. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at -. An addition made in August 1976 stated:
"In no event shall any fact be used twice to determine, aggravate, or enhance a sentence." SB
42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 123. Did this include using a
fact to rule out probation? For example, if probation were denied because the rape victim had
been tortured, did that preclude use of the torture facts to impose a great bodily injury
enhancement? How could a record clearly show what facts were or were not used for all these
purposes, even if it could make the simpler showing that a fact was not used both to enhance
and set an upper term?
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such motions. It broadened the specification for what material might be
considered in mitigation or aggravation, required advance filing of state-
ments in mitigation or aggravation, and wherever the statute referred to the
trial court or trial judge, AB 476 substituted the word "court." '2 49
AB 476 also narrowed the broad prohibition against dual use of facts. 250
The problem, however, has not been entirely clarified. The law expressly
allows dual use of facts in some instances. 251 It may implicitly allow the
dual use of facts in other instances, such as where the enhancement252
includes within its scope a wide range of conduct. For example, if the
defendant not only brandishes but also fires the firearm, the question is
raised whether the brandishing is a sufficient fact to support an enhancement
under Penal Code Section 12022.5, and the firing is a sufficient fact to
support imposition of an upper term. On the other hand, it is possible they
are so closely related that they may support either an upper term or an
enhancement, but not both. 3 Similar arguments could be made where the
defendant not only injures but also tortures the victim. The problem of dual
use of facts will remain a headache for some time to come.
Several interesting questions also remain in the choice of the base term.
One is the evidentiary effect of the newly created "statement in mitigation
or aggravation."254 Is this really a motion, an argument of counsel drawing
attention to, but not itself constituting, evidence as contended by the Judicial
Council Rules?1 5 Or could a judge rely on allegations made in these
statements, if he lacked any other evidence on the point? The Judicial
Council repeatedly offered amendments during the last days of AB 476
trying to turn the "statement in aggravation or mitigation" into a motion
procedure without evidentiary value. 56 After the proffered amendments
were expressly rejected in the Assembly, in the Senate, and by the confer-
ence committee, the Judicial Council then adopted Rule 437, which clearly
treats the "statement" as a motion and indicates that factual matters therein
cannot be considered unless otherwise supported by competent evidence.
The rather broad comment to this rule declares that it would be unconstitu-
tional to do otherwise. The comment thereby either conflicts with a long line
249. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §15, at 17-19; AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §15, at 18-21; AB 476, 1977-78 Regular
Session, as amended, Apr. 19, 1977, §15, at 12-15.
250. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(b).
251. CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5(c)(8), 1170.1(d).
252. People v. Donnell, 52 Cal. App. 3d 762, 778-79, 125 Cal. Rptr. 310, 320-21 (1975);
People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 841 (1974)Z.People v. Reaves, 42
Cal. App. 3d'852, 856-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. 163, 165-66 (1974).
253. This problerh is very similar to the one posed by Penal Code Section 654, for which
there is presently no adequate answer. See note 379, infra and accompanying text.
254. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(b).
255. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 437.
256. Letter from James P. Corn, Assistant Director (Legislation) of the Judicial Council, to
Assemblyman Boatwright, May 23, 1977; letter from James P. Corn to J. Anthony Kline,
Governor's Legal Affairs Secretary (with attachments) (June 21, 1977) (copies on file at Pacific
Law Journal).
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of cases that allow hearsay to be considered in sentencing, or concludes as a
matter of law that factual matters contained in the "statement" are unreli-
able. 57 Resolution of this issue must await future litigation, but the question
underlines a more general problem of the weight that will be given to the
Judicial Council Rules where they diverge from or interpret the statute. For
example, the legislature decided that courts shall apply, not just consider,
these rules.5 8 In the rules that must be applied, however, the Judicial
Council declared at the outset that the rules are simply to be considered. 5 9 It
would seem that a rule could not directly contradict the statute, but clearly
the courts will give great weight to the Council's interpretation of an
ambiguous or vague statute.
Yet another unresolved issue as to basic sentencing involves the language
"circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime,''26° in Section
1 170(b). It was contended by the "liberal coalition" 261 that facts relating to
the crime itself could be considered by the court, but facts relating to the
defendant's background were excluded by the legislature's use of the word
"crime." It was argued that had the legislature intended to include back-
ground, it would have said "punishment," as it did in the probation
statutes. 262 The first version of AB 476 attacked this problem by changing
"crime" to "punishment," but a hasty retreat was made after the change
was severely criticized during committee hearings on the amended bill. 263
"Punishment" was changed back to "crime," despite an awareness of a
proposed Judicial Council Rule that included the defendant's background as
a circumstance in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 264 It can be argued
that this sequence of events constitutes a "reverse" legislative intent. That
is, having had the opportunity to change "crime" to "punishment," the
legislature expressly intended to exclude consideration of the defendant's
background when it rejected the word "punishment."
The current Judicial Council Rules reject this notion of reverse legislative
intent in the factors they set forth in mitigation and aggravation. 265 These
factors deal not only with the crime but also with the offender's criminal
history, his probation or parole status, his mental or physical state, his
257. The leading cases are cited in the comment as support for the rule. The comment
overlooks the long accepted practice of submitting hearsay information through a defendant's
presentence report authorized by Penal Code Section 1204.
258. CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170(a)(2).
259. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 408, 409.
260. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(b) (emphasis added).
261. See note 107, supra.
262. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.
263. Compare AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §15, at 16
with AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §15, at 20.
264. Judicial Council Rule 421(b), proposed at the time AB 476 was being considered by the
legislature, was subsequently adopted by the Judicial Council, and allows consideration of
"[f]acts relating to the defendant." CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 421(b).
265. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 421, 423.
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acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and his restitution to the victim.2" Con-
sideration of such factors may violate the guiding principle of uniform
sentencing for the same offense under similar circumstances. It can be
argued, however, that a sentence can justifiably be tailored to the individual
since the individual offender and his background constitute part of the
circumstances of the offense.
B. Adding Enhancements
Once the judge has considered Judicial Council guidelines, reviewed the
evidence specified in Penal Code Section 1170, heard any statements in
mitigation or aggravation, and finally made his choice of a base term for the
substantive offense, he may make further findings that will result in an
increase to the defendant's total term. The six means for increasing the term
are called "enhancements" or "additional terms.' '267 It is important to note
that, with the exception of consecutive sentencing, if the enhancements are
pleaded and proved they must normally be imposed by the court.268 If the
court decides to strike this additional time, it is the punishment, not the
finding, that is stricken or stayed. 269 Further, the court must state on the
record the mitigating circumstances that justify this action.270 The provision
making imposition of enhancements mandatory was a hotly contested matter
in the development of SB 42, one that almost cost the support of the
Attorney General.271 The result is clearly a compromise, emphasizing uni-
formity by generally requiring that the penalty be imposed but allowing for
some judicial discretion in appropriate cases.
For purposes of discussion, it is convenient to divide enhancements into
two categories, specific and general. Specific enhancements are those spe-
cifically relating to the crime, such as being armed with, or the use of, a
weapon,272 causing great loss of property, 273 or causing great bodily in-
jury.274 General enhancements result from prior prison terms275 and the
imposition of consecutive terms.27 6
266. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 421, 423.
267. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a), (c).
268. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(c).
269. The statute speaks of striking a mitigated enhancement, but it is unlikely that this
-language was intended to prevent staying the enhancement in lieu of striking it. We shall use the
word "strike" in the sense of staying the punishment.
270. CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170.1(g); see CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 445. This
procedure creates a presumptive enhancement, that is, one neither discretionary nor manda-
tory.
271. See, e.g., SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 130; SB
42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 125; letter from Evelle
Younger to Senator Nejedly (June 3, 1976) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
272. CAL. PENAL CODE §§12022, 12022.5.
273. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6.
274. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7.
275. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5.
276. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1.
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1. Specific Enhancements
a. Penal Code Section 12022(a)(b)
Exposition
Penal Code Section 12022 now adds one year to the base term if the felon
was armed with a firearm or personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon
in the commission or attempted commission of the felony. Involvement of a
firearm is so disapproved that merely being armed is sufficient for applica-
tion of the enhancement. One need not be personally armed with the
firearm, as any principal in the offense is subject to the enhancement.277 The
enhancement for the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, however, is only
applied for personal use.278
Section 12022, like other enhancement sections, specifies that the en-
hancement may not be added if such arming or such use is an element of the
substantive offense for which the person was convicted. Thus, double
punishment in the base term and the enhancement is avoided, just as Section
1170(b) generally avoids a double punishment that might occur through use
of the same fact to impose both an upper term and an enhancement.
Commentary
SB 42 advanced the concept of a one-year penalty for being armed with a
deadly weapon, and simply subsumed the definition by former Penal Code
Section 3024 of a deadly weapon into Section 12022.79 This approach,
while simple, created a hidden problem regarding the type of weapon to be
proscribed. Prior law punished the offender armed with a deadly or danger-
ous weapon only during the crime of first degree robbery, 280 and punished
being armed, either during the crime or at arrest, with a deadly weapon in
connection with other crimes under Section 3024.281 That section made
peculiar distinctions in defining what constituted a deadly weapon by
including within that definition a "slung shot," "sandclub," and knife with
a blade longer than five inches. 282 Adopting the narrower definition of a
deadly weapon in former Section 3024 eliminated from the prohibited
weapon category many weapons whose use could previously have resulted
in first degree robbery convictions. A second problem under SB 42 concern-
ed whether the defendant was to be personally or vicariously liable for the
penalty. Armed robbers were vicariously liable for the arming and use of
277. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022(a).
278. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022(b).
279. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §304, at -. Actually SB 42 initially specified a two-year
penalty. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §304, at 154.
280. CAL. STATS. 1923, c. 127, §, at 270; CAL. STATS. 1923, c. 128, §, at 271.
281. CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 1617, §3, at 2964-65.
282. CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 1617, §3, at 2965.
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weapons by their companions, and in recent years litigation over this
question attended the former arming and use provisions.2 83
AB 476 set about rectifying these matters by initially proposing to punish
merely being armed with any deadly or dangerous weapon and requiring
personal arming. 284 This was quickly changed to using a deadly or danger-
ous weapon, apparently to avoid the problem of punishing the defendant
who possessed an object that could have been used as a weapon, but was
not.285 Finally, Section 12022 was bifurcated into its present form, which
punishes in subdivision (a) being personally or vicariously armed with a
firearm and in subdivision (b) personally using any deadly or dangerous
weapon.
b. Penal Code Section 12022.5
Exposition
Penal Code Section 12022.5 requires a two-year enhancement for person-
al use of a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
The section contains the usual limitation prohibiting application of the
enhancement if use of a firearm is an element of the offense itself. Although
Section 12022.5 generally retains the form in which it was enacted by SB
42, the list of crimes to which the enhancement was once limited has now
been eliminated. 286 To make clear the legislative intent, the last sentence
specifies that one may impose the enhancement in a case of assault with a
deadly weapon under Penal Code Section 245.287
Commentary
Because Sections 12022 and 12022.5 both provide enhancements for
weapons, their legislative histories are interrelated. A change to one section
usually required a change to the other.288 The changes demonstrate clearly
that an appropriate gradation of culpability for possessing or using various
types of weapons was being sought. The final version of these sections
283. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 18 Cal. 3d 232,238-43,655 P.2d 306,309-12, 133 Cal. Rptr.
520, 523-26 (1976); People v. Hicks, 4 Cal. 3d 757, 764-65, 484 P.2d 65, 69-70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 393,
397-98 (1971).
284. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §91, at 69.
285. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended Apr. 12, 1977, §91, at 73.
It is, however, unfortunate that subdivision (b) of Section 12022 (colloquially called the
"arming clause") now refers to use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, thereby creating
confusion with the use of a firearm proscription of Section 12022.5 (the "use" clause). It was
unnecessary to change the phrase "armed with" to "use of" since former law spoke of being
armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon without any danger of punishing the person who
possessed an object that could have been used as a weapon, but was not.
For example, in People v. Bennett, 208 Cal. App. 2d 317, 325, 25 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (1962),
defendant's shoes were found to be a sufficient weapon after he used them to kick the victim's
head, causing numerous lacerations. Obviously, most robbers wear shoes but do not become
liable for armed robbery merely because their shoes could have been used as weapons.
286. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.5 with CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 954, §1, at 1900.
287. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.5.
288. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §92, at 70; AB
476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §92, at 73.
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definitely distinguishes possession or use of firearms, from other types of
weapons. Because of the close relationship of the two sections, they might
better be combined into a single section.
c. Penal Code Section 12022.6
Exposition
Section 12022.6 provides that if in the commission or attempted commis-
sion of a felony the perpetrator intentionally causes the taking, damage, or
destruction of property exceeding in value $25,000, an additional year may
be added to the sentence. If the value of the property exceeds $100,000, two
years are added. The statute specifically requires that the facts of such
damage in excess of the specified amount must be charged in the accusatory
pleading and must be admitted or found true by the trier of fact. 289
Commentary
The enhancement for great loss of property had a checkered history in the
course of SB 42 and AB 476. It did not appear at all in the March 4, 1975,
version of SB 42. Indeed, it did not enter the bill until 1976 and then its
monetary triggers were $100,000 and $500,000; it only applied where
taking was already an element of the crime; the definition of the crime itself
could specify no amount or an amount under $100,000; and the added
penalty was calculated on percentages of the base term for the crime, 50
percent of the base term added for amounts between $100,000 and $500,000
and 100 percent for amounts equal to or greater than $500,000. As with the
current law, the necessary facts had to be pleaded and proved. 290 Consistent
with the move to give judges the power to strike enhancements, such a
provision was added to SB 42 in August 1976.291 Unfortunately, the
enhancement was virtually emasculated by another assembly amendment
that excepted a sentence for the crimes of robbery, arson, and burglary292
from the addition of the enhancement, and this version of the enhancement
briefly became law. 293 As it was set forth in SB 42, the enhancement may
have been limited to white-collar crime and even the exceptions made little
sense. For example, one exception, burglary, involves entering with the
intent to commit any variety of felony,294 but does not necessarily involve a
taking, and therefore was already covered by an exception. Likewise, the
essence of robbery is not the amount taken but the manner in which it is
taken. 295 Further, arson would be one of the crimes to which the penalty
289. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6.
290. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §305.5, at 162.
291. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §305.5, at 155.
292. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 13, 1976, §305.5, at 149.
293. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §305.5, at -.
294. CAL. PENAL CODE §459.
295. CAL. PENAL CODE §211.
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would seem most readily applicable. The reasoning behind these exceptions
is not easily perceived.
AB 476 greatly expanded the enhancement's applicability and simplified
its calculation. The enhancement became applicable to any felony; the
numerical triggers were dropped to $25,000 and $50,000; and the penalty
itself became one or two years.296 What appears to be a wholly unnecessary
amendment, still extant in the new law, requires that the additional facts be
pleaded and proved. 297 At one point, the thought had apparently been
entertained to drop the entire enhancement.298 Section 12022.6 did, howev-
er, survive basically in its May 2, 1977, form.
One remaining peculiarity of the enhancement is that, unlike the other
penalties that relate to the manner in which the crime was committed,
Section 12022.6 does not by its own terms render itself inapplicable to
crimes in which taking or damage is an element of the offense. Nor does it
any longer require, as it did in SB 42, that taking or damage be an element
of the crime.299 This seems to open the way for a rather difficult multiple
punishment argument the first time the penalty is added to a crime in which
taking or damage is included.3 ° Moreover, to take a ridiculous example,
suppose $25,100 is taken. Can the one-year enhancement be imposed for the
first $25,000 and the upper term imposed considering the other $100 as an
aggravated circumstance resulting in the same term as though $100,000
were taken? Finally, if this enhancement is used frequently, we will see
some interesting valuation battles in criminal trials.
d. Penal Code Section 12022.7
Exposition'
Section 12022.7 represents an unsuccessful attempt to define specifically
what constitutes great bodily injury. As it now reads, this enhancement adds
a three year penalty to the sentence of an offender who personally and
intentionally inflicts great bodily injury in the commission or attempted
commission of a crime. Excepted from the enhancement are: great bodily
injury inflicted by accomplices; crimes in which great bodily injury is
already an element; and the specified offenses of murder, manslaughter, and
assault with a deadly weapon or assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury under Penal Code Section 245. The statute redundantly
296. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §93, at 71.
297. Compare AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, May 2, 1977, §93, at 58-59,
with AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, May 2, 1977, §17, at 14-16. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§1170.1(e), 12022.6.
298. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §93, at 74.
299. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.6 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §305.5 at -.
300. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §654 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170(b), 1170.1(d), 12022,
12022.5, 12022.7, and CAL. RULES OF COURT tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 441 with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022.6.
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requires the fact of great bodily injury to be pleaded and proved."° Great
bodily injury is defined as "significant or substantial physical injury." 302
Commentary
Infliction of great bodily injury once constituted an element in the defini-
tion of several crimes.303 Case law had developed a relatively flexible
standard for defining what type or degree of injury qualified, at least for
purposes of going to the jury.3 °4 Indeed, the first version of SB 42 contained
no separate enhancement for great bodily injury but continued instead the
pattern of increased punishment where that factor was involved. 30 5 The
change to a separate enhancement occurred in the assembly in August
1975,306 though the provision still drew upon existing law in defining what
constituted the offending conduct. It was in 1976, again in the assembly,
that a definition of great bodily injury was drafted. 307 In its final form, SB
42 defined great bodily injury as "a serious impairment of physical condi-
tion," which included any of the following: (a) prolonged loss of conscious-
ness; (b) severe concussion; (c) protracted loss of any bodily member or
organ; (d) protracted impairment of function of any bodily member or organ
or bone; (e) a wound or wounds requiring extensive suturing; (f) serious
disfigurement; or (g) severe physical pain inflicted by torture. 308
This definition drew the details fine indeed, and the section promised to
foment endless litigation over questions such as: how much unconscious-
ness is "prolonged;" is serious disfigurement a redundancy; how severe
must pain inflicted by torture be; and what constitutes torture? The overall
thrust of the list was also disturbing for those concerned with sex offenses,
where rather slight physical injury may have been accompanied by severe
psychological damage or breakdown. Finally, the section was not drawn in a
style consistent with other enhancements. It omitted the language of com-
mission or attempt to commit; it excepted "homicide offenses;" and its
exception of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
resided in a distant subsection. 309
Under AB *476, the "homicide offenses" in the exception were de-
fined, 310 the list of injuries was eliminated, and the exception for assault by
301. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7 with CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(e).
302. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7.
303. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1301, §3, at 2406 (former CAL. PENAL CODE §264 (rape)); CAL.
STATS. 1967, c. 149, §1, at 1216 (former CAL. PENAL CODE §1213 (robbery)); CAL. STATS. 1967,
c. 150, §1, at 1261 (former CAL. PENAL CODE §401 (burglary)). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 12309
(bombing).
304. See, e.g., People v. Cardenas, 48 Cal. App. 3d 203, 206-07, 121 Cal. Rptr. 426, 428-29
(1975); People v. Wells, 14 Cal. App. 3d 348, 356-59, 92 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195-97 (1971).
305. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §138, at 69-70; §154, at
75; §207, at 97; §316, at 158.
306. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §306, at 141.
307. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §306, at 162-63.
308. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §306, at-.
309. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at -.
310. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §94, at 72.
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means of force likely to produce great bodily injury was brought into the
penalty section itself.3" An interesting problem created by this section
arises from the fact that the final version of AB 476 provided that the great-
bodily-injury enhancement would not apply to the crimes of assault with a
deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury under Penal Code Section 245.312 The question of whether this
enhancement should apply to assault crimes was frequently raised during the
summer of 1976 by the staff of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee.
Arguing that "the definition of many crimes (assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a caustic chemical, etc.) imply or certainly practically
never occur without a weapon present or injury inflicted," the staff urged
that no weapons or injury enhancement be permitted in connection with an
assault crime.313 The argument was made that allowing an enhancement for
great bodily injury in assault crimes results in "the anomoly that the assault
crimes are going to be punished in the category of second-degree mur-
der" 314 since addition of three years to the two-, three- or four-year crimes
results in a five-, six- or seven-year punishment. Although it was recognized
that infliction of injury in an assault should be punished, it was felt that "on
a comparative scale," imposition of the upper term of four years was
sufficient. 315 The Chairman of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee
adopted this position.316 Overlooked was the absurdity that the criminal who
set out to rob his victim and inflicted injury could have been punished with
the injury enhancement, but the criminal who set out to injure his victim and
was successful, could not be additionally punished.
The argument that no great-bodily-injury enhancement should be permitt-
ed in conjunction with an assault crime was rejected in SB 42, but was
partially accepted in AB 476, as noted above. The public policy behind the
exception of some, but not all, assault crimes from the purview of this
enhancement is not at all clear, but was apparently the result of comprom-
ises reflected in the April 19 version of AB 476.317 The compromise leads to
the irony that assault with intent to commit murder under Penal Code
Section 217 can carry the injury enhancement, but assault with a deadly
weapon or murder cannot. The likely result is that prosecutors will charge
under Section 217 what formerly would have been charged as an assault
311. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §94, at 75.
312. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7. It is difficult to understand why this should have been
excepted when use of a firearm was allowed to enhance assault with a deadly weapon under
CAL. PENAL CODE §245. Factually one can easily posit an ADW-great bodily injury case. The
apparent reasoning was that a person convicted of ADW without injury would probably receive
a probationary sentence, and that to use an injury to enhance the crime would be tantamount to
double punishment.
313. Memo to Alan [Sieroty] and Jack [Knox] from Tom Clarke, Jr. and Mike Ullman (May
28, 1976) at 4 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
314. Memo to J. Anthony Kline from Mike Ullman (July 29, 1976) (copy on file at Pacific
Law Journal).
315. Id.
316. Memo from Alan Sieroty (Aug. 3, 1976) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
317. See note 110, supra, and accompanying text.
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with a deadly weapon. This again illustrates the need to redefine the crime
of assault, which now encompasses an excessively broad range of criminal
conduct. 318
One important element of the old concept of great bodily injury is now an
open question. Great bodily injury is now specifically tied to "significant or
substantial physical injury." 319 Psychological trauma, such as that resulting
from rape, may be excluded from this enhancement provision. One can
expect arguments that psychological damage should be included on the same
basis that case law had previously included it in the statutory language of
"great bodily injury."
2. General Enhancements
a. Penal Code Section 667.5
Exposition
While specific enhancements concern facts surrounding the crime, gener-
al enhancements focus on other crimes committed by the criminal. Section
667.5 provides an enhancement for his prior criminal history, if it has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt by felony convictions and the service
of prison terms. It is important to remember that whatever the continuing
relevance of prior felony convictions, the focus of Section 667.5 is on actual
service of a prison term and on the nature of the past and current felony
terms.
Penal Code Section 667.5 provides enhancements of either three years or
one year for each prior prison term served. A three-year enhancement is
added to a prison term under Penal Code Section 667.5(a) and (c) when: (1)
one of the current offenses is specified in subsection (c), which lists violent
felonies; 320 (2) the prior term in question also involved one of the offenses
listed in subsection (c);321 (3) the defendant served a "prior separate prison
term" for that prior offense; (4) the prior term is properly pleaded and
proved;322 and (5) the prior term is not cut off by a ten-year period during
which the defendant remained free of both prison custody and the commis-
sion of an offense that results in a felony conviction.
A one-year enhancement is added under Penal Code Section 667.5(b) if:
(1) either a current offense or the prior conviction in question is not listed in
subsection (c); (2) the- defendant servied a "prior separate prison term"; (3)
the prior term was properly pleaded and proved; and (4) the prior term is not
insulated by a five-year period during which the defendant remained free of
318. See text accompanying notes 354-355, infra.
319. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7.
320. The eight subsections of Section 667.5(c), while outlining more than eight offenses,
have become known as the dirty-eight or in more polite society, the listed violent felonies.
321. See note 320, supra.
322. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5(d), 1170.1(e).
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both prison custody and the commission of an offense that results in a felony
conviction. The difficulties in Section 667.5 center on ambiguities in the
definition of a prior prison term. Each element of this new concept of a prior
prison term has its own complexities.
A "prior separate prison term" is a "continuous completed period of
prison incarceration imposed for the particular offense alone or in combina-
tion with concurrent or consecutive sentences for other crimes . ... 323
Thus, the concept of a prior prison term emphasizes not the crime itself, but
the fact of the actual time served in prison. It begins when the defendant is
committed to prison on that first offense, even though concurrent or con-
secutive sentences may follow. It ends when the prisoner has been released
as discharged or on parole.324 Because of its close relationship to time in
prison, reimprisonment for escape or upon revocation of parole does not
start the running of a new and separate term, but is included in the old
term. 325 Perhaps the legislature felt that treating such reimprisonment as a
new term would give the sentencing judge or prosecutor too much leverage
from one antisocial period in the criminal's life. Such reimprisonment is
instead included in the term from which the inmate escaped or was
paroled. 326 Out-of-state convictions may qualify as prior terms if the offense
is punishable as a felony in California and if the offender served one or more
years in prison in the other jurisdiction.327 To determine the applicability of
the enhancement, the out-of-state felony is identified as the California
offense having all the same elements. Also qualifying as a prison term is
confinement in a state or federal penal institution as punishment for an
offense, even though that confinement might be called hospitalization.
328 If
the jurisdiction credits it as service of prison time, it may constitute a prior
term.
329
As important as the definition of the prison term, is the definition of the
five- or ten-year "washout period." This is a period during which the
defendant remained free of prison custody and did not commit an
offense that results in a felony conviction, and if present appears to prevent
further use of the prior prison term as a general enhancement. Again, we are
dealing with the concept of actual service of a term in prison to define when
the period runs. It begins to run when the prisoner has served the term, that
is, when he has been released as discharged or on parole. It is interrupted by
either actual prison custody or the commission of an offense that results in a
323. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(g).
324. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(d).
325. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(d).
326. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(d).
327. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(f).
328. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(h).
329. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(h), (i). An example of this is commitment for over
one year as a mentally disordered sex offender.
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felony conviction. 33° Thus, a felony conviction that results in probation with
a suspended sentence would interrupt the running of the "clean" time. 331
Similarly, the date the offense is committed is the critical date, even though
actual prosecution and conviction may have occurred beyond the five- or
ten-year mark.
It is interesting to note the scope of the current statute's specification of
violent felonies meriting a three-year enhancement when one of the current
offenses is also a violent felony. Subsections (1) through (7) are relatively
limited: (1) murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape
(under Penal Code Sections 261(2) and (3)); (4) sodomy by force, violence,
duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (5) oral copulation by force,
violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (6) lewd acts on a
child under 14 (Penal Code Section 288); and (7) any felony punishable by
death or imprisonment for life. 332 But subdivision (8) includes any felony
with a pleaded and proved enhancement for great bodily injury or use of a
firearm. To this broad sweep of offenses, Section 667.5(c) applies a special
declaration of the legislature that these crimes "merit special consideration
when imposing a sentence to display society's condemnation for such
extraordinary crimes of violence against the person." 333 While the court has
the power to strike the enhancement, such specific condemnation of crimes
that can range from a liquor store holdup to sodomy and murder will
doubtlessly give the judge extra pause when faced with such prior offenses.
Commentary
The method of enhancing under Penal Code Section 667.5 was constantly
amended to the.very end of the progress of AB 476 through the legislature.
This is understandable in light of the heavy burden this one section bears. It
is one of the few means of increasing time for the multiple offender; 334 and it
is the sole means of directly taking into account a violent and criminal
past. 335
The section began as a simple provision adding one year for each prior
prison term pleaded and proved. 336 In August of 1975, however, other
provisions for retaining the repeat offender were deleted, the habitual
criminal statute was repealed, 337 and provision for extended confinement of
330. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(a), (b).
331. A dismissal of the original charges after successful completion of probation as permitt-
ed by Penal Code Section 1203.4 will have an uncertain effect.
332. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c).
333. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c).
334. Consecutive sentencing requires more than one active term of imprisonment. CAL.
PENAL CODE §1 170. 1(a).
335. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 421,423. Although these rules include a
criminal past as one of numerous factors, they may be challengeable for failure to adhere
strictly to factors surrounding the crime rather than the criminal.
336. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §268, at 125.
337. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §261.5, at 106.
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dangerous offenders was abandoned. 338 By 1976, Section 667.5 had become
more complex, providing different guidelines for certain violent felonies
versus other felonies, setting up washout periods, and entering the morass of
defining when prison terms and washout periods began, when they ended,
and how they might be interrupted. 339
As it passed into law in SB 42, the enhancement provision for prior prison
terms had several serious defects. One was a problem of proof, for the
prosecutor was obliged to prove prior separate prison terms of "at least one
year in duration. "34 This obviously required more than the readily available
abstract of judgment because the sentence imposed would not necessarily
correspond to the actual term served, but there was confusion over which
records from the Department of Corrections would suffice to demonstrate
incarceration of the offender for a period of over a year. Another problem
was whether a prior term might be "resurrected" despite the passage of a
five- or ten-year washout period." The statute described a washout period
"immediately preceding" the filing of the current case.342 A repeat offender
might then be faced with his entire criminal past if his most current offense
was not immediately preceded by one of the washout periods. A third point
promising at least annoyance was that a felony conviction without actual
prison incarceration interrupted the ten-year washout period while only
actual prison custody interrupted the five-year washout period.343
Section 667.5 was extensively modified by AB 476. The pattern in SB 42
of adding a flat one or three-year penalty for each prior prison term was
reconsidered and the Assembly substituted instead a percentage of the total
term for the new offense as the penalty for each prior offense. 344 This
formulation of the penalty was, however, soon rejected, and AB 476
reverted to the one-year/three-year penalty pattern. 345 AB 476 redefined the
phrase "prison term" by eliminating the one-year minimum duration re-
quirement and excluding paroles revoked after a new felony commitment to
state prison.346 The list of violent felonies was expanded to include crimes
enhanced under Penal Code Sections 12022.5 and 12022.7. 347 The problem
of proving a prior separate prison term of "at least one year in duration"
was solved by eliminating the requirement that at least one year be served.
338. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 116-19. CAL.
PENAL CODE §3024, raising the minimum term and hence minimum release date for repeat
offenders, had already been repealed. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4,
1975, §279, at 137.
339. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §268, at 123-25; SB
42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §268, at 117-20.
340. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §268, at-.
341. See text accompanying notes 330-331, supra.
342. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §268, at-.
343. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §268, at -.
344. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §13, at 12.
345. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §13, at 11-14.
346. CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5(e), 667.5(g).
347. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §13, at 13.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
Presumably, then, a copy of the readily available abstract of judgment now
satisfies proof of a prior prison term in state prison. 348 AB 476 then
corrected the definition of the washout period indicating that once a prior
term was followed by the statutory washout period that term could never be
used as a basis for adding an enhancement to a later sentence. Also, the
events capable of interrupting the five- and ten-year washout periods were
made uniform. 34 9
While Section 667.5 has been greatly clarified, it still promises to raise its
share of issues. The fact that washout periods are interrupted by "prison
custody" as well as the commission of a new felony raises the problem of
how prison custody in the context of a referral under Penal Code Section
1203.03, or a later recall of the sentence under subsection (d) or (f) of Penal
Code Section 1170 are to be treated. In either situation, sentencing or
resentencing the defendant for a felony if the crime is a misdemeanor/felony
would moot the question, because the washout would be interrupted by a
felony conviction. But if a misdemeanor sentence is ultimately imposed,
will prior prison custody pursuant to a diagnostic referral or before recall of
a sentence interrupt clean time? If so, perhaps resentencing as a misde-
meanor will restore an uninterrupted washout period.
One intriguing aspect of Section 667.5(a) is its "poison the well" quality.
If any one of the new offenses committed by a defendant is one of the listed
violent felonies, each prior prison term for a violent felony will merit a
three-year, rather than one-year, enhancement. This gives interesting lever-
age to the prosecutor in the charging and plea bargaining process. A more
fundamental problem concerns the arbitrariness of the list of violent felonies
contained in Section 667.5(c). The list defines as violent some crimes that
often do not involve actual injury to the victim, such as lewd acts on a child
or the armed holdup, but excludes many crimes that frequently involve
actual injury to the victim, such as assault with a deadly weapon, assault
with intent to commit murder, and attempted murder. A hidden, though
significant anomaly allows severe punishment for lewd conduct with a child
under 14350 even without actual violence, but either oral copulation 351 or
sodomy 352 with the same child is not on the list. Because placement of a
crime on this list has such severe consequences on the amount of increase in
penalty and on the elimination of limitation provisions, 353 it is likely there
will be a yearly legislative battle to expand or contract the list. The problem
349, See CAL. PENAL CODE §969b.
349. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 19, 1977, §13, at 8; AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 6, 1977, §13, at 19; AB 476, 1977-78 Regular
Session, as amended, June 14, 1977, §13, at 18-21.
350. CAL. PENAL CODE §288.
351. CAL. PENAL CODE §288a(c).
352. CAL. PENAL CODE §286(c).
353. See text accompanying notes 404 and 409, infra.
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is essentially one of defining the culpability of crimes within the definition
of the crime itself. This was of little consequence under the indeterminate
sentence law since the parole board was supposed to exercise discretion in
assigning culpability based on the actual facts of the crime, regardless of the
code section under which the defendant was ultimately convicted. Now that
a set penalty is tied directly to the crime, this determination of culpability
has become a much more acute problem. As pointed out in People v.
Wingo, 14 the crime of assault can range in culpability from the drunk who
takes a swing in a bar fight all the way to the street hoodlum who stomps an
old man to death on the streets of San Francisco, as occurred in Wingo.
Under the new law, both defendants are subject to base terms of two, three
or four years. Hopefully, this difficulty will result in pressure on the
legislature to define more narrowly the range of criminal conduct proscribed
by any given criminal statute and to subdivide the "wide range" crimes
discussed in Wingo. 3 55
One last note is in order. Section 667.5 nowhere precludes imposition of
the enhancement if the prior term is an element of the offense. For example,
a violation of Penal Code Section 647(a) is ordinarily a misdemeanor but
becomes punishable as a felony if the defendant was previously convicted of
violating Section 288. Apparently, if the prior conviction under Section 288
resulted in a prison term, the present violation of Section 647(a) is not only a
felony, but also subject to an enhancement for that prior prison term.
b. Penal Code Section 1170.1
Exposition
The second general enhancement, consecutive sentencing, brings us to
the only penalty section356 that allows the judge openly to consider rather
subjective factors in making a sentencing determination. Apart from the
basic requirement that the defendant be convicted of more than one currently
active felony, this enhancement provision is restricted almost exclusively to
the calculation of the consecutive term enhancement, rather than defining
when the enhancement may be-imposed. Once the judge has considered the
multiple punishment aspects of Penal Code Section 654 and any merger
problems under Penal Code Section 669, and has chosen or been compell-
ed357 to sentence consecutively, he faces a difficult calculation problem. A
consecutive term is calculated by adding the principal term, all subordinate
354. 14 Cal. 3d 169, 176-77, 534 P.2d 1001, 1007-08, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1975).
355. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 176-77,534 P.2d 1001, 1007-08, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-
04 (1975).
356. While under the old law one thought of consecutive sentencing simply as a mode of
sentencing and not a penalty like arming or use, it is now listed as an enhancement in Penal
Code Section 1170(b) and it does involve a computation that adds a numerical increment to the
term.
357. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§4501, 4501.5, 4502, 4503, 4530, 4532.
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terms for consecutive offenses and any enhancement for prior prison
terms.
358
The principal term is the greatest term the court can impose based on any
of the offenses then before it or based on other currently active terms.359 The
court may impose consecutive sentences for two or more felonies "whether
in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and
whether by judgment rendered by the same or by a different court. . . .. 60
In determining which term is the greatest, and therefore principal term, the
court considers both the base term to be imposed (upper, middle, or lower,
as appropriate) and the enhancements added to the base term under Penal
Code Sections 12022, 12022.5, 12022.6, or 12022.7. Hence, rape with
great bodily injury may result in a greater term than second degree mur-
der, 361 even though the base term for rape is lower.
The subordinate terms are computed by taking one-third of the middle
term prescribed for each of the remaining felonies to be sentenced consecu-
tively.362 This is not one-third of the actual term imposed, but is merely a
computational device. Specific enhancements are not included in this com-
putation unless an offense is one of the listed violent felonies in Section
667.5(c). In such case the subordinate term for that offense consists of one-
third of the middle term and one-third of any enhancement imposed under
Penal Code Sections 12022, 12022.5, or 12202.7. Section 1170.1(a) im-
poses a five-year limitation on the total of subordinate terms for offenses not
listed in Section 667.5(c), excepting those enumerated violent felonies from
the five-year ceiling on the overall duration of subordinate terms. The
principal term, all subordinate terms (perhaps grouped into violent and
nonviolent categories) and any enhancements for prior prison terms363 are
then added to compute the total term. 364
Penal Code Section 1170.1(b) provides for imposition of consecutive
terms where one or more of the felonies were committed in prison or
involved an escape from prison. If one such felony is committed, the
consecutive term "shall commence from the time such person would other-
wise have been released from prison." 365 If, however, two or more felonies
are committed while the inmate is in prison or during escape from prison and
358. Prior prison terms must be separately considered since, unlike other enhancements,
they attach to the offender, not one of the particular offenses.
359. If it were not still being served, it would be a prior term handled under Penal Code
Section 667.5. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(d) (definition of when a term is deemed ended).
360. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a).
361. Assuming use of the middle term, rape at four years plus three years for great bodily
injury exceeds six years for second degree murder. CAL. PENAL CODE §§190, 264, 12022.7. If
there are circumstances in aggravation justifying an upper term, the figures for rape would be
five plus three years.
362. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a).
363. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5.
364. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a).
365. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(b).
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the new offenses are to be served consecutively, a principal term and
subordinate term are calculated following the method described in Section
1170.1(a). These terms, then, must be served after the date the inmate
would otherwise have been released. Furthermore, the five-year limit on
subordinate terms does not apply to these offenses.
Section 1170.1 is silent on the question of how the court is to exercise its
discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence. The only guidance is found
in California Rules of Court, Rule 425, and it provides only the most general
guidelines.
Commentary
The legislative history of the code section providing for consecutive
sentencing was characterized by experimentation with the definition of the
term "consecutive." Running the full term for each offense in tandem was
rejected from the outset. The consecutive sentence enhancement under
Section 1170.1 began as the straightforward addition of one year for each
lesser crime (paralleling the early version of Section 667.5)366 to the "great-
est term of imprisonment" imposed by the judge.3 67 The consecutive sen-
tence enhancement was intended to apply to all active terms, even those
derived from convictions in other than the present sentencing court. In 1976,
Section 1170.1 took on its current complex form, specifying that the
"greatest term of imprisonment" included enhancements but that lesser
terms were computed by adding one-third (originally one-half) of the middle
term excluding all enhancements. Poor language in the statute gave the
impression that the enhancement for prior prison terms was to be excluded
from the total calculation, 368 a problem that was corrected by AB 476.369
From the inception of AB 476, new ways were sought to increase the
length of time that could be added under this enhancement. At first AB 476
provided that the lesser terms were to be computed by taking one-half of the
middle term including enhancements for each such offense.3 70 Then the
terminology of principal and subordinate terms appeared and a provision for
more severely punishing subordinate terms for violent felonies (listed in
Penal Code Section 667.5(c)) was added.371 Finally, AB 476 provided that
one-third of any enhancement imposed could be added to subordinate terms
involving the listed violent felonies. 372 The resulting Section 1170.1, in
comparison to the consecutive sentencing provision in SB 42, 3 73 does
provide a longer term for the multiple, violent offender. For some of the
366. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §268, at 125.
367. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 128.
368. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 124-25.
369. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170 1(a).
370. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §17, at 20.
371. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §17, at 21-22.
372 AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, May 2, 1977, §17, at 15.
373. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at -.
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worst felonies, it includes in the computation a proportion of the enhance-
ments imposed for arming with or use of weapons, and causing great bodily
injury,374 It includes enhancements for prior prison terms without the limita-
tion that was imposed by an earlier version of SB 42. 31 It does, however,
limit the time added for nonviolent consecutive offenses to five years. 3
76
Because of the many problems associated with consecutive sentencing, the
remainder of this commentary is broken down into various categories.
i. Disparity in Sentencing
The relatively subjective nature of the decision to sentence consecutively
creates the danger of disparity in sentences imposed by different judges, and
it is likely to pose major problems for the Community Release Board in
performing its disparate sentence review function. Should a particular
judge's sentences be too inconsistent with the sentencing practices of other
judges, the anomalous cases will likely reappear for resentencing due to the
disparity. 37 7 Reference made to the Judicial Council Rule governing this
decision does not give assurance that merely following the guidelines will
avoid that disparity. Rule 425 simply refers to the factors in mitigation or
aggravation and states new factors sounding very much like the considera-
tions used to determine whether multiple punishment under Penal Code
Section 654 is involved. In short, the factors are so subjective in nature that
consecutive sentencing is the one area in which the judge's discretion
concerning imposition of the enhancement remains least circumscribed,
ii. Multiple Punishment
This leads to another serious problem indirectly related to consecutive
sentencing. Before a court can impose sentence, it must first determine for
which crimes a sentence can be imposed without causing multiple punish-
ment as prohibited by Section 654. The existing doctrine, developed since
Neal v. State,378 is inadequate to discern clearly when the proscribed
multiple punishment may occur. The tests provided in case law are confus-
ing, vague, and difficult to apply to factual situations. The issue is frequent-
ly raised on appeal, and the doctrine has been subjected to scholarly
criticism. 379 It seems probable that the doctrine will break down under the
determinate sentence law because each separately punishable offense can
now result in additional time in prison, a result which was not clear under
former law. Judges as well as attorneys should pay close attention to the
374. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §19, at -.
375. See text accompanying note 416, infra.
376. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 165, §19, at-.
377. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1 170(d), 1170(f). See text accompanying notes 453-457, infra.
378. 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960).
379. See Comment, Multiple Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 217 (1970).
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multiple punishment doctrine, for a count stayed under Section 654 is a
count that cannot result in a consecutive sentence.
iii. Equal Principal Terms
How does the court choose the greater offense to be the principal term
where offenses with different base ranges yield identical terms after specific
enhancements are added to the respective base terms? Choosing the term
that includes specific enhancements as the principal term will always result
in a longer total term, since the specific erhancements that would be
excluded from the subordinate term will have already been included in the
principal term.
AB 476 solved this problem for many violent crimes by allowing one-
third of the enhancement to be added for subordinate terms. Hence, assum-
ing use of the middle term as the base term, it will make no difference in the
length of the consecutive term whether the judge computes the principal
term based on the offense of second degree murder or robbery with great
bodily injury. 380 The choice of offense to be the principal term will,
however, still make a difference in the duration of a consecutive term for a
great variety of other crimes-for example, the combination of robbery and
second degree burglary with excessive taking. 8 1 Is the judge's choice to be
guided by rule, by accident, or by the judge's inclination to be severe or
lenient? Logically, the choice should depend on the relative culpability of
the offender, comparing the two offenses. Certainly, depending on the
victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the criminal's
motivation, robbery might be a more or less serious offense than burglary
380. Taking the middle term from the range of five, six or seven years specified for second
degree murder, the principal term would be six years. CAL. PENAL CODE §190. Similarly, taking
the middle term from the range of two, three or four years specified for robbery and adding the
three-year enhancement for causing great bodily injury, a principal term of six years results.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§213, 12022.7. If second degree murder is chosen as the principal term and
robbery as the subordinate term, the consecutive sentence is computed as follows:
6 + [(1/3 x 3) + (1/3 x 3)] = 8 years
If robbery is the principal term and second degree murder is the subordinate term, the
consecutive sentence is computed as follows:
(3 + 3) + (1/3 x 6) = 8 years
Compare these with the computation under SB 42 if second degree murder is chosen as the
greatest term, which would be:
6 + (1/3 x 3) = 7 years
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at .
381. Again assuming that the middle term is selected, the range for robbery (two, three or
four years) would result in a principal term of three years. CAL. PENAL CODE §213. For burglary
the range is 16 months, two, or three years and the enhancement for excessive taking (assume
over $100 but under $25,000) is one year, resulting in a principal term of three years. If robbery
is selected as the principal term and burglary is the subordinate term, the consecutive sentence
is computed as follows:
3 + (1/3 x 2) = 3 2/3 years
If burglary is selected as the principal term and robbery is the subordinate term the consecutive
sentence is computed as follows:
(2 + 1) + (1/3 x 3) = 4 years
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with excessive taking. 382 Perhaps judges can simply avoid the problem by
imposing the mitigated or aggravated term for one of the offenses. 383
iv. Different Proceedings or Courts
Putting aside this comparatively simple problem, let us address one of
Section 1170. I's more serious lacunae. Assuming a crime spree that results
in several convictions in different courts, can the last judge to sentence the
offender rearrange the consecutive or concurrent pattern that prior judges
have placed on the convictions that occurred in their courts? For example,
Judge A sentences the offender on three counts concurrently. Judge B in a
new case wishes to impose a consecutive sentence. Is Judge B's sentence
consecutive to the longest of the concurrent counts or does Judge B consider
and sentence for every felony, including those that had been before Judge
A ?384 This seems at first glance to be a problem easily resolved since Penal
Code Section 1170. 1(a) specifically refers to felonies, not to sentences. It
seems to direct attention to each offense, not each term of imprisonment
imposed by the court, and one would therefore lean toward the second
result. Furthermore, Section 1170. 1(a) is an artificial, mathematical formula
for reaching a figure to impose as the penalty for a multiple offender.385 This
is emphasized by the use. of one-third of the middle term for subordinate
offenses, disregarding the actual term chosen by the court for each offense.
This suggests that Judge B may recalculate the term for each felony,
disregarding Judge A's decision.
Adopting the view that the term for every felony may be recalculated,
however, raises statutory, and possibly constitutional problems. First, does
the last sentencing judge have the statutory power to negate the earlier
judge's choice,386 which may be based on a plea bargain? Is Section 1170.1
specific enough to give him that power, or does it simply fail to address the
problem? One might seek help in the fact that Section 1170.1 refers to
"sentences imposed" under Penal Code Section 669. Indeed, some of the
language in Section 1170.1(a) is similar to Section 669, which was not
changed by SB 42 or AB 476. The temptation is to carry over into the new
law the method of calculation under Section 669. But when Section 669
382. Compare for example, robbery of a social security check from an elderly, frail victim
and burglary of a well-insured jewelry store or robbery of a wallet from a wealthy, unarmed
adult versus burglary and destruction of all the worldly belongings of a widowed pensioner.
383. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 421,423, guiding imposition of a mitigated
or aggravated term, do not include numerical manipulation as a mitigating or aggravating factor.
This is apparently a sentence choice requiring statement of reasons. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit.
2, div. I-A, rule 405.
384. Stated in another manner, if Judge A sentenced concurrently on three counts of
robbery and Judge B also has a robbery conviction before him for sentencing, does he give four
years (3+ (1/3 x 3)) or does he give six years (3 + (1/3 x 3)+ (1/3 x 3) + (1/3 x 3))? To do the
latter is to make Judge A's sentence consecutive internally as well as externally to Judge B's
sentence.
385. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(b).
386. On sentencing, see generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§1191-1208.5.
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refers to imposing a consecutive sentence, it refers to "term of imprison-
ment," and thus retains the interal pattern of the prior judge's convictions.
Section 1170.1 with its reference to "crimes" and "felonies" arguably
does not.
Second, while a full discussion of all possible constitutional implications
is beyond the scope of this article, we might at least suggest that some due
process or ex post facto problems may be involved in the failure to retain the
prior court's pattern of sentences. Effectively making consecutive, sen-
tences that were concurrent, may be an increase in penalty fitting one of the
ex post facto categories. 387 Making previously concurrent sentences run
consecutively may also violate the doctrine of finality of judgments388 and
deprive the offender of a vested and substantial right or vitiate an earlier plea
bargain. Certainly, this sentencing roulette will lead to "judge shopping"
where crimes are being separately tried, for a tough last judge could undo
any leniency in the earlier sentence. A proper solution would require the
subsequent sentencing judge to leave the prior judgments as they stand and
make the new sentence consecutive to the longest earlier concurrent term.
v. Concurrent Sentence-More Time in Prison
The sentencing court in a subsequent proceeding may have to compute the
sentence both consecutively and concurrently to determine which results in
more time served. A well-intentioned judge should not automatically impose
a concurrent term assuming it will always result in less time than a consecu-
tive term. Unusual as it may sound, a concurrent term may not be shorter
than a consecutive term if sentence is imposed on a new offense while the
defendant has almost completed a current active term. Pursuant to Penal
Code Section 2900 the prison term commences upon reception of the
defendant into prison. If the defendant is subsequently sentenced to a term
that is to run concurrently with the active term, the concurrent term will
commence upon reception in prison on the new term,389 even if the defend-
ant is serving a currently active term. Thus, a concurrent sentence of three
years imposed towards the end of an active term being served will add
almost the full three years, there being only a brief period during which the
two terms overlap. On the other hand, if the three-year sentence is to run
consecutively with the active term, the defendant will presumably have the
additional increment added to the term already being served. 390 Thus, the
387. See People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458, 472, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519, 528"(1973); U.S.
CONST. art. 1, §9; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §16.
388. See Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 179-80, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383, 392-93
(1977) (finality of judgment) and the cases cited therein.
389. CAL. PENAL CODE §2900.
390. This assumption that the consecutive incremental term for the new offense (subordi-
nate term) is added to the principal term for the prior offense is made only because of the lack
of a better alternative. The situation becomes hopelessly confused when one contemplates the
possibility that the new offense may carry a greater term than the old, and therefore becomes
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additional three-year term imposed consecutively might add only one year
(one-third of three years) to the active term since that term would be the
principal term and the later term would be added as a subordinate term.391
Consequently, the trial judge may have felt he was doing the defendant a
favor by imposing a concurrent sentence rather than a consecutive sentence,
but the road to the appellate court is paved with good intentions. 392
vi. Combination of Determinate and Indeterminate Sentences
Another area of confusion is the order393 in which an offender should
serve consecutive sentences for a combination of determinate and indetermi-
nate sentences. 394 This situation can arise if the defendant is sentenced for an
indeterminate, nonlife offense, or for an offense committed prior to July 1,
1977. In the latter event, presumably the Community Release Board would
retroactively calculate a determinate term for the indeterminate offense and
then combine this term with the determinate term imposed by the court for
the post-July 1 offense in the same manner as though the consecutive
sentences had been imposed in different proceedings. In either event, which
term should be served first, the discretionary, indeterminate term, 395 or the
fixed, determinate term?
The Judicial Council has decided, by rule, that the offender must serve
the indeterminate sentence first. 396 This rule raises conceptual problems, for
apparently the determinate term cannot begin to run until a decision is made
by the CRB that the offender should be released on the indeterminate term.
If that indeterminate parole date is later rescinded, presumably the determi-
nate term goes back into limbo until the CRB establishes a new parole date
for the indeterminate term. In short, the offender cannot be sure of when his
determinate term will begin until he has actually reached his indeterminate
release date, or has reached the maximum of his indeterminate term.
A more easily understood procedure would require that the determinate
term be served first. The determinate term, reduced by good time credits,
the principal term. Presumably, the total term for both offenses would still commence to run
from the defendant's prison reception date on the first (now subordinate) offense. At this point,
logic breaks down, for the prisoner might have already served more time than the first (now
subordinate) term, and thus have begun serving time on the new offense before it was even
committed! See In re Park, 63 Cal. App. 3d 963, 134 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1976).
391. The total new term is subject to reduction by any applicable "preprison" credits. CAL.
PENAL CODE §2900.5.
392. See note 663, infra.
393. Section 1170.1 specifically does not address this, for subsection (a) limits the provi-
sions to sentences under Penal Code Sections 669 and 1170. Indeterminate sentences are
provided for in Penal Code Section 1168(b).
394. Life sentences would apparently cause other active sentences to merge, precluding
imposition of consecutive sentences. See CAL. PENAL CODE §669. This merger doctrine is likely
to be challenged, since a life sentence is no longer for life, it is discharged three years after
release on parole. It is still possible to have indeterminate sentences even under the new law,
however, since sentences such as those not exceeding one year and a day remain. See text
accompanying note 182, supra.
395. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2931, which requires that the prisoner be advised of his
tentative release date, an impossibility if an indeterminate term runs first.
396. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 451.
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would then act as a period of parole ineligibility, followed by release on the
indeterminate term with its period of parole taking effect.397 This approach
has the advantages of more closely approximating the traditional parole
model (a mandatory minimum period of time in prison, followed by a period
of eligibility for parole) and of being easier to administer. It has the
disadvantage of conflicting with the Judicial Council Rule. This may become
an issue as the Judicial Council conducts new hearings on its rules during the
spring of 1978.
vii. Repeated Prison or Escape Offenses
Yet another problem with Section 1170.1 involves consecutive terms for
prison and escape offenses under Section 1170. 1(b). This problem is likely
to arise in many cases since most mandatory consecutive terms are for such
offenses. 398 We have already discussed how these sentences are com-
puted, 399 but consider the situation of the prisoner who stabs several people
during the first year of imprisonment, receives consecutive terms for the
offenses, and several years later while still a prisoner, repeats the crimes.
Are the new crimes to be figured as principal terms or as subordinate terms
with the earlier series, using the one-third method of Section 1170.1 (a)? Or,
are they to be computed independently for their full value, and "commence
to run from the time such person would otherwise have been released from
prison?" The last two sentences of subdivision (b) control, but provide little
guidance. The first sentence requires that "the new offenses . [which
are] consecutive with each other"4° be calculated as provided in subdivi-
sion (a), implying that it is possible to have a series of new offenses, and to
have each series commence to run upon termination of the previously
imposed term. The next sentence, however, provides that "the provisions of
this subdivision shall be applicable in cases of convictions of more than one
offense in different proceedings, and convictions of more than one offense
in the same or different proceedings," thus indicating that the offenses are
to be computed as principal or subordinate terms with the earlier offenses.
While the legislative intent is probably the former, it is a close question.
viii. Relationship to Prior Prison Term
We shall avoid such practical nightmares as how a court informs itself of
all felony proceedings currently in progress against the defendant and what
the trial court does when the appellate court reverses a principal term in a
series of consecutive terms involving different courts. One final problem,
however, deserves mention. The calculation in Section 1170.1(a) adds the
397. But see CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 451.
398. See note 357, supra.
399. See text accompanying note 365, supra.
400. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(b).
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principal term, the subordinate term and "any additional term imposed
pursuant to Section 667.5." If there were several convictions in separate
courts that are now being consecutively sentenced by a later court, there
may well be duplications and omissions in what prior terms were pleaded,
proved, and imposed by the various judges. A question arises as to whether
the later court is to include all additional terms imposed pursuant to Section
667.5 in its computation of the consecutive sentence. There are three
possibilities. In the first, the court must impose any enhancement for prior
prison terms imposed by a court in a previous proceeding, but eliminate all
duplications, and then exercise its discretion on any additional prior prison
terms pleaded and proved in the present proceeding. Second, a literal
interpretation of Section 1170.1(a) might require that only the prior prison
terms pleaded in this latest proceeding be imposed in the final sentence, with
the prior enhancement for prior prison terms imposed in earlier proceed-
ings being dropped since they were not pleaded and proved in this latest
proceeding. Third, it is possible to argue that all enhancements for prior
prison terms are duplications in the different proceedings.
The first possibility is the only one that really makes any sense. Only the
first option retains the internal pattern of earlier judgments, already the
subject of the exercise of judicial discretion. Nothing in Section 1170.1
implies that it is meant to somehow reopen discretion on the earlier courts'
sentencing choices; once decided, those decisions should stand unless there
was some defect in them. The enhancement for prior prison terms is,
however, a general enhancement as it attaches to the offender and not to
each separate crime. We are unaware of any other situation in which the
enhancement for prior prison terms is added to individual crimes as opposed
to the total term imposed once punishment is determined. Thus, while those
enhancements for prior prison terms that were imposed in previous proceed-
ings should be included in the present calculation of the concurrent term,
duplications should be eliminated. Unfortunately, it is easier to answer this
with a result-oriented response than it is with a specific, statutory reference.
ix. Simplifying Consecutive Sentencing
A number of the problems raised above could be solved by simply
eliminating the idea of consecutive sentencing and instead treating multiple
crimes in the same manner as prior criminal history is currently treated.
Instead of becoming involved in complicated calculations in which a per-
centage of the subordinate term for each multiple offense must be figured, a
simple one or three-year enhancement could be added for each nonviolent or
violent offense. There appears to be no reason to distinguish between
current multiple offenses and prior prison terms, and a great simplification
of the determinate sentence law would be achieved.
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C. Limitations on Imposition of Enhancements
Exposition
There are many limitations on determinate sentencing if we describe
"limitations" in the general sense. As we have noted, the same fact may not
be used both to enhance and to impose the upper term.4° ! A fact that is
already an element of the offense generally cannot be used to add an
enhancement. 4°2 The judge may choose to impose a concurrent, as opposed
to a consecutive sentence, or may strike an enhancement. Enhancements
must be specifically pleaded and proved. By cautioning the judge to check
for any limitations on the term, however, we refer to three numerical or
mechanical limitations apart from the general limitations described above.
1. Five-Year Limit on Consecutive Sentences
The first is a five-year limitation on the amount of time that can be added
for subordinate terms in the consecutive sentence calculation. 4 3 Section
1170.1 (a) limits the total time to be added for felonies not among the listed
violent felonies of Penal Code Section 667.5(c). If one of the violent
felonies is involved, two effects detrimental to the offender occur. The five-
year limit is removed and one-third of the enhancements for arming with or
use of weapons or causing great bodily injury may be added to that subordi-
nate term as well. Finally, the phrasing of the last sentence of Penal Code
Section 1170. 1(a) makes it appear that the listed violent felonies are to be
distinguished from other felonies for purposes of applying the five-year
limitation on the total of subordinate terms. It states: "In no case shall the
total of subordinate terms be consecutive offenses not listed in subdivision
(c) of Section 667.5 exceed five years, '"404 thus suggesting that subordinate
terms for offenses not listed are subject to the limitation even if one or more
of the listed offenses is also present.
2. Stacking Enhancements
The second limitation is contained in Section 1170. 1(d) and restricts the
multiple application of enhancements for arming with weapons, use of
weapons, or causing great bodily injury.405 In some cases, the prosecutor
may wish to charge multiple enhancements on a given offense, and the trier
of fact may find more than one to exist. In such a case, the court is directed
to apply the greatest enhancement. A special rule, however, is set forth for
rape, robbery, or burglary whether attempted or actually committed. In such
cases the court "may impose both (1) one enhancement for weapons as
401. See text accompanying note 242, supra.
402. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§12022, 12022.5, 12022.7.
403. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a)
404 CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a) (emphasis added).
405. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(d).
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provided in either Section 12022 or 12022.5 and (2) an enhancement for
great bodily injury as provided in Section 12022.7.' 406 Under the indeter-
minate sentence law, rape, robbery, and burglary convictions carried special
penalties if great bodily injury was involved. 4° 7 This provision of AB 476
appears to carry forward or even strengthen that special condemnation 40 8 for
these crimes.
3. Double the Base Term
The third limitation, contained in Section 1170.1(f), restricts the total
term of imprisonment to moot more than twice the base term imposed under
Section 1170(b), but contains exceptions so numerous that it effectively
limits only the term of the nonviolent, nonprison crimes4°9 having no added
enhancements where the offender has a few too many prior and subordinate
terms added to the principal term. It basically means you cannot keep a
forger in prison forever. Section 1170.1(f) itself provides that the term of
imprisonment may not exceed twice the base term unless: (1) the defendant
"stands convicted" of one of the listed violent felonies; (2) the defendant
is being consecutively sentenced for an in-prison crime; or (3) an enhance-
ment "is imposed" under virtually any of the specific enhancement provi-
sions. Section 1170.1(f) appears to limit, then, all enhancements for prior
prison terms410 and consecutive sentences for nonprison, nonviolent of-
fenses. 411 Due to the number of exceptions and the overlap of enhancements
and listed violent felonies, it is difficult to list in an affirmative fashion
precisely what is limited by this section.
Commentary
The first full version of SB 42 contained only one sentencing limitation
which provided that if "the aggregate of cumulative or consecutive sen-
tences" 41 2 exceeded ten years, the sentence was to be reviewed by the
Community Release Board for a recommendation on resentencing. 413 This
in practical terms was scarcely a limitation at all and was eliminated in
August 1975. At the same time, however, a limitation on the use of multiple
enhancements was drafted.414 It provided inter alia that only one of the
406. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(d).
407. CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 150, §, at 1216; CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 151, §1, at 1217.
408. Prior law did not specify attempts of these offenses as meriting this special penalty.
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§213, 264, 461 with CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 149, §1, at 1216 and CAL.
STATS. 1967, c. 150, §1, at 1216 and CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 151, §1, at 1217.
409. That is, no specific enhancements relating to the crime itself, as opposed to general
enhancements, are involved.
410. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c). Violent prior terms can be limited, for if a current
offense is also one of the violent felonies, the limit automatically does not apply anyway. If it is
not, all priors seem limited under this section,
411. They must be nonviolent as well as nonprison consecutive terms, for if any current
crime is a listed violent felony, the limit does not apply under the first exception.
412. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 129.
413. Id.
414. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 114.
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enhancements for arming with or use of weapons or causing great bodily
injury could be applied to a single offense. A prisoner affected by this
provision, however, would receive a mandatory consecutive sentence. 415
Just before SB 42 died in committee, another familiar limitation made its
debut. A five-year limit was imposed on the addition of enhancements for
prior prison terms and consecutive sentences for other than in-prison of-
fenses 416
In 1976, SB 42 contained the basic limitation provisions that would be
present when SB 42 became law. The limitation provisions appeared as
subsections (d), (e) and (f) of former Penal Code Section 1170.1a. 417
Subsection (d) indicated, inter alia, that only one of the enhancements for
arming with or use of weapons or causing great bodily injury could be used.
Subsection (e) placed a five-year limit on addition of enhancements for
nonviolent prior prison terms and nonprison consecutive sentences. A new
subsection (f) indicated that the term of imprisonment could not exceed
twice the base term. The limitation of subsection (f) would not apply if a
violent felony, or arming with a deadly weapon or use of a firearm, was
charged and found by the jury, or admitted by the defendant. 418 The array of
limitations in subsections (d), (e), and (f) first entered SB 42419 accom-
panied by a provision that the imposition of enhancements was to be
mandatory,420 and these limitations would have served as one of the few, if
not the only, mollifying forces in such a scheme. They nevertheless re-
mained in SB 42 even after the court's power to strike enhanced punishment
was restored. 421
The trend of AB 476 to punish more severely the multiple violent
offender is most visible in the alteration of these sentence limitations. Its
first version virtually eliminated all limitations. 422 All ihat remained was a
portion of subsection (d), providing that only the greatest of the enhance-
ments under Sections 12022, 12022.5, or 12022.7 would be applied to a
given offense. 423 One by one, however, the limitation provisions reap-
peared. The five-year limit on enhancements for prior prison terms and
consecutive sentences became a five-year limit on nonviolent subordinate
terms.424 At the same time, the use of multiple enhancements was expanded
415. Id.
416. SB 42, 1974-75 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 14, 1975, §273, at 117. In addition,
the loose ten-year limit or review trigger was revived. Id. at 117-18.
417. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 130 as enacted
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273, at-.
418. Id.
419. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 125-26; SB 42,
1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 13, 1976, §273, at 120-21; CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
1139, §273, at -
420. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 129-30.
421. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 125-26.
422. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §17, at 21-22.
423. The former provision stated that only one enhancement could apply-it never said
which one.
424. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §17, at 22.
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in the cases of rape, robbery or burglary, and the twice-the-base-term
limitation returned.425 On June 6, 1977, the provision that one enhancement
for arming with or use of weapons and one enhancement for causing great
bodily injury might apply to certain crimes was expanded by the Senate to
include all felonies.42 6 In conference, the list of felonies eligible for multiple
enhancements shrank back to rape, robbery, burglary or attempts thereof, 427
and this was the limitation that was ultimately passed into law.
There are far fewer problems in understanding and applying the limitation
sections than in comprehending the enhancement provisions for prior prison
terms or consecutive sentences, but each limitation does have its
peculiarities. First, the five-year limit on nonviolent, subordinate terms
provides: "In no case shall the total of subordinate terms for consecutive
offenses not listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 exceed five years." 428
This implies that violent and nonviolent felonies would be segregated for
application of this limitation, and only the total of subordinate terms for
nonviolent felonies would be limited to five years. Assume, for example,
that a defendant has ten years of subordinate terms for nonviolent felonies to
be added onto an offense and ten years of listed violent terms to be added as
well. 429 It would follow that the five-year limit would affect the ten years of
subordinate terms for nonviolent felonies, leaving the ten years for violent
felonies unaffected. Fifteen years, then, would be added to the term, not 20.
The presence of prior terms for violent offenses would not have "poisoned
the well" such that all 20 years would be added. This differs from the effect
that a single, current listed violent felony seems to have in determining
whether one or three years is to be added for a series of listed violent prior
prison terms. 430
The interesting questions about the multiple enhancement limitation con-
cern how courts will treat the ability to stack enhancements in rape, robbery,
or burglary cases. While the general rule in Section 1170.1 is that only the
greatest applicable enhancement applies, when it comes to stacking en-
hancements, that section states that the court may, not must, impose one
enhancement for arming with or use of weapons, and one enhancement for
causing great bodily injury. Even within the weapon enhancement, it
specifies either a weapons enhancement under Section 12022 (one year), or
one under 12022.5431 (two years). It is uncertain what guidance, if any, a
court should follow regarding this apparent discretion to choose the higher
or lower enhancement. Does it turn to the Judicial Council's guidelines
425. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 19, 1977, §17, at 16-17.
426. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 6, 1977, §17, at 27.
427. See AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 14, 1977, §17, at 19.
428. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a).
429. (10 - 5) + 10 = 15 years.
430. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5.
431. CAL. PENAL CODE §1 170.1(d).
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concerning mitigating circumstances? 432 Presumably, the general rule of the
section would apply here, that is, the greater weapon enhancement must be
applied. But it may be that this is one remnant of judicial discretion which,
as with consecutive sentences, is left relatively untouched.
Finally, the twice-the-base-term limitation in Section 1170.1(d) does
present some relatively serious problems. It appears at first glance that
where some base terms were enhanced and some were not, one could
manipulate this limitation by choosing as the base term the higher, unen-
hanced offense. Twice the higher base term would allow a longer total
sentence. This is probably not a correct reading of the provision, however,
because by its own terms almost any enhancement renders the limitation
inapplicable. After all, the limitation applies to only prior terms and nonpri-
son, nonviolent consecutive sentences. It does not limit cases involving
arming, use, great bodily injury, or great loss.433
The other difficulty with the twice-the-base-term limitation involves its
shift in terminology when listing its exceptions. The court is free of the
limitation if the defendant "stands convicted" of a violent offense,434 or if a
consecutive sentence "is being imposed" for an in-prison felony,435 or if
any enhancement "is imposed" under the listed sections.436 Consider the
multiple offender receiving sentences in several separate proceedings. From
the perspective of the judge in the last of these cases, does the defendant
"stand convicted" of a violent felony if he has an active term for such
felony from any of these prosecutions, or does the judge consider only the
offenses now before the court? Use of the terminology "is imposed" is less
problematic, and "is being imposed" definitely relates only to the case then
before the court. Of what practical significance is the fact that a felony is
listed in Section 667.5(c)? Recall that the legislature made a special finding
in Section 667.5(c) "that these specified crimes merit special consideration
when imposing a sentence to display society's condemnation for such
extraordinary crimes of violence against the person," 437 implying that if any
active offense is violent, even an offense from an earlier proceeding, the
limitation does not apply.
D. Imposition of Sentence
Exposition
It is earnestly to be hoped that most of the above calculations and
quandries will have been dealt with in chambers, perhaps with the aid of
432. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 423. If a court does follow the Judicial
Council Rule concerning mitigating circumstances, must the court state reasons for this particu-
lar decision? See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 405.
433. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(f).
434. CAL. PENAL CODE §§667.5, 1170.1(a).
435. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(b).
436. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(c).
437. CAL. PENAL CODE §667,5(c).
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trial briefs. At some point, however, armed with a fistful of notes, the judge
will take the bench to impose sentence. The new law provides: "The court
shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of
sentencing." 4 38 The court also must inform the defendant of the possibility
of parole. 439 Early controversy over whether' "sentence choice" includes
probation was settled by a Judicial Council Rule that defines it as the
selection of any disposition not amounting to a dismissal, acquittal, or grant
of a new trial." 40 There is some advantage in granting "straight" probation,
that is, suspending even imposition of sentence, for under Penal Code
Section 1170(b): "A term of imprisonment shall not be specified if imposi-
tion of sentence is suspended." While this frees the judge from actually
making the calculation, the Judicial Council has required that even in such
cases factual findings be made regarding imposition of upper or lower
terms. 44
1
Commentary
The provisions for imposition of sentence retained the same substance
throughout the years that the legislature struggled with the new law. There
were no dramatic policy shifts. The requirements that the judge state the
reasons for the sentence choice and give notice of the possibility of parole
appeared at the outset and remained intact 4 2 although the role of the Judicial
Council shifted somewhat.443
Problems with imposition of sentence may be largely practical rather than
theoretical. One inquiry is how detailed the judge must be in imposing
sentence since numerous sections demand attention. Penal Code Section
1170(c) requires reasons for a sentence choice, but does not specify the
detail needed. The grant or denial of probation, for example, is a sentence
choice. There is the upper or lower term for the judge to consider. Penal
Code Section 1170(h) requires the judge to state the "facts and reasons" for
imposing an upper or lower term. Enhancements may be stricken on the one
hand or stacked up on the other, each requiring the court's justification.
Consecutive sentencing may be considered. 444 Limitations may prevent
438. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c).
439. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c).
440. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 405.
441. CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rule 433(b).
442. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 128. Warning
about the possibility of extended confinement of dangerous offenders was deleted.
443. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 127-29; SB 42,
1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 112-14; SB 42, 1975-76 Regular
Session, as amended, Aug. 14, 1975, §273, at 117-18; SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as
amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 128-31; SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2,
1976, §273, at 122-26; SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 26, 1976, §273, at 129-
32; AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Feb. 10, 1977, §§15-16, at 19-20; AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §§15-16, 17.5, at 21-24; AB 476, 1977-78
Regular Session, as amended, June 24, 1977, §15, at 17.
444. See text accompanying notes 356-400, supra.
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certain punishments. 4 5 Some facts cannot be used twice and some can.446
The sentence includes any period of parole following the term.447 By the
time the court has explained its last subtrahend and minuend, we will see a
hearing far longer than that necessary to sentence a defendant to the "term
prescribed by law." And by the time the appellate courts have combed
through the trial judge's soliloquy, many an offender's term will have been
served. 448
Where imposition of sentence is suspended, the judge will not have to go
into quite that much detail. This, however, is both good and bad news. The
good news is that the court will not have wasted extravagant amounts of
time making findings never really needed when probation is successfully
completed. A certain embarrassment or incongruity is also avoided in that
the judge will not have to make findings on aggravated aspects of the crime
and then release the person on straight probation. The authority for this
exemption from making detailed findings is found in the tautalogical last
sentence of Section 1170(b), which warns, "[a] term of imprisonment shall
not be specified if imposition of sentence is suspended." This seems to be
more a definition of suspending imposition of sentence than a procedural
guide. The amendment was introduced by the Judicial Council in the last
days of AB 476 in order to "avoid a possible misconstruction where
specification of a 'term of imprisonment' would be 'required,' even in an
alternative felony-misdemeanor situation where a misdemeanor disposition
is appropriate.' "449 Various judges and the Judicial Council were extremely
concerned during the drafting of both SB 42 and AB. 476 that the word
"findings" be scrupulously avoided in the statute to assure that extensive
"findings of fact" similar to those required in civil cases are not required.
Accordingly, the more generic terms, "circumstances," "facts," and "rea-
sons" were used to assure that reasonable factual detail would be forthcom-
ing, without the formalism found in civil cases.
The bad news is that some detail is required, even if imposition of
sentence is suspended. The California Rules of Court require this, 450 and it
may be necessary to avoid practical and constitutional problems that could
arise later. The practical problem arises upon revocation of probation, where
the revoking judge will have to recreate a great number of facts in an
unfamiliar case. The constitutional problem faces the court at the same time,
445. See text accompanying notes 401-437, supra.
446. See text accompanying notes 242-243, supra.
447. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c).
448. In all seriousness, considering the factors recently set forth for bail pending appeal,
that area may be modified greatly. See In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 544 P.2d 1297, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1976). In fact, it now seems likely that many more criminal appeals will not be decided
until after release of the prisoner.
449. Letter from James P. Corn, Assistant Director (Legislation) of the Judicial Council to
Assemblyman Daniel E. Boatwright, May 23, 1977 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
450. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, tit. 2, div. I-A, rules 433(b), 435(b)(1).
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since Rodriguez451 appears to prohibit considering any facts subsequent to
the original crime, including the probation violation, to increase the term on
the original offense. 452 If not done with sufficient clarity, an offender will
surely claim, and perhaps rightly so in some cases, that the term being given
on the original offense really reflects misconduct on probation instead.
E. Sentence Review
Exposition
Having pronounced sentence, the judge may still face the case again for
resentencing should the term be considered disparate. Resentencing can
occur in two ways. First, the court may on its own motion within 120 days,
or upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections or the Communi-
ty Release Board at any time, recall the sentence and resentence the defend-
ant.4 53 The court will apply Judicial Council rules to eliminate the perceived
disparity, so long as the sentence is downward.454 The second way in which
the court may receive the case is after the one-year Community Release
Board review. That agency is directed to review the sentence within one
year after commencement of the term of imprisonment and may, by motion,
recommend that the case be recalled and resentenced.45 The Community
Release Board must apply the Judicial Council's rules and information on
sentencing4 6 in deciding whether to make its motion. The law requires the
CRB to consider not only the length of the prison sentence received but also
whether probation was properly denied.457 Nothing in the law, however,
requires the sentencing court to accept the CRB's recommendation, and
presumably the motion may simply be denied.
Commentary
Throughout the histories of SB 42 and AB 476, recall could always be
recommended by the Director of Corrections or the Community Release
Board, or could be accomplished by the court itself. Changes in this area of
the law basically involved the following issues: (1) how broad the Commu-
nity Release Board's disparate sentence review would be and whether it
would be mandatory; (2) whether resentencing would be limited to a lower
rather than a higher sentence; 'and (3) what the placement and numbering of
the provisions should be. 458
451. In re Rodiguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
452. Id. at 652-53, 537 P.2d at 547, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
453. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(d).
454 See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(d).
455. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(0.
456. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170.4-.6.
457. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(f).
458. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 128-29
with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170, 1170.1, 1170.15. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as
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The disparate sentence review and recall powers of the Community
Release Board raise more questions than are answered by the statute. There
appear to be two distinct procedures authorized in the statute: (1) the
"recall" power of Section 1170(d), which is basically the old Section 1168
recall provision with the Community Release Board authorized to recom-
mend recall along with the Director of Corrections, after the 120 days for
court recall has passed; and (2) the "disparate sentence review" of Section
1170(f).
The recall provision of Section 1170(d) allows the CRB to recommend
recall of a sentence. No criteria are specified in the statute. The court may
recall the sentence previously ordered "and resentence the defendant in the
same manner as if he had not previously been sentenced, provided the new
sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence." 4 59 Obviously,
probation may also be granted, and the resentence is to "eliminate disparity
of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. "44 The CRB is not
mandated to review each prisoner's case, and this appears to be a purely
discretionary procedure that can occur at any time during the prison term for
any reason; these reasons can go beyond the narrower provisions for dispa-
rate sentence review.
The disparate sentence provision of Section 1170(f), on the other hand,
requires the CRB to review each prisoner's term within one year of the
commencement of the term with a view toward ensuring uniformity of
sentences for similar offenses and offenders. It shall recommend recall of a
sentence if it determines that the sentence is disparate, and although the
statute is silent, the court apparently has the choice of rejecting the CRB's
recommendation. The statute is also silent on whether a higher sentence may
be imposed. There are three approaches to this problem: (1) if the recall is
construed to occur under subdivision (d), the statute expressly prohibits a
higher sentence; (2) if the recall occurs under subdivision (f) there may be
finality of judgment reasons461 that prohibit the imposition of a higher
amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 112-14 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170, 1170.1, 1170.15.
Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 14, 1975, §273, at 117-18 with
CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.15. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22,
1976, §273, at 128-31 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 1170.1. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular
Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §273, at 122 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170, 1170.1.
Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 26, 1976, §27, at 129-32 with CAL.
PENAL CODE §§1170, 1170.1(b). Compare AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session as introduced, Feb.
10, 1977, §§15, 16, at 19-20 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170, 1170.1. Compare AB 476, 1977-78
Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §§15, 16, 17.5, at 21-24 with CAL. PENAL CODE
§§1 170, 1170.1. Compare AB 476, 1977-78, Regular Session, as amended, June 24, 1977, §15, at
17 with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.
459. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(d).
460. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(d).
461. There appears to be no absolute, constitutional bar to later imposition of a higher
sentence. See North Carolina v. Pearie, 395 U.S. 711, 719-23 (1969);, see also People v.
Thornton, 14 Cal. App. 3d 324, 326, 92 Cal. Rptr.327, 328 (1971). If the defendant, however; is
exercising his right to an appeal, later imposition of a higher sentence is prohibited. See People
v. Ali, 66 Cal. 2d 277, 281, 424 P.2d 932, 935, 57 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (1967); People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 495, 386 P.2d 677, 685, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1963); In re Ferguson,
233 Cal. App. 2d 79, 82, 43 Cal. Rptr. 325, 327 (1965).
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sentence; or (3) the disparate sentence review provisions may be such an
integral part of the sentencing procedure that the strongly stated policy of
uniformity of sentences allows imposition of a higher sentence when the
original sentence was disparately low.
Another theoretical problem is whether the disparate sentence review
procedure violates the separation of powers doctrine. 462 A similar contention
was rejected under the indeterminate sentence law, 463 which allowed an
administrative agency to set a term under a judicial commitment. There
seems to be no reason to believe that a mere recommendation of a judicial
recall and resentence would violate the doctrine.
The real problems with sentence review again appear to be practical rather
than theoretical. The following practical problems are raised. In conducting
its disparate sentence review, how sensitive must the CRB be to every
change in the statistics that are gathered on an ongoing basis by the Judicial
Council? How many times can a sentence be reexamined? How disparate
must a sentence be before recall is in order? On what factual basis will
similar cases be compared? Will the CRB be able to rely on the more
complete facts in the probation officer's report, or will it be limited to
consideration merely by the legal facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt in
the elements of the crime?464 Will the CRB review the reasons given by the
judge for imposing the upper (aggravation) or lower term (mitigation),
striking an enhancement, or imposing a consecutive sentence? Will the CRB
second-guess the prosecutor's charging decision if that has apparently re-
sulted in the disparity?
There is a very practical question, too, as to whether the statistics on
California prison terms will drift inexorably downward. If courts may not
resentence to a higher term to correct a lenient and hence disparate sentence,
will not statistics in California begin to fall? And as to figures in other
states, great care must be taken in relying on the validity of figures used to
express the "penalty" for the offense. 465 After all, the statutory "penal-
ities" in California under the old law were extremely high, but its median
times served were comparable to the new ranges. Will actual practice in
other jurisdictions, rather than their statutory figures, be compared? Will
figures on the actual medians in other states even be physically retrievable?
The-inswers to these and other related questions will have to await future
462. See Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1977), and the
cases cited therein.
463. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-95, 171 P.2d 958, 959-60 (1918).
464. If the CRB may rely only on those facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt there will
rarely be a disparity, since each like crime has identical elements and the same range of three
choices for base terms.
465. CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170.4, 1170.5. The new law requires the Judicial Council to
provide essentially an ongoing Lynch test for sentence reviewers to use. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal.
3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). Those who supported SB 42 out of annoyance
with judicial interference with the legislature's sentences would seem to have bought as much
uncertainty as they have sold.
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litigation and further regulations of the CRB in Title 15 of the Administra-
tive Code. This new experiment in Anglo-American law may well become
the most important function of the CRB in the future.
This is sentencing under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of
1976. 46 If you liked the new sentencing structure, you will find the new
structure this law creates for parole equally engaging.
NEW PAROLING STRUCTURE
A. The Nature of Parole
Exposition
The nature of parole under the new law is substantially different from that
under the old indeterminate sentencing system. Parole in the past has been
thought of as constructive custody, as service of a prison sentence outside
prison walls. 467 The powerful, theoretical "handle" on the parolee was the
Adult Authority's ability to revoke parole and return the inmate to serve,
potentially, the rest of his maximum term in prison. 468 Penal Code Section
3000 now opens with the legislative declarations that:
the period immediate [sic] following incarceration is critical to
successful reintegration of the offender into society and to posi-
tive citizenship. It is in the interest of public safety for the state to
provide for the supervision of and surveillance of parolees and to
provide educational, vocational, family and personal counseling
necessary to assist parolees in the transition between imprison-
ment and discharge. A sentence pursuant to section 1168 or 1170
shall include a period of parole, unless waived as provided in this
section.
There are elements in this statement of supervision and social work, public
safety and personal rehabilitation. The control aspect of parole, however,
should diminish, given a more limited parole period than under the old law
and a highly limited period of reincarceration for a parole violation.
Parole for determinately sentenced inmates runs for a maximum period of
one year. 469 It may be waived by the Community Release Board,4 70 and the
CRB is also obligated to consider the request of any inmate regarding the
length of his parole and the conditions thereof.471 Outright absconding can
466. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §350 at-. The word "Uniform" in the title is puzzling. If it
means sentences are uniform, it is redundant; if it means Uniform Act, it is merely a conceit of
the drafters.
467. See In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171,486 P.2d 657, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1971); In re Marzec, 25
Cal. 2d 794, 797, 154 P.2d 873, 874(1945); In re Albori, 218 Cal. 34,38,21 P.2d 423,424(1933);
People v. Prochnan, 251 Cal. App.2d 22, 27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265, 269 (1967).
468. See In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 646, 537 P.2d 384, 389, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 557
(1975); In re Winn, 13 Cal. 3d 694, 699, 532 P.2d 144, 147, 119 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1975).
469. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(a).
470. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(b).
471. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(c). One might question whether this consideration of re-
quests is the same as the review of parole lengths and conditions under Penal Code Section
5077.
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toll the running of the parole period, but revocation can only do so for a
limited time. Additional confinement time for revocation of parole unac-
companied by a new felony commitment is limited to six months,472 and
jurisdiction over the parolee, whether through parole supervision or cus-
tody, may not extend longer than 18 months from the date of initial
parole. 473
Parole is also available for the inmate sentenced to an indeterminate term
or a life term under Penal Code Section 1168(b); and it appears clear that the
Community Release Board retains ultimate control over conditions of parole
for both determinately sentenced inmates and those sentenced to life impris-
onment. 474 For those sentenced to life, the parole period is three years, as
opposed to the one-year period for those determinately sentenced. 475 Either
period may be waived, however, by the Community Release Board. The
limit on parole jurisdiction over those sentenced to life imprisonment is four
years rather than 18 months, although additional confinement for any one
revocation not involving a new felony commitment is limited to six
months. 476 Absconding from parole will toll the running of the parole
period.477 As with determinately sentenced inmates, those sentenced to life
imprisonment are now discharged at the end of the parole period. 478 This is a
significant innovation, as formerly such persons had to obtain a pardon to be
free from parole. 479
Commentary
The history of the provisions relating to the nature and duration of parole
reflect two basic trends. One is the shortening of parole and parole revoca-
tion periods, and the other is an attempt to define the purpose of parole
under the new system. SB 42 originally provided for a two-year parole for
most inmates and five years for those serving a life term. 480 One year of
additional confinement was allowed for revocation not accompanied by a
new commitment. 481 With these exceptions parole under the new system
was characterized by fixed periods at the end of which the offender was
472. CAL. PENAL CODE §3057. It is questionable whether parole may be revoked for longer
than six months if accompanied by a new felony commitment. This may have a practical effect
on a parolee sentenced to life imprisonment who is later released on a three-year parole and
who receives a new 16-month term. The new sentence, less good-time credits, may expire
before the original three-year parole expires.473. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d). Hence, if the parolee constantly violates parole and is
immediately processed through Morrissey revocation proceodures, several reincarcerations of
six months or less duration might be fitted into the 18-month ceiling before jurisdiction ran out.
474. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§3041.5(b)(1), 5077.
475. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(b).
476. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§3000(d), 3057.
477. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3064.
478. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d).
479. This occurred because they were serving a sentence fixed by statute at life. The Adult
Authority had no power to fix the sentence at less than life imprisonment.
480. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §278, at 136.
481. SB 42, 1975-76-Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §282, at 141.
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released, rehabilitated or not, dangerous or not. The CRB was required to
consider any inmate's request regarding length and conditions of parole. 82
Revocation did not toll the running of the parole period, but it was soon
recognized that absconding would have to toll the running of parole. 483
Other than that, however, the parole and revocation periods began to drift
downward, first by making it procedurally more difficult to set the longer
parole484 and then by directly reducing the periods themselves .485 AB 476
slightly increased jurisdiction over the parolee by providing that revocation
could toll the parole period to a limited degree.486
Under the determinate sentence law, the concept of parole has changed
radically from the traditional model of constructive custody while complet-
ing the term in the community .487 SB 42 consistently provided that parole
came after the term had been served. 488 While some more traditionally
worded sections remain,489 parole was simply not considered to be con-
tinued service of the sentence. SB 42 never addressed questions concerning
the theoretical basis for parole, but the new parole was clearly different from
the former idea of continued custody, given automatic discharge, limited
revocation and limited jurisdiction. AB 476 finally answered the question
with the theory, which was quoted from Section 3000 above, that parole is a
period of reintegration into society during which parolees will be super-
vised, kept under surveillance and given assistance. 490
One theoretical problem deserves mention. Considering the presumption
that parole will be granted and the subsequent inevitability of discharge,
there will effectively be no such thing as a life term4 91 once the prisoner is
released on parole. This legal discharge of a life term raises some new
possibilities. First, will the constitutional principles enunciated in Rodri-
482. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975; §278, at 136.
483. See SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 28, 1975, §278, at 11.
484. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §278, at 123; SB 42, 1975-
76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 14, 1975, §278, at 123.
485. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §278, at 142-43, §282, at
146-67.
486. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §42, at 46-47; AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §42, at 51-52
487. See note 467, supra and accompanying text.
488. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §278, at 136 with
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §278 at -.
489. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§3040, 3056.
490. Another interesting sidelight concerns the debate over the new theory of parole. As
originally amended in the Senate, AB 476 declared parole to be necessary for "public protec-
tion." AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 6, 1977, §42.2, at 49. This declara-
tion was deleted in the conference committee for fear that the state might be held financially
liable for new crimes committed by parolees who may have been improperly supervised. AB
476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 24, 1977, §42, at 41-42.
491. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§3041(b), 3041.7, 3000(d). Actually, few ever served life
terms. The life term simply served as a persistent control that could be exercised over the
felon's behavior. This could have been defended as a means of protecting society from one who
has been exceptionally violent; or it could be condemned as an inordinate interference with
freedom and dignity long after any reasonable purpose of sentencing had been served. See
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SECTION, RESEARCH UNIT, POLICY AND
PLANNING DIVISION, NUMBER AND TIME SERVED IN PRISON BEFORE FIRST PAROLE, MALE
FELONS PAROLED 1970 AND 1976. (Mar. 21, 1977).
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guez492 require the CRB to set a "primary term" 493 now that the "term" is
no longer life, but rather the preparole period plus three years? Or, will the
courts hold that a maximum of life is appropriate for six crimes carrying life
sentences regardless of the individual circumstances of each crime? Second,
can determinate enhancements and terms now be made to run concurrent
with a life term? Under Penal Code Section 669, punishment for other
crimes must "merge and run concurrently" with a life term. But what if the
court stayed the determinate punishment, to become effective only in the
event the prisoner was released and discharged on the life term? In addition
to these considerations, many practical problems remain494 in the parole
provisions under the new law. The interplay between fixed revocation
periods and the due process requirements of recent years provide one
example. 495 Even assuming the parolee violates the conditions of his parole
soon after release, the revocation process developed in recent years has
taken months to complete. 496 The new law's six month maximum additional
confinement period for revocation refers to "confinement pursuant to a
revocation of parole."497 Does this time commence to run after final revoca-
tion or does the six month period run during the revocation process?
Suggesting that time during the revocation process is a part of the six month
period, Penal Code Section 3000(d) speaks of "suspension" of parole when
a parolee has absconded, implying that otherwise the time is counted. If this
is the case, a lengthy parole revocation procedure, perhaps involving a
pending prosecution, fearful witnesses, and delays by counsel may mean no
additional confinement time upon revocation is possible at all if the parolee
has been held in custody pursuant to a parole "hold."
If a convicted offender violates parole toward the end of his parole
period, the limitation on additional confinement time pursuant to a revoca-
tion may make revocation impractical. Again, Penal Code Section 3000(d)
speaks of a suspended parole, perhaps giving the Community Release Board
the power to retain jurisdiction by suspending parole pending full revocation
procedures. If revocation takes several months, however, there would be
little point in going through complete Morrissey498 procedures just to send
the offender back to prison for a month or two. Similarly, if the parolee were
near the 18-month or four-year limitation on parole, the situation again
makes revocation impractical, if not impossible.
492. 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
493. See text accompanying notes 78-79, supra.
494. One technical problem concerns year-and-a-day prisoners. While it is clear that
someone sentenced to a term not to exceed one year and one day would have a one year, not a
three-year parole, CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(a), (b), it is not quite as clear that he would
have an 18-month maximum rather than a four-year maximum. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d).
Presumably, such a peccadillo is easily remedied by sound interpretation.
495. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See text accompanying notes 30-42
supra.
496. See 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §§2607-2610.
497. CAL. PENAL CODE §3057.
498. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See text accompanying note 33, supra.
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The new CRB rules require that the parolee's hearing occur within 30
days of the placement of the parole hold, unless the parolee in effect pleads
nolo contendere. 499 Since most parolees are undergoing a criminal prosecu-
tion of some sort for the same incident, the use immunity provisions of
People v. Coleman500 are now going to be the subject of many arguments in
the criminal proceedings. Indeed, already many anguished defense attorneys
are requesting that the revocation proceedings be delayed until after the
criminal proceedings. This procedure is not being allowed 0 1 because it
would mean that the revocation hearing would be held after the six-month
revocation time had elapsed, arguably turning the parole hold into mere
preventive detention.
B. Releasing the Determinately Sentenced Inmate
Exposition
In general, it is evident that not only has the nature of parole been altered,
but the manner of releasing inmates has been radically changed. Once a
matter of broad discretion in the hands of the parole board, the inmate's
release is not determined by the court's sentence minus good time credits.
As we will describe, good time credits are easily earned but can be taken
away only after a complex procedure has been meticulously followed. As
good time credits take into account the good or bad behavior of the inmate in
prison, the creation of elaborate procedures for their grant or denial also
constricts the broad power of the Department of Corrections over internal
prison control. 5 2 Somewhat offsetting this dramatic constriction of the
discretion of prison officials is the fact that the terms imposed for many
prison offenses are mandated by statute to be served consecutively. 503 There
is also relatively harsh treatment of consecutive prison crimes under Section
1170. 1(b), which provides for tandem service of consecutive terms, rather
than a mathematical increment.
1. Granting Good-Time Credits
The inmate's arrival at prison triggers a series of duties imposed on prison
officials to notify the prisoner of his rights to good-time credits. Within 14
days after arrival at the reception center, the prisoner must be informed of
"all applicable prison rules and regulations" including the possibility of
good-time credits. 5" Then, within 14 days of arrival at the institution to
499. 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §2641.
500. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 889-97, 533 P.2d 1024, 1042-47, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 402-07 (1975) (use-
immunity required for any testimony given by a probationer at a probation revocation hearing,
held prior to criminal trial on the same charge).
501. See 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §§2640-2641.
502. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§5003.5, 5055 for a description of the Department's broad
powers.
503. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§4501, 4501.5, 4502, 4503, 4530, 4532.
504. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2930(a).
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which the prisoner is ultimately assigned, he must be informed of the
"programs" that are offered and available at that institution. The fact of
communicating these notices must be reflected in the inmate's central file
within 90 days of arrival in state prison.505 Also apparently during that 90-
day period a document signed by a prison official is given to the prisoner
outlining the conditions under which good-time credit may be earned.50 6
While this is hardly an atmosphere for arms-length bargaining, the docu-
ment apparently has some binding effect on the Department of Corrections,
for it may be modified only upon: (1) mutual consent of the prisoner and the
Department of Corrections; (2) the transfer of the inmate from one institu-
tion to another; (3) the Department's determination of the prisoner's lack of
adaptability or success in a specific program or assignment (in such case the
inmate shall be entitled to a hearing regarding the Department's decision);
and (4) a change in custodial status. 507 Finally, within 30 days of reception
in prison, the inmate must be notified of the maximum credits he can earn
and the resulting "good-time release date," that is, the date of release on
parole assuming accumulation of all possible credits.50 8
The prisoner, settled at his ultimate prison address, notified of the rules,
notified of the programs, notified of good-time credits, and in possession of
a document specifying how to earn those credits, begins to earn credits at a
rate of four months possible reduction for every eight months served.A0
Thus, good-time credits can result in a possible one-third reduction in the
court-imposed term, and any period of less than eight months is subject to a
comparable ratio.510 One must note, however, that good-time credit is
earned on time "served in prison." 51' Hence, preprison credits which
include time spent in county jails before trial or under a parole hold would
presumably be credited against the court-imposed term,5 12 but would not
also permit accrual of good-time credits further to reduce that term. As a
result, the expected release date cannot be precisely calculated by taking
one-third off of the court-imposed term.
Actually it is an overstatement to refer to "earning" good-time credits.
Good-time credits are composed of good behavior credit (three of the four
months' reduction) and participation credit (one of the four months' reduc-
tion).51 Good behavior credit is defined in Section 2931(b) as not: assault-
ing anyone, escaping, inciting successful riots,5 14 falsifying significant
505. CAL. PENAL CODE §2930(a).
506. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(a).
507. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(a).
508. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(b).
509. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b).
510. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b).
511. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b).
512. CAL. PENAL CODE §2900.5. See also 15 CAL. ADM CODE §§2340-2346 for the com-
plicated manner in which preprison credits for different offenses are credited.
513. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b), (c).
514. Inciting riots does not count unless acts of force or violence result. CAL. PENAL CODE§2931(b)(2).
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records,515 intentionally destroying state property in excess of fifty dollars,
possessing escape tools withoutpermission,516 possessing a weapon without
permission, possessing drugs without prescription, or manufacturing or
selling intoxicants.517 Participation credit is "earned" by participation in
"work, educational, vocational, therapeutic, or other prison activities." 51 8
No demonstrable success or skill need be shown, since participation credit is
earned as long as a reasonable effort is made. 519 Those "confined by choice
or due to behavior problems" are given a chance to participate in activities
"commensurate with the custodial status,''520 and may earn participation
credits in these activities.
2. Taking Away Good-Time Credits
If the inmate has earned good-time credits, these credits can be taken
away for misbehavior, but only after an elaborate procedure has been
meticulously followed. Misbehavior is divided into three categories of
seriousness, and in these categories, 45 days, 30 days, or 15 days of good-
time credits are lost for each prohibited activity,521 Failure to participate in
activities can result in the loss of 30 days of good-time credits for each
failure. 522 A limitation enters into this calculation, requiring that an inmate
not lose more than 90 days of good behavior or 30 days of participation
credit "during any eight-month period during which the misbehavior or
failure to participate took place.' '523 Furthermore, if prison officials fail to
follow the time limitations set forth for the procedures, they are barred from
denying any good-time credit at all. 524
The procedure for denying good-time credits grants the inmate certain
rights. The inmate is entitled to written notice of the charge, the date, time,
and place of alleged misbehavior, the evidence relied upon, his rights and
the procedures that will be employed at his hearing. 52 This notice must be
promptly given, preferably within five days of discovery of the misbe-
havior. If the notice is delayed until 30 days or more after the misbehavior
took place, it must include reasons why the evidence was not reasonably
discoverable within 30 days "or any sooner than it was discovered.' '526
After notice has been given, the inmate is entitled to a hearing held within
515. Apparently one can falsify insignificant ones. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(bJ(3).
516. While the idea behind this is probably sound, the way in which it is phrased is, to say
the least, curious.
517. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b)(2)-(3).
518. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(c).
519. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(c).
520. Apparently, then, if you cannot go to class because you are in maximum custody for
stabbing a guard, prison officials will design a program, such as sweeping your cell, so you can
continue to earn participation credits.
521. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b)(3).
522. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(c).
523. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a).
524. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a).
525. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(1).
526. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(1).
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ten days by "an individual who shall be independent of the case." 527 Again,
a time table is involved, for if the hearing is not held within ten days, it can
only be held up to 30 days after the notice, after further notifying the inmate
of the extraordinary circumstances causing delay and after ascertaining that
he is not prejudiced thereby. Beyond 30 days, no hearing may be held at
all.528
Another provision entitles the inmate to an "investigative employee" to
gather information, talk to witnesses, prepare a written report, and be
present at the hearing. 529 If the hearing officer determines that the inmate
needs assistance in presenting a defense at the hearing, the inmate, may
request that an employee of the Department of Corrections be assigned to
assist in that task. 530 Finally, the inmate may request witnesses to attend the
hearing, and they must be called unless the hearing officer denies the request
on the basis of specific reasons presented to the inmate in writing. 531 The
inmate, under the hearing officer's direction, may personally question all
witnesses. 532
The standard of proof at the hearing is a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 533 If the inmate is found guilty of the misbehavior charged he is
entitled to written notice of that decision, the specific evidence relied upon,
and the amount of credits to be denied.534 This notice must be given within
ten days, and the inmate may then appeal the decision first through depart-
ment procedures and then to the Community Release Board. The CRB may
affirm, reverse, or modify the "department's decision" or grant a hearing
before the CRB itself with rights specified in Penal Code Section 3041.5.535
One variety of misbehavior worth special mention involves misbehavior
by the inmate that also constitutes a crime, for this initiates a different
procedure. In such cases the Department may refer the case for prosecution
and if it does so, the timetable for the hearing described above is suspend-
ed, 536 and the following procedure applies. If the district attorney has not
filed an accusatory pleading within 60 days of referral, the prisoner may
request that the Department go forward and the Department must then hold its
527. CAL- PENAL CODE §2932(a)(1).
528. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(1).
529. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(2).
530. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(4). It is difficult to assess the meaning, if any, of the
variations in reference to the "investigating employee" and the departmental employee. Pre-
sumably, they may be the same.
531. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(3).
532. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(5).
533. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(6).
534. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(7).
535. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a)(7). Which decision is meant-the Department's final
denial of the appeal or the Department's denial of good-time credits? Is the review mentioned in
Section 2932(a)(7) the same as that provided for in Penal Code Section 5077? See also the
discussion of Penal Code Section 3041.5, the general rights provision, in text accompanying
notes 583-594, infra.
536. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(c).
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hearing within 15 days of the request. If the district attorney does file the
case and the inmate is convicted, good-time credits may be denied or taken
away. If the inmate is acquitted, no credits may be taken away. If the
Department does not wait for the prosecution and denies or takes away
credits in its own hearing, good-time credits must be restored to the inmate
upon acquittal in court even if this means crediting that time against
parole. 537
Commentary
The history of the provisions in SB 42 relating to good-time credits
reflects a continual increase in the rights of the felon and in the complexity
of procedures required of the Department of Corrections. It is obvious from
the history of SB 42 that the Department had relatively little influence in the
drafting of this procedure, and many practical problems were ignored. AB
476 later made certain provisions comprehensible or, in some cases, physic-
ally possible to comply with.
As the good-time credit provisions were first drafted, the Department of
Corrections had 90 days to provide the initial notice of rules, programs and
credits. Credit of a one-fourth reduction in the term for "good behavior and
cooperation" was to be possible and a "document" was to be executed by a
prison official and the inmate specifying how credits might be earned. A
month prior to the good-time release date, a Department of Corrections
official would meet with the inmate to grant or deny the credit for refraining
from violent behavior or lack of cooperation with the program. 538 Clearly,
this left the Department with broad discretion, with a lot of room for its own
rules and regulations, and with an easily calculated system of credits and
time limits.
In a subsequent version of SB 42, the time for providing notice to the
inmate was dropped from 90 days to 30 days, and the maximum credit was
raised to a one-third reduction in the term. The four-month credit for eight-
months served formula was created with no provision for a comparable ratio
for lesser periods of time. Credits were deemed automatically earned unless
the Department acted, and notice of the ever-redetermined release date was
to be given to the inmate every eight months. If misconduct constituted a
crime, the Department was prohibited from proceeding until the district
attorney had acted or certified in writing that he would not act. 539
The first 1976 rewrite of SB 42 contained most of the good-time credits
provisions that are now in the new law. It further reduced the time for
giving initial notices to 14 days. It limited conditions under which the
document on earning credits could be altered. It specifically listed how
537. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(d).
538. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §276, at 134-36.
539. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §276, at 120-22.
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credit might be earned, or, more accurately, what one must not do in order
to earn credit. It created the constellation of rights given upon initiation of
credit denial proceedings. Finally, where misbehavior was to be referred to
the district attorney, it created the interesting loophole that the Department
could not act until: (a) the district attorney certified in writing that he would
not act; or (b) the trial court proceedings were completed. The Department,
however, had to act within 30 days of notice to the inmate of possible credit
loss (and notice had to be given within five to 30 days after the conduct)
unless an accusatory pleading was at least filed. If the district attorney
simply delayed, credits could apparently not be taken away even if the
inmate were convicted. 54° AB 476 made mostly technical changes to this
whole area. One change involved starting the time limit for the 14 day
notices from the time of the inmate's arrival in prison rather than from the
"commencement of term." 541 Presentence credit for county jail time would
otherwise have made it physically impossible for the Department to comply.
AB 476 also added the idea of a comparable ratio for credit on time less than
eight months, so that credit could be earned under SB 42's formula. 542
This area of the new law remains deeply troubled and once it takes full
effect, good-time credits may prove to be a very significant source of
litigation. At the outset, the adequacy of the 14-day notices under Penal
Code Section 2930 may be challenged. To require that "all applicable"
prison rules be explained to each new inmate is burdensome at best.543 The
nature of the "document," at one time characterized as an agreement
between the Department of Corrections and the inmate, described in Penal
Code Section 2931(a) must be questioned. For example, could the drafters
have intended the document to be contractual in nature? 54 Can credit be
given for activities not included or taken away for conduct not expressly
covered by the provision? Among the list of events justifying modification
of this document after the initial briefing is the vague "lack of adaptability
of a program" that results in an undefined "hearing regarding the Depart-
ment's decision.' '545 Transfer to another prison and change in custody are
also listed as reasons to modify this document. These provisions may lead to
a requirement that due process procedures be followed before such decisions
can be made.546
540. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §276, at 136-42. See also
SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 2, 1976, §276, at 131-37, as enacted, CAL.
PENAL CODE §§2930, 2931, 2932.
541. CAL. PENAL CODE §2930.
542. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §38, at 41; see CAL.
PENAL CODE §2931(b).
543. Does this include due process rights specified in case law or only "rules" the prison
has specifically compiled?
544. But cf. Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1977) (held
that a plea bargain is not a contract).
545. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(a)(3).
546. See note 42, supra.
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These are minor questions compared to the problems one perceives in
working with the list of activities that 'must be avoided in order to earn
credit.547 Provisions regarding possessing weapons or escape tools without
permission, the prohibition against destroying only state property, the
prohibition against successfully inciting riots or falsifying significant re-
cords seem ludicrous. The key question in this list is, of course, whether it is
exclusive. Its opening line simply allows credit for "forbearance from any
or all of the following activities, '" 548 a phrase not especially helpful in
determining whether exclusivity was intended. The odd admonition that
"[n]othing in this section shall prevent the Department of Corrections from
seeking criminal prosecution for violations of law" 549 almost suggests that if
the misconduct is not listed, the only recourse is criminal prosecution. It
seems likely that the scope of misconduct in the gap between this list and a
new criminal offense that can be proved in a prison setting will be dealt with
in other ways, such as restrictions on internal prison privileges and more
extensive use of disciplinary confinement in security housing units. While
perhaps less important, another question can be raised as to the value
judgments drawn in this list. Failure to participate in a prison program may
result in loss of 30 days credit,55 yet destruction of state property, falsify-
ing records, possessing escape tools, manufacture or sale of intoxicants
merit only a 15-day loss per incident.55'
The specification in Penal Code Section 2932(a) of a maximum limit on
credit denial also raises a serious question. If only four months' credit can be
lost "during any eight-month period during which the misbehavior or failure
to participate took place," 552 which eight-month period is to be considered?
Is the inmate's term conceptually divided into eight-month blocks from his
receipt in state prison? Or does one look to an eight-month period before or
perhaps after or perhaps around the date of the misbehavior? Considering an
inmate who is repeatedly involved in disciplinary incidents or constantly
refusing to participate in activities, definition of this eight-month period
becomes vital to determining how much credit can be taken away.
Even the portion of Penal Code Section 2932 detailing hearing rights
causes certain problems. One question arises from the provision that if time
limits are not met by the Department, credit may not be denied. No
provision is made for delay caused or requested by the inmate himself.. The
provision that requested witnesses be "called" does not specify the conse-
quences if the witness refuses. No subpoena power is given to compel
547. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b).
548. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b).
549. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b)(3).
550. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(c).
551. CAL. PENAL CODE §2931(b)(3).
552. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(a).
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attendance 553 nor does the provision take into account the violent atmo-
sphere of prison when it requires this confrontation. 554 Finally, in the
provision for referring cases to the district attorney, the question of whether
departmental hearings should be stayed pending the district attorney's deci-
sion is unclear. In SB 42, the Department was clearly forced to await the
district attorney's decision, 555 but now that priority is not so clear. It seems
that if the verdict in the criminal proceeding conflicts with the result of the
credit hearing, amends are simply made. 556 One interesting aspect of this
interface is that "worse is better." If the inmate's conduct is so egregious
that criminal prosecution is justified, he goes unpunished unless the high
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is met.557 But if it were less
serious and not referred to the district attorney, the same credit may be
denied on a mere preponderance of the evidence.
C. Paroling Life Prisoners
Exposition
Procedures for paroling those inmates sentenced to life imprisonment558
retain a much more familiar form. The practitioner will notice, however,
some significant differences under the new law. 559 The Community Release
Board is now required to meet with an inmate sentenced under Penal Code
Section 1168(b) within the first year of incarceration. 6° The'sole purpose is
to review the inmate's file and make recommendations, although Penal
Code Section 3041(a) does not say to whom or about what. Due to the
changes in Penal Code Section 5076.1 (dealing with the composition of
CRB hearing panels) discussed previously, the Board may apparently be
represented at this hearing by case-hearing representatives.
One year prior to the minimum eligible parole date the inmate's case is
again reviewed, this time by a three member panel of gubernatorial appoin-
tees. This body according to the new law, "shall normally set a parole
release date." '5 61 The aim is to "provide uniform terms for offenses of
similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public. "562 The
553. Hopefully, this will not be too serious since witnesses will often be inmates or prison
officials who are available for such hearings. Cf. In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 370, 375-76, 503 P.2d
1326, 1331, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318, 323 (1972) (disclosure of informants' statements).
554. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1974).
555. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §276, at -.
556. CAL. PENAL CODE §2932(c)(d).
557. This is also contrary to the principles of In re Coughlin, 16 Cal. 3d 52,56-57,545 P.2d
249, 251-52, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339-40 (1976) and In re Dunham, 16 Cal. 3d 63, 69, 545 P.2d 255,
259, 127 Cal. Rptr. 343, 347 (1976).
558. Actually, a life sentence is not an indeterminate term; it'is "determinate" life as
opposed to the old indeterminate life sentences such as five years to life. We will, however,
discuss the parole of inmates serving life terms under this general heading.
559. One example already discussed is the discharge of life-termers.
560. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(a).
561. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(a).
562. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(a).
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panel is directed to comply with the Judicial Council rules devised for
determinately sentenced inmates and to consider any sentencing information
relevant to parole dates. 563 The Community Release Board must also estab-
lish its own criteria for setting parole dates and must consider therein: (1) the
number of victims of the crime for which the inmate was sentenced; and (2)
other factors in mitigation or aggravation of the crime.564 There is a lame
attempt to maintain continuity among panels considering the inmate, for
Section 3041(a) provides "at least one member of the panel shall have been
present at the last preceding meeting, unless it is not feasible to do so or
where the last preceding meeting was the initial meeting." The grant of
parole is important enough that any member of the hearing panel may send
any decision regarding parole to the Board for a full en banc hearing. In such
case, a majority vote of the full Board is required to grant parole. 565 While
these rules encourage the establishment of a parole date, the panel clearly
may decline to set one, and the new law addresses that situation directly. It
states that a date shall be set by the panel unless it determines that "the
gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and
gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that con-
sideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarcera-
tion for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at
this meeting." 566
Special provisions govern the parole of those sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Apparently due to the seriousness of these offenses, written notice of
an impending hearing to set or advance parole must be sent 30 days in
advance thereof to the judge, the district attorney, the defense attorney who
tried the case, and the law enforcement agency that investigated it. 567 These
parole hearings are recorded and a transcript is made within 30 days of the
hearing. 561 Incorporated into the transcript are statements, recommendations
or "other materials" considered at the hearing unless confidentiality is
required to preserve institutional security or personal safety. 569 Also con-
tained in the transcript are the findings and supporting reasons for the action
taken.570 The transcript is then filed with the Community Release Board and
made available to the public in the office of the CRB no later than 30 days
after the hearing. The public has at least 30 days, then, to examine the
record leading to the decision concerning parole for the inmate, since the
prisoner may not be released within 60 days after the hearing date. 57'
563. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(a).
564. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(a).
565. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(a).
566. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(b).
567. CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(a). Reference to the prosecutor is actually reference to the
district attorney of the county from which the inmate was sentenced.
568. CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(b).
569. CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(d).
570. CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(c).
571. CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(b).
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Commentary
The first major version of SB 42 contained the same basic parole provi-
sions for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment that were contained in the
final version of SB 42. The provisions required a CRB hearing in the first
year of an inmate's incarceration and another hearing one year prior to
minimum release date. Three members of the CRB were required to attend
both hearings. 572 Special provisions were also made for the parole of
inmates convicted of first degree murder or kidnapping for robbery or
ransom under Penal Code Section 209.57
3
AB 476 removed the requirement of a three-member panel at the initial
review and of continuity among panels. The special provisions for hearings
were expanded to include all inmates sentenced for life and those provisions
were moved to Penal Code Section 3042. 571 The entire 3020 series, relating
to term fixing, was repealed.575 Despite these procedural changes, the Board
clearly retains an extensive discretionary power over inmates sentenced to
life imprisonment.
The new procedures, however, raise intriguing questions. One question
concerns the notices to officials of the impending hearing required by Penal
Code Section 3042. These notices are now automatically sent out, whereas
in the past they were only sent out upon request. Under Penal Code Section
3046, the CRB on granting or denying parole must consider any statements
submitted by the people who were notified and responded or by other
interested persons. Even assuming the public or notified officials violently
oppose parole, what effect can that have on the Board, given Penal Code
Section 3041's specification of criteria in grating a parole date?
576
A more fundamental question involves the theoretical basis for setting
parole dates for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment, now apparently a
hybrid of determinate and indeterminate sentencing theories. On the deter-
minate side, Penal Code Section 3041(a) emphasizes the "punishment"
provisions of Section 1170 by exhorting the Community Release Board to
"set the parole release date in a manner that will provide uniform terms for
offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the
public" and to "consider the number of victims of the crime for which the
prisoner was sentenced and other factors in mitigation or aggravation of the
crime." Section 3041(b) seems to reinforce this determinate emphasis on
the crime and past criminal history by mentioning "the gravity of the current
convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past
572. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 31, 1976, §278.2, at 139-40.
573. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 31, 1976, §278.2, at 139-40.
574. Compare CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §278.2 at - with CAL. PENAL CODE §3042.
575. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §43, at 48.
576. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §3041 with In re Fain, 65 Cal. App. 3d 376, 389, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 550 (1976).
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convicted offense or offenses." 577 Suddenly, in midsentence, the theory
changes to protection of public safety, requiring parole to be denied if
"public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this
individual .... ",578 Apparently the inmate's present danger to society and
degree of rehabilitation must be taken into account. This subjective con-
sideration of the inmate, characteristic of an indeterminate sentencing sys-
tem, is buttressed by retention of the diagnostic and psychological reports
required by Penal Code Sections 5068 and 5079, which "shall include a
scientific study of each prisoner, his career and life history, the cause of his
criminal acts and recommendations for his care, training and employment
with a view to his reformation and to the protection of society." 579
The major difficulty raised by these conflicting mandates is not whether
uniform terms can be established based on the crime and prior criminal
history, but the extent to which uniformity is destroyed by consideration of
post-conviction factors. These factors include the inmate's conduct and
mental attitude while in prison. Common sense dictates that the CRB must
be able to consider post-commitment conduct. For the determinately sen-
tenced prisoner, it is the good-time credit system that takes account of good
or bad behavior, and participation or lack of participation in prison ac-
tivities. Only the traditional parole considerations can do the same for the
life prisoner. To summarize, the CRB sets uniform terms based on the
current crime and that inmate's prior crimes. But the CRB also must give
"traditional consideration" to the life patterns of the inmate, 580 the public
safety, the incarceration needed for "this individual," ' 58' and comments
from the public under Section 3042.582 To what extent, then, can prison
conduct and present mental status be considered? The Board will be forced
to sythesize this unfortunate pastiche of theories in the criteria Section 3041
requires it to adopt.
D. Parole Setting, Rescission, and Review Rights
Exposition
One portion of the new law contains a set of inmate's rights that are to be
applied to a variety of hearings. 583 The rights section, Penal Code Section
3041.5, directly applies to hearings, "for the purpose of reviewing a
prisoner's parole suitability, or the setting, postponing, or rescinding of
parole dates." At such hearings, the inmate has the following rights:
577. Convicted offenses perhaps means felony convictions as opposed to "silent beefs."
578. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(b).
579. CAL. PENAL CODE §5079.
580. CAL. PENAL CODE §5068.
581. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(b).
582. See generally In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1038-41, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529-31
(1976); CAL. PENAL CODE §3046.
583. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§2932(a)(7), 3041.5, 3041.7.
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(a) The inmate has the right to review the file to be used by the CRB. He
is allowed to make his review at least ten days prior to the hearing and may
enter a written response to any material to which he objects 8 4
(b) The inmate can be present at his hearing, can ask and answer
questions, and can speak on his own behalf. 585
(c) A person designated by the Department will be present at the hearing
to insure that all facts relevant to the decision are presented, including
contradictory assertions as to matters of fact that have not been resolved by
departmental or other procedures. This requirement is dispensed with if the
defendant is represented by legal counsel at the hearing. 586
(d) Upon reqqest, the inmate will receive a stenographic record of all
proceedings 87
(e) If the hearing is being held to postpone or rescind parole dates, the
inmate is further given the right to the attendance of witnesses, the right to
question such witnesses, and the right to specific reasons in writing for
refusal to call any witness the inmate desires. 588
(f) Depending on the result of the hearing, the inmate is entitled to
written findings sent within a specified time:589
(i) If it was a hearing to set parole and a parole date was granted, the
inmate is entitled to a written statement setting forth the parole date,
conditions to release on that date and consequences of failure to meet those
conditions. This notice must be sent within ten days of the hearing.5 90
(ii) If it was a hearing to set parole and a parole date was denied, the
inmate is entitled to a written statement, sent within 20 days of the hearing,
that sets forth reasons for not setting a parole date and suggests beneficial
activities in which the inmate might participate. Also, if a date was not set,
the CRB is obliged to hold a hearing with the inmate every year there-
after. 591
(iii) If the hearing resulted in postponement of a previously set date, the
inmate is entitled to a written statement, sent within ten days of that CRB
action, 591 that sets forth the new date and the reasons for postponement. The
inmate is further allowed to seek review of the postponement within 90 days
of receiving the statement.593
584. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a)(1).
585. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a)(2).
586. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a)(3).
587. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a)(4).
588. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§2932(a)(3), (5), 3041.5(a)(5).
589. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b).
590. CAL PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(l).
591. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(2).
592. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(3). Note that in this and the following section, the date
of the "board action" rather than the hearing date is controlling. This apparently refers to the
date the decision is final underBoard regulations.
593. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(3).
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(iv) If the hearing resulted in rescission of a parole date the inmate is
entitled to a written statement, within ten days of the Board action, setting
forth the reasons for rescinding the date. In addition, however, a new release
date must be set within six months.
594
Assuming that the inmate has had hearings which preserved all of the
rights described in Penal Code Section 3041.5(a) and has received the
notices required by Penal Code Section 3041.5(b), 595 he may further request
a rehearing by the Board under Penal Code Section 3041.7. A rehearing
must be granted to any life prisoner: (1) whose parole date is set at more
than three years beyond the minimum eligible parole date; (2) whose parole
release date is not set at the hearing held one year prior to the minimum
release date; or (3) whose parole date is rescinded. 596 At this rehearing, held
within 60 days of the inmate's request, the inmate is entitled to counsel and
to the rights set forth in Penal Code Section 3041.5. Furthermore, he is
entitled to counsel and to a hearing with rights specified in Section 3041.5 at
every subsequent hearing to set or advance a parole date.597
Commentary
As with the basic provisions for parole consideration of inmates sentenced
to life imprisonment, the provisions defining an inmate's rights at various
hearings did not vary dramatically in the course of SB 42. SB 42, however,
did contain a number of semantic and procedural problems. Sections 3041
and 3041.5 referred to the CRB's reviewing "eligibility" for parole, a
fruitless task, since legal eligibility for parole is determined by statute and is
not the subject of discretion. The more appropriate word "suitability" was
added by AB 476.598 The requirement that the Board grant counsel at "any
subsequent hearing," was clarified to mean any hearing for the purpose of
setting or advancing a parole date.599
Many less significant problems remain in the final version of the new law.
One question concerns the types of hearings at which the new statutory
rights will apply. The introductory sentence of Section 3041.5 provides that
the section applies to hearings reviewing "parole suitability, or the setting,
postponing or rescinding of parole dates." Is a suitability hearing different
594. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(4). Apparently a date must be set, regardless of whether
the new date is within six months.
595. Not all hearings contain specific notice provisions like those for setting, postponing,
or rescinding a date. Review of suitability, appeal from the denial of good-time credits, en banc
review of a parole decision are examples. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§2932(a)(7), 3041(a),
3041.5(2) with CAL. PENAL CODE §§3041.5(b), 3042. Perhaps the inmate's right to request a
stenographic record protects his interest in this area. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a)(4). Ad-
ditionally, some records are public and determinately sentenced inmates must be informed of
changes in their release date. CAL. PENAL CODE §§2932(b), 3042.
596. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.7.
597. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.7.
598. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a).
599. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.7.
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from one setting a parole date? Does it include board hearings reviewing the
denial of good-time credits for determinately sentenced inmates? Will it
apply if a member of a panel dissents and takes the case to the full Board, as
provided by Section 3041(a)?
The rights of the inmate granted in the section also raise certain questions.
The right to review the file relied on by the CRB6 ° raises the question of
what can be done to protect the confidentiality of sensitive material. Must all
material be turned over to the inmate? Under existing law it is possible to
protect the confidentiality of some sources where individual safety or in-
stitutional security would be threatened. 6° 1 The problem was avoided in
other areas of the new law by expressly retaining limited confidentiality. 
6M
One must assume, then, that the inmate's right to review the file remains
subject to the security exception of current case law.
Other questions are raised in Section 3041.5(a)(3) and (4), which provide
for the assistance of a person designated by the Department and for prod-
uction of a record on request. What right, if any, does an inmate have to
choose the person appointed? Clearly this designee represents the inmate's
interest, as well as the overall interest of fairness. Can the inmate insist on
appointment of his favorate jailhouse lawyer, or is this person always an
employee of the Department? As to a stenographic record, how soon must
this be requested? After what period of time may such records be purged
without violating an inmate's rights under Section 3041.5 and without
thwarting effective review of a decision?
The rights granted to an inmate by Section 3041.5(a)(5) in connection
with a rescission hearing fall short of those hitherto required by case law.
The rights do not include certain requirements of notice of charges. The
rights also do not include the conditional right to counsel at the rescission
hearing itself; and its provision for confrontation and cross examination of
witnesses is broader than that in case law.603 It is not clear, however,
whether the due process rights required by case law continue to exist side by
side with the new statutory rights, or whether the new law represents a
reweighing of the interests involved. After all, several of the new rights
exceed what Prewitt604 and Gee6°5 required. For example, the due process
case law did not include the right to review the file used by the CRB or the
right to stenographic record, or a specific schedule for notification of
600. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(a)(1).
601. See In re Love, 11 Cal. 3d 179, 184-85, 520 P.2d 713, 715-16, 113 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91-92
(1974); In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470,476,503 P.2d 1326, 1331, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318,323(1972); In re
Olson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 783, 790-91, 112 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584 (1974).
602. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(d).
603. Compare Gee v. Brown, 14 Cal. 3d 571,536 P.2d 1017, 122 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1975) and In
re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 479, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§3041.5.
604. See In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 479, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972).
605. Gee v. Brown, 14 Cal. 3d 571, 536 P.2d 1017, 122 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1975).
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results, or an absolute right to counsel on rehearing. Dramatic additions
under the new law include the duty to set a new parole date within six
months of the rescission and the right to a contested hearing with counsel at
any subsequent parole hearing. The life prisoner, upon rescission of parole,
is not cast back into the boundless discretion of the parole board as he once
was. Discretion to set a parole date must follow published departmental
criteria and Judicial Council Rules, and, again, a new parole date must be
set. If due process is flexible and represents a balancing of interests, 6° as
stated in numerous cases, then perhaps the provisions of the new statutory
law supplant rather than supplement older case law in this field.6°7
Another question raised by the new provision granting rights to inmates
involves the consequences of a postponement hearing. The inmate is given
the opportunity for a review within ninety days of the postponement, 608 but
the scope of this review is not stated. Originally, an "appeal" was required
for both postponement and rescission, but the appeal for rescission became a
full rehearing under Section 3041.7 while the appeal for postponement
became a review. 6°9 This history hardly answers the question of whether the
review of postponement decision is a de novo hearing or an appellate type
review of an earlier record.
Finally, a question arises as to the rights to be given at rehearings under
Penal Code Section 3041.7. Generally, rehearings involve the right to
counsel and the rights of Penal Code Section 3041.5. One part of Section
3041.5, however, further refers to the rights of Penal Code Section
2932(a)(3)(5) when postponement or rescission is involved. Where the
rehearing or subsequent parole consideration hearing involves a case which
was rescinded, do the rights to confront and examine witnesses apply? Or
despite the language of Section 3041.7, is this a portion of Section 3041.5
that does not apply?610
An interesting aspect of the entire section which grants rights to inmates is
that revocation of parole goes unmentioned. It is clear that the Community
Release Board will be the body revoking parole. Presumably, the rights the
606. See, e.g., Montanye v. Haynes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471.(1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
607. Occasionally even the California Supreme Court will tailor due process rights in the
field of prison law where competing interests are involved. See, e.g., In re Winn, 13 Cal. 3d 694,
532 P.2d 144, 119 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1975); In re Bye, 12 Cal. 3d 96, 524 P.2d 854, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382
(1974); In re Sturm, I 1 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974); In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d
21, 513 P.2d 621, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973).
608. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(3).
609. Compare SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §281, at 140 with
CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(3).
610. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§3041.5(a)(5), 3041.7.
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inmate has will continue to be those set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer,611
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,612 and their progeny.
Undoubtedly the course of future litigation will show either that the
problems discussed in this article merely scratch the surface of the new
law's complexity or that we are needlessly splitting hairs. But problems
beyond those already discussed will still arise in applying the new law to
inmates and parolees already in the system, and the retroactivity provisions
of the new law will undoubtedly be the area where the first major litigation
occurs. We now turn our attention to the retroactivity provisions of the new
law.
RETROACTIVITY OF THE NEW LAW
A. Retroactivity in General
The determinate sentence law is, by its own terms, retroactive to inmates
and parolees already within the jurisdiction of the Department of Correc-
tions. The new sentencing provisions apply to persons committing felonies on
or after July 1, 1977.613 The new law, however, also applies the new
sentencing provisions and the new parole and credits system to inmates
whose crimes were committed prior to July 1, 1977.614 The primary section
we shall discuss in the retroactivity context is Penal Code Section 1170.2.
For the most part, the express retroactivity of the new law relieves courts
from the obligation of analyzing the express, presumed, and rebutted legis-
lative intent that has characterized efforts to determine the retroactivity of
previous changes in penalties. 615 Penal Code Section 1170.2 explicitly
provides a method of applying the new law to those who committed crimes
before July 1, 1977, so that, with few exceptions, all inmates will enjoy the
same provisions regarding sentence, imprisonment, and parole. 616 Despite
the express legislative intent to make the new law retroactive, however, this
portion of the new law will not go into effect unchallenged. The retroactivity
provisions raise questions of constitutional magnitude regarding problems of
ex post facto laws, equal protection, separation of powers, and impairment
of the obligations of contracts. In addition, within the new law itself, there
are questions regarding the interpretation of some of the ill-drafted provi-
sions of Section 1170.2.617
611. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
612. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
613. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
614. See People v. Alcala, 74 Cal. App. 3d 425, 141 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§1 170.2, 2930(b), 2931(a), 3000(b), (d), 3041(c), 3065.
615. See In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740,408 P.2d 948,48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965); Sekt v. Justice
Court, 26 Cal. 2d 297, 159 P.2d 17 (1945); In re May, 62 Cal. App. 3d 165, 133 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1976); People v. Orozco, 266 Cal. App. 2d 507, 72 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1968); CAL, Gov'T CODE
§9608.
616. See also CAL. PENAL CODE §3065.
617. As we have seen in the history of the determinate sentence law, particularly of AB
476, retroactivity with its spectre of thousands of hard-core offenders released under new,
drastically reduced statutory maximums, became for a time a very political issue. A tgure ot
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For most inmates, the new law became operative July 1, 1977, and within
90 days thereof inmates incarcerated under the old law should have been
informed of any new rules, of programs offered at their institutions, and of
the possibility of beginning to earn good-time credits on and after July 1.618
For those inmates, the most interesting question is whether the recalculation
of sentence will result in release sooner than they would have been released
under the old law.
B. Calculating Retroactive Determinate Terms
1. The Basic Retroactive Release Date
The portion of the retroactivity provisions having by far the greatest
overall impact is the retroactive calculation of a determinate term under
Section 1170.2(a) and the consequent setting of a parole release date. If the
inmate committed, prior to July 1, 1977, a felony that would now result in a
determinate sentence, he receives a determinate term retroactively cal-
culated by the Community Release Board. The CRB must determine "what
the length of time of imprisonment would have been under Section 1170' '619
but must ignore the good-time credit provisions of the new law and must
make the calculation using a specified formula. 620 The calculation is made
utilizing the middle term of the offense bearing the longest term of
imprisonment of which the prisoner was convicted increased by
any enhancements justified by matters found to be true and which
were imposed by the court at the time of sentencing for such
felony.621
The enhancements to be used in the calculation are expressly noted. 622 Since
the existence of a set of enhancement provisions is a new concept, the new
enhancements do not precisely correspond to similar provisions of prior law,
and many enhancements were previously elements of crime definitions.
Hence, Section 1170.2(a) provides by analogy to the new Section 12022,
that a one-year enhancement may be added for being armed with a deadly or
dangerous weapon as was provided in former Penal Code Sections 211 (a),
460, 3024, or 12022. A two-year enhancement may be added for using a
how many would be released because of the new law was much sought after. Such a figure
may never be known, for on April 13, 1977, the Adult Authority directed that early release begin
for some inmates whose SB 42 dates appeared to have been served. Administrative Directive
2/77. The obvious practical problem is that statistics on release under the new law are hard to
ascertain-those releases having been spread over three additional months.
618. CAL. PENAL CODE §§2930(b), 2931(a), 1170.2(d). There is an interesting gap between
Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2930. For persons sentenced under Section 1170, notice of
rules, program and credits is given on a schedule set by Section 2930(a). For inmates whose
sentence is recalculated under Section 1170.2, notice must have been given by 90 days from
July 1. If an inmate committed a crime before July 1, 1977, but was not received by the
Department of Corrections until 90 days after July 1, it is physically impossible to comply with
Section 2930(b).
619. CAL. PENAL CODE §I170.2(a).
620. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
621. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
622. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
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firearm as specified by former Penal Code Section 12022.5.623 On the other
hand, one or three years may be added as appropriate for prior felony
convictions meeting the new requirements of Penal Code Section 667.5 for
prior prison terms. Enhancements to be added also include "any consecu-
tive sentence." 6 24 We must make the working assumption that the consecu-
tive sentence enhancement must also meet the new requirements of Penal
Code Section 1170.1. Roughly stated, then, the CRB largely by analogy to
the enhancement provisions of the new law, will compute what the inmate's
determinate term would have been by taking the longest middle term of the
offenses as the base term, and then adding applicable enhancements, if any,
to that base term.
It becomes apparent at once that long before the courts must do so,the
Community Release Board will face nearly all the questions about the new
sentencing structure that were discussed earlier, particularly questions raised
by the enhancement provisions. As a result, the first sizable body of case
law on determinate sentencing may well result from the CRB's application
of the retroactivity provisions.
2. The Increased Retroactive Term
Once the Community Release Board has completed the calculation re-
quired in Section 1170.2(a), all is not over. It is possible that the inmate may
be subject to an increased retroactive term if he fits the description of
Section 1170.2(b), which outlines five factors that allow an inmate's recal-
culated date of release to be increased. If two members of the Community
Release Board determine that the prisoner should serve a longer term than
the basic term calculated under Penal Code Section 1170.2(a) due to: (1) the
number of crimes for which the prisoner was convicted; (2) the number of
his prior convictions; (3) the fact that he was armed with a deadly weapon
when the crime was committed; (4) the fact that he used a deadly weapon
during the commission of the crime; or (5) the fact that he inflicted or
attempted to inflict great bodily injury on the victim, 625 the prisoner
will be so notified and will be scheduled for a hearing. 626 He must be
notified of his placement in this category within 90 days of July 1, 1977, or
of his entering the custody of the Department of Corrections, whichever is
later. 627 This allows time for prompt notice of possible increases both to
inmates now in custody and to offenders who were given an indeterminate
623. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
624. CAL. PENAL CODE §I 170.2(a).
625. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170 2(b). Conduct in prison is a notable exception from this list.
626. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b). These were colloquially called "bad dude" hearings.
They are now formalized as "serious offender hearings" in the CRB rules, despite the fact that
many of the hearings will involve the addition of enhancements which could have been imposed
under the new law, and regardless of whether the offender is "serious."
627. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b).
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sentence only because their crime occurred before July 1, 1977, but who
were received by the Department well after that date.
The hearing to which an inmate is entitled before the term calculated
under Section 1170.2(a) may be increased, is to be conducted by two
members of the Community Release Board and must be held either by April
1, 1978, or by 120 days after his receipt into state prison, whichever is
later.628 The CRB is given authority to extend this period by 90 days, subject
to veto by a resolution of either house of the legislature. 629 It is made the
express intent of the legislature that these hearings be accomplished as
expeditiously as possible. 630
At the hearing, the inmate is entitled to counsel. He is ultimately entitled
to the setting of a release date, to written findings of the "extraordinary
factors [which the CRB] specifically considered determinative," 631 and to
an explanation of the basis upon which the new date has been calculated. He
is not entitled, however, to a term set within the maximum limits of
determinate sentencing for his crimes. Apparently the term set may go as
high as a term set under the old Rodriguez guidelines.632 Reinforcing this
provision is yet another legislative declaration that "the necessity to protect
the public from repetition of extraordinary crimes of violence against the
person is the paramount consideration.'"633
3. Retaining Benefits of Former Law
Once a retroactive date has been calculated for the inmate under either
subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Section 1170.2, it is important to
remember that the benefits of the old law are preserved to the inmate if they
result in release earlier than this recalculated date. 634 For example, if an
inmate has a parole or discharge set for a date earlier than the date calculated
under subsection (a) of Section 1170.2, subsection (c) provides:
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to keep an inmate in the
custody of the Department of Corrections for a period of time
longer than he would have been kept in its custody under the
provisions of law applicable to him prior to July 1, 1977.635
628. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b)
629. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b).
630. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b).
631. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b).
632. See text accompanying notes 76-80, supra.
633. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(b). Actually subsection (b) is a huge section which might be
considerably easier to understand if it were completely subdivided.
634. Ameliorative provisions of former law, which were repealed, remain in effect for
those who commit crimes before July 1, 1977. The most important of these, besides minimum
eligible parole dates, is the youthful offender provision of former Penal Code Section 1202(b),
CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 916, at 2948. But cf. CAL. Gov'T CODE §9608 (when a law is repealed or
amended an information indictment can still be filed against a person who acted prior to the
effective date of the repeal or amendment).
635. One may question whether "custody" as used here means actual custody in prison or
includes the constructive custody of parole. The concept of actual custody in Penal Code
Section 667.5(d) appears to apply to that section only.
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If, on the other hand, a parole date has not been set, but his parole eligibility
under the old law is still earlier than his recalculated term, his suitability for
release under the old rules will be reviewed annually. 636 In short, each
inmate will be treated independently under both systems, receiving parole
consideration hearings upon becoming eligible for parole under the old law
and a fixed term calculated under the new law, until he is actually released
on the earlier of the two dates.
C. The Impact of Retroactivity on Indeterminate Terms and on Parole
Clearly the first impact of the new law will be on the calculation of terms
under the retroactivity provisions of Section 1170.2(a) and challenges to the
serious-offender hearing provisions of Section 1170.2(b) involving persons
currently in prison. Section 1170.2, however, also affects inmates who will
continue to have indeterminate sentences under Penal Code Section
1168(b), and it has an effect on persons already on parole. The retroactivity
section states that inmates whose sentences would still be indeterminate
under the new law receive the release procedures of the new law. 637 This
would appear to require that the procedures of Penal Code Section 3041 and
related sections be followed for setting the parole release date of inmates
serving life sentences and the other few, still indeterminately sentenced
inmates. These inmates then become entitled to the new parole with its new
length, conditions, and other attendant rights. 638
Inmates already out on parole, as of July 1, 1977, will begin to serve a
parole under the new law, to end in either one or three years as appropri-
ate.639 It is important to note that what one calculates under Section
1170.2(a) and (b) is a term, but what is then set is a parole release date.64°
The parole period itself will run from either the date of initial parole or July
1, 1977, whichever is later.4' Thus, inmates serving sentences under the
old law, even parolees, must still serve a period of parole governed by the
new law unless the Board chooses to waive further parole. 6
42
1. History
Perhaps no other portion of the new law was as constantly rewritten and
as significantly changed as Section 1170.2. Few versions of SB 42 or AB
476 failed to alter it in some way, although no version failed to include
retroactivity. The first version of Section 1170.2 presented a problem that
636. CAL. PENAL CODE §3041(c). This of course raises the problem of defining what
decisional law, provisions or administrative decisions must be preserved and used by panels
doing the Section 3041(c) review. Cf. People v. Sobick, 30 Cal App. 3d 458, 472-76, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 519, 528-31 (1973) (general discussion of changes raising ex post facto problems).
637. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(e).
638. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§1170.2(c), (f), 3000(b), 3065.
639. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.2(f), 3000(d).
640. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170 2(b).
641. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(d).
642. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000(b).
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continued into SB 42's chaptered form. The first version of Section
1170.2643 made the date of sentencing, rather than the date on which the
crime was committed, dispositive as to what law applied to the inmate and
used the effective date of the act as the pivot point for when the new law
would begin to apply. The retroactive calculation involved finding the
maximum the judge could have imposed under the new law, although the
inmate did get the benefit of the indeterminate sentence or the recalculated
term, whichever was less. If. an inmate had already served the recalculated
term, he would be released on parole within one year. If. already a parolee,
he would simply be discharged. 64 "
In the course of the many changes that were made to Section 1170.2, a
pattern of shortening the recalculated terms was established by the early
amendments. Some of the first amendments specified that recalculation of
terms would use the middle term rather than the upper term, and parole
release, if one had already served this term, would have to occur within six
months rather than one year. Some virulent virus, however, began to attack
the basic comprehensibility of the section, for it provided that if an inmate
had not served time in prison that exceeded the middle term of imprison-
ment as computed under Section 1170.2(a), "his term of imprisonment shall
be set at such maximum time plus the maximum statutory period of
parole. . . ."64 Incomprehensibility struck again a week later when SB 42
was amended to add:
In the case of any inmate sentenced for a felony to state prison
prior to the effective date of this act, who would have been
sentenced under Section 1168 or Section 1168a of this act after the
effective date of this act, the length of time of imprisonment shall
be deemed to be the maximum time which could have been im-
posed by the judge under this act. 6
The problem with this amendment was that the sections referred to forbade
judges to impose any time at all. Even a charitable reading of this provision
in practical terms invoked shades of Gertrude Stein-a life sentence which
is still a life sentence is a life sentence.
In 1976 the section was completely rewritten, although the date of
sentencing and the effective date of the act were still controlling as to which
law applied. This 1976 rewrite was the version of retroactivity that was
enacted in SB 42. 647 The basic calculation of the retroactive term required
the board to use "the middle term of the offense bearing the longest terms of
643. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Mar. 4, 1975, §273, at 129-31.
644. Id. at 130.
645. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 7, 1975, §273, at 115 (emphasis
added).
646. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 14, 1975, §273, at 118. Sections
1168 and 1168a in this quotation refer to indeterminate sentencing.
647. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 132-35.
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imprisonment of which the prisoner was convicted aggregated by any
additional terms which could have been imposed by the judge under this
section for such felony or aggravation." 64 Aside from the obvious semantic
difficulty that "aggravation" referred back to nothing and prisoners were
not convicted of terms of imprisonment, the section retained substantive
problems. How did one "aggregate" two numbers? And what were these
additional terms-enhancements, possibly?
Under this 1976 version of Section 1170.2, an increased term was
possible if a majority of all of the members of the Community Release
Board reviewed the file and determined that more time was necessary due to
the five factors previously discussed. 649 But the hearing to increase the term
had to occur within 90 days of the effective date of the new law.650 and
presumably a panel of three members would have to conduct the hearing. 651
It was ludicrous that proponents of the bill pointed to the increased term
provisions as the safeguard against release of large numbers of violent
offenders. Given 18,000 to 20,000 inmates, nine members of the Commu-
nity Release Board, the time and personnel limitations on these hearings, the
inmate's extensive hearing rights and the requirement of counsel at the
hearing,65 2 it would have been physically impossible to increase terms for
more than a handful of violent offenders. 653
The 1976 version of SB 42 went on to provide that the inmate receive the
benefit of old or new law, whichever produced the greatest benefit to him,
and also that the inmate receive the benefit of the new parole provisions. 654
Even increased term calculations were to be guided by the new term the
prisoner might have gotten for a "similar crime under similar circum-
stances" tried after the effective date of the bill.655
One last minute addition to SB 42 was the so-called "McAlister Amend-
ment," which provided that in cases of increased retroactive terms, particu-
larly where one of the violent felonies of Section 667.5(c) was involved,
"the necessity to protect the public from repetition of such extraordinary
crimes of violence against the person is the paramount consideration.'"656 If
ultimately retained, this would have caused confusion in the standards to be
applied under subsection (b) of Section 1170.2, which referred to
guidelines related to the crime rather than to whether the criminal was
rehabilitated.
648. Id. at 132.
649. See text accompanying note 625, supra.
650. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 132-33.
651. Id. at 153-54.
652. Id. at 132-33.
653. It took well over a year just to comply with In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d
384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975), and that was with full use of case hearing officers. See In re
Williams, 53 Cal. App. 3d 10, 125 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1975).
654. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 22, 1976, §273, at 134.
655. Id. at 133-34.
656. SB 42, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 31, 1976, §273, at 129.
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The basic changes that AB 476 made to SB 42 clarified the controlling
dates when the old law ended and the new law began, and made it physicial-
ly possible for the Community Release Board to conduct the hearings
required to increase the retroactive term calculated under subsection (a). It
had become obvious that use of the date of sentencing created serious ex
post facto problems. If an inmate commited a crime before July 1, 1977, and
was sentenced after July 1, 1977, the CRB might lack jurisdiction to give
the benefits of the old law657 even if it might be more lenient than the new
law. Use of the date of sentencing rather than the date of the crime to
determine which law applied to the inmate was also somewhat arbitrary. An
inmate exercising rights to extensive pretrial challenges as to searches,
discovery, or change of venue might be sentenced at a later date due to the
extra time required, and might thereby be penalized by receiving a harsher
sentence under the new law than he could have received under the old law.
An Attorney General's Indexed Letter,658 therefore opined that despite the
language of the statute, July 1, 1977, rather than the "effective" date of the
statute, January 1, 1977, should be utilized as the date that the new law
began, and the date of the crime, rather than the date of sentencing, would
be critical in determining which law applied to the defendant. AB 476
rendered litigation on the applicable dates of the new law less likely by
specifying them in the amendments to SB 42. The date, July 1, 1977,
replaced references to "effective date" and the date of commission of the
crime was made determinative as to which law applied. 659 /
The first version of AB 476 also made other basic corrections to Section
1170.2. It consolidated provisions for setting increased terms, provisions
formerly contained in two nearly identical subsections. It allowed two
members of the Community Release Board rather than a majority of the
entire board to schedule an inmate for a hearing on an increased term and
simply required that that hearing be held as expeditiously as possible. It
freed the hearing panel from using the guideline of determinate terms for
fixing a retroactive term under subsection (b) and eliminated the "McAlis-
ter Amendment's" reference to violent felonies under Section 667.5 when
rewording the legislature's intent. 66°
Later versions of AB 476 were extensively rewritten but were not signifi-
cantly changed in content. When the legislature in AB 476 redefined the
enhancements for arming with or use of a weapon or causing great bodily
injury, it was of course necessary to explain how one would add enhance-
ments retroactively. 661 Time allotted for completion of hearings to increase
657. See In re Sandel, 64 Cal. 2d 412, 412 P.2d 806, 50 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966) (discussion of
the limited jurisdiction of the Adult Authority to correct errors or change legal status).
658. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S INDEX LETrER 77-7.
659. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 10, 1977, §18, at 22-26.
660. Id.
661. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 12, 1977, §18, at 24-28; AB 476,
1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, June 24, 1977, §18, at 28-31.
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retroactive terms was limited to April 1, 1978, with a possible 90-day
extension. 62 One of the most interesting additions to the new law arose
from the fact that in retroactively calculating the term for a multiple offend-
er, it was possible to come out with an earlier release date if he were
consecutively sentenced, than if sentencing had been concurrent. If one
simply computed a number and added that number to the date of first receipt
in prison, rather than working with the real calendar history of the case,
some inmates even appeared to serve their term on a crime before they had
committed it.663 The new Penal Code Section 1170.2(c) made it clear that
this should not occur and that no one consecutively sentenced should benefit
thereby. This was referred to by many as the rule of "presumed judicial
intelligence," so-called because it was hoped that even under SB 42, a
judge would have reached this result.
2. Remaining Problems
The retroactivity provisions as finally amended and made operative on
July 1, 1977, still left dozens of unanswered questions, many of them highly
complex. While it is beyond the scope of this article to explain fully all of
the constitutional, mathematical, and statutory dilemmas hidden in the
retroactivity provisions, we will point out some of the more notable prob-
lems in the order in which they arise in the code section itself.
The threshhold problem with Penal Code Section 1170.2 is whether the
entire section is unconstitutional. Way v. Superior Court664 has declared
that the provision does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. It
was argued that the legislature was infringing upon the pardoning power of
the Governor by discharging certain individuals and upon the power of the
judiciary by altering final judgments. Another interesting issue raised by
Way was impairment of the obligation of "contracts" made during the plea
bargaining process-a unique argument that indicates the extent to which
plea bargaining has become ingrained in our system, and the extent to which
it is a double-edged sword. Numerous judges doubtlessly did give concur-
rent rather than consecutive sentences and did strike various allegations
assuming that the then existing penalties under the old law would quite
suffice. Numerous district attorneys and defendants surely plea bargained
662. AB 476, 1977-78 Regular Session, as amended, Apr. 19, 1977, §18, at 18.663. Consider, for example, three robberies in 1965, 1970 and 1976. If one merely com-
puted a consecutive sentence-3 + (1/3 x 3) + (1/3 x 3)-and added it to 1965, the inmate
would have served his full term before he even committed the last robbery. If one used the real
calendar and the idea that it is not possible to serve the time until the crime has been committed,
then the last (1/3 x 3) would be added onto 1976. The release date would then be at least 1977. If
one further reasoned that as of 1976 there was really no new term for the 1976 conviction to be
consecutive to and that the inmate ought not to profit by a sentence obviously intended to be
more severe, a full three years for the robbery would be added onto 1976 for a release date of
1979. He would then not receive a more lenient sentence consecutively than he would have had
concurrently. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(c).
664. 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 178, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383, 392 (1977).
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with certain consequences in mind. The parole board doubtlessly released
life prisoners on parole with the understanding that full revocation and
return would be possible. Although the rules of the game have now been
changed, it hardly amounts to the impairment of a contract. It is also certain
that prisoners will file suit to bar the use of Section 1170.2(b), which allows
an increased retroactive term. It may be years before the basic validity of the
sweeping retroactive provisions are settled.
Assuming, however, that the retroactivity section is upheld, Section
1170.2 itself creates problems in its first sentence. The first sentence
provides general guidance for the CRB in determining "what the length of
time of imprisonment would have been under Section 1170. . ,,665 Yet
the CRB cannot determine what a court in an adversary sentencing hearing
at a time when facts were fresh would have done, and the inability to do so
creates equal protection issues, particularly for inmates whose cases were
still pending before the trial court when the new law came down.666 Equal
protection problems may be raised by the fact that the express terms of
Section 1170.2(a) provide that good-time credits cannot be considered, nor
can enhancements be stricken, in spite of guidelines that the Judicial Coun-
cil might give suggesting that this case might be appropriate for such
leniency. Furthermore, recalculated sentences do not appear to be eligible
for disparate sentence review. 667 Given the chance assignment of a harsh or
a lenient judge, and the fact that the calculation under Section 1170.2(a)
discounts many mitigating factors and the CRB's inability to adjust dispa-
rate terms, the CRB cannot actually do what Section 1170.2(a) says it shall.
In attempting to do its impossible task, the CRB must use the middle term
of the "offense bearing the longest term of imprisonment of which the
prisoner was convicted . ... "668 Of course the prisoner was not convicted
of a term of imprisonment, but the genuine question this phrase raises
concerns multiple punishment under Penal Code Section 654. The inmate
may have been convicted of several felonies whose effect was stayed due to
problems of multiple punishment. Presumably these are not to be used.
More interesting yet is how one chooses which term is the "longest." It
must be recalled that we are dealing with great gaps between statutory
maxima under the old and the new law. Which is greater, the second degree
murder conviction from 1970 or the second degree burglary from 1976?669
665. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
666. Cf. In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 742, 408 P.2d 948, 950, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 174 (1965)
(holding that when a criminal statute is amended after the prohibited act is committed, but prior
to final judgment, and the punishment is mitigated, the amended act prevails).
667. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(d).
668. CAL. PENAL CODE §I170.2(a).
669. The murder at five, six and seven years would expire in 1976, CAL. PENAL CODE §190,
while the burglary at 16 months, two and three years would expire in 1978, CAL. PENAL CODE
§461(2).
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Do we deal with numbers in the abstract or with the real, calendar implica-
tions of the latest expiring term? The Community Release Board Rules have
interpreted this section to mean the latest expiring term.
670
Further, once the CRB determines which offenses have the longest term
of imprisonment, the middle term for that offense is to be increased by "any
enhancements justified by matters found to be true and which were imposed
by the ourt. .. ."671 The enhancements are then listed by reference to the
sections in which they existed under prior law or by analogy to their current
code sections. One readily notes that the requirement that enhancements
have been pleaded, proved and imposed is absent; proved and imposed
suffices. This is probably due to the fact that pleading the enhancement in
many cases involved pleading the offense itself. 672 Presumably the enhance-
ment was, by the same token, sufficiently imposed when the court imposed
sentence for the offense containing the enhancement in its definition.
A less easily resolved question concerning the enhancements to be im-
posed retroactively by the CRB is their relation to the existing enhancement
provisions of the new law. Three of these retroactive enhancements are
defined, for purposes of Section 1170.2(a), as they were defined under prior
law, yet the postscript is added "pursuant to the provisions of Section
12022" or 12022.5 or 12022.7. Perhaps this postscript does no more than
emphasize the reason for the number of years assigned to each retroactive
enhancement. Certainly the content of enhancements under the new law
differs from similar aggravating factors appearing in various forms under the
old law. Yet when we come to the enhancement for prior prison terms, the
full requirements of the new law, Penal Code Section 667.5, must be met to
enhance retroactively. No guideline is given whatsoever for how consecu-
tive sentencing will apply retroactively. Surely cases will explore the rela-
tionships of old and new enhancement definitions given the general goal,
stated in Section 1170.2(a), of finding the length of time the inmate would
have received under the new law.
Finally, let us assume the CRB does not wish to increase the retroactive
term under Section 1170.2(b) but wishes to release the inmate on the date
calculated under subsection (a). May the inmate who has not yet reached
his minimum eligible parole date under the old law be released? 673 Way
670. 15 CAL. ADM. CODE §2150(e).
671. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.2(a).
672. Examples are burglary with great bodily injury and armed robbery.
673. One may- not give a snappy "yes" on the theory that under Section 1170.2(c) the
inmate gets the benefit of whichever law lets him out earlier. The problem is brought into focus
by comparing Penal Code Section 1170.2(g) and Penal Code Section 3049. Section 1170.2(g)
provides that nothing in this chapter "shall affect the eligibility for parole" of indeterminately
sentenced inmates (emphasis added). "This chapter" presumably refers to Chapter 4.5 of Title
7, Part 2, of the Penal Code, not Chapter 1139 of the 1976 Statutes. These inmates may obtain a
parole period as set forth in the new Penal Code Section 3000(b), which refers to Penal Code
Section 1170.2, after going through the procedures of Penal Code Section 3040 and related
sections. When you turn to the 3040 series, however, you find that Penal Code Section 3049
provides:
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appears to answer this question affirmatively by recognizing that the retroac-
tive provisions will result in the release and final discharge of prisoners
before this could have occurred under former law. 674
Breaking free of arguments over release on a date calculated under
Section 1170.2(a), we come to the problems of Section 1170.2(b), allowing
an increase in the date calculated under Section 1170.2(a). One point of
interest is the imperfect correlation between the five factors675 that may
subject an inmate to a hearing to 'increase his retroactive term and the
enhancement provisions. The definition of being armed with a deadly
weapon is of course quite different now from what it was under the old
law. 676 Great bodily injury is more narrowly defined now than it was under
the old law. 677 To enhance the length of a term, prior convictions now must
be prior prison terms. 678 No changes in Section 1170.2(b) occurred compa-
rable to those in Section 1170.2(a), tying down definitions to those existing
under prior law. Apparently the subsection is designed simply to give the
CRB greater latitude, with exactitude left behind.
Consideration of this latitude in making the Section 1170.2(b) determina-
tion really leads one to question what evidentiary rules and what standard of
proof was intended for these hearings. If the hearing panel can only utilize
these facts if they appear on the abstract of judgment, then there is no
purpose to the subsection as these matters result in the term under subsec-
tion (a). Moreover, a standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" was ex-
In all other cases heretofore provided for, no prisoner sentenced prior to July 1, 1977
may be paroled until he has served the minimum term of imprisonment provided by
law for the offense of which he was convicted ....
Penal Code Section 1170.2(c) at first, appears to be helpful. It states that the retroactive
calculation may not keep one in custody longer than one would have been kept under the old
law. But the problem we have been discussing is actually the reverse of the situation addressed
in Section 1170.2(c): can one be released under the new law before he would even have been
eligible for parole under the old? Subsection (c) merely preserves eligibility under the old law if
the new law is harsher; and does not address eligibility if the old law is harsher. Some sections,
however, are helpful in resolving this dilemma. Section 1170.2(b) flatly states that if the
retroactive date is earlier than the parole release date under the old law, the inmate is released.
The only exception to release is in permitting initiation of a hearing to set an increased term.
Section 1170.2(f) states and Penal Code Section 3065 affirms, that the length, conditions,
revocation, and other incidents of parole are to be the same for inmates whose crimes occurred
before or after July 1, 1977. Surely an incident of parole is a determination of when it begins.
The very history of Penal Code Section 3049 suggests that it was not meant to limit full
retroactivity of Section 1170.2. It would not, perhaps, be too bold to suggest that the six-word
addition creating the current wording of Section 2349 was no more than a lame attempt to
preserve eligibility for parole rather than preclude release. This reasoning would suggest that
the Department could release an inmate under the new law even prior to his former law's
minimum eligible parole date.
674. Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 173 n.6, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388-89 n.6
(1977).
675. The factors enumerated in Section 1170.2(b) are: (1) the number of crimes of which the
prisoner was convicted; (2) the number of prior convictions received by the prisoner; (3)
whether the prisoner was armed with a deadly weapon when the crime was committed; (4)
whether the prisoner used a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime; and (5) whether
the prisoner inflicted or attempted to inflict great bodily injury on the victim of the crime.
676. Compare CAL. STATS. 1957, c. 1617, §3, at 2964 (former CAL. PENAL CODE §3024) with
CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.
677. CAL. PENAL CODE §12022.7. This section does not include an attempt.
678. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5.
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pressly suggested to the legislature, and apparently rejected.679 There is also
a question of whether the appearance of any of the five factors in the
transcript of trial and sentencing or in the probation officer's report is
sufficient to allow them to be considered by the Board in the hearings to
increase the term. This would be consistent with the Board's practice under
the indeterminate sentence law of looking at all relevant circumstances.
There is also a question of whether allegations that were stricken clearly as
part of a plea bargain may be considered by the board in the hearing to
increase the term. Consideration of these factors appears permissible and
would also be consistent with former practice, but raises further questions
about the integrity of plea bargains.
Another difficulty in interpreting subsection (b) of Section 1170.2 ap-
pears in determining how much time can be added at the hearings to increase
the term. The legislative intent expressed in the last sentence emphasizes
that "the necessity to protect the public from repetition of extraordinary
crimes of violence against the person" 680 is paramount. As we reviewed
above, this provision once specifically referred to prisoners who had com-
mitted violent felonies listed in Penal Code Section 667.5(c), but now refers
only to those who have committed "extraordinary crimes of violence."
How will a hearing panel deal with an inmate whose in-prison or parole
conduct, rather than aspects of his crime, show that he would be an
imminent threat to the public safety? Does it expand the five factors from
which it is obviously removed in subsection (b)? Does it add anything at all
except perhaps an outdated reference to prediction of violence or rehabilita-
tion, prognostications which the new law decisively abandons?
Finally, there remains the question of the equal protection impli-
cations of Section 1170.2(b). Granted, one can divine a rational basis, even
a compelling interest, in distinguishing subsection (a) and subsection (b)
inmates. Judges sentencing under the old law could not know how the
sentences they imposed would be altered, and for the more serious offender
perhaps the increase permitted by subsection (b) more accurately reflects the
sentence the judge would have imposed originally than does subsection (a).
But individuals sentenced under the new law who have the same record as
inmates sentenced under the old law, will receive terms that cannot reach the
maximum possible for a retroactive calculation under Section 1170.2(b),
with its possible increase all the way to a primary term under Rodriguez.
Perhaps the sole distinction is that one inmate committed his crime under the
old law and the other under the new. Therefore it is possible that despite the
rhetoric in Section 1170.2(b) of public safety, the maximum term for a given
679. Memo from Tom Clarke, Jr. and Mike Ullman to Alan [Sieroty] and Jack [Knox] (May
28, 1976) at 3 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
680. 'CAL. PENAL CODE §I 170.2(b).
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offense under the new law may be constitutionally compelled by the equal
protection clause as the maximum for those sentenced under the old law.
CONCLUSION
Having been so involved in the history of this law, we cannot resist the
temptation to indulge in a little speculation about the future. It is clear that a
major effect of SB 42 and AB 476 has been the limitation of discretion in the
judicial and executive branches, and the vesting of that discretion in the
legislature. Apart from imposing a consecutive sentence, imposing an upper
or lower term, or striking enhancements, courts are given no real discretion
to set terms based on the widely varying culpability involved in the human
conduct we denote as criminal. The prison and parole authorities that once
had such a power have it no longer. Yet it remains to be seen whether the
legislature, having so blithely taken over this responsibility of determining
the actual release date for most prisoners, can live with the pressures
inevitably accompanying that task.
Certainly the legislature will soon face demands for higher penalties.
Generally increasing prison terms as high as some advocate will surely
present great difficulties. Dramatic increases in a few terms, perhaps as a
reaction to some notorious crime, will destroy the pattern of penalties
created in the new law and will invite courts to invoke the Lynch and
Rodriguez doctrines. Too many readjustments of penalties will destroy any
certainty in punishment and will create a chaotic set of diverging penalties
for the same crime, a set of penalties to be somehow understood and
administered by the Department of Corrections and the Community Release
Board.
While the setting of penalties will be a problem, the failure of the
legislature to provide for mentally disordered violent offenders may equally
be a problem. The new law does not address the question of how to handle
the prisoner who has completed his determinate sentence but because of
some mental disorder is likely to injure seriously another victim upon
release. The drafters of SB 42 made several proposals to answer this
question, but their efforts came to naught. This was predictable in light of
the decisive rejection in the new law of the concept of rehabilitation, a
cornerstone in the old law. The limited ability of the psychiatric profession
either to predict future violence or to treat the underlying mental disorder
gives the drafter of any proposed rule in the area no firm scientific base on
which to work. By contrast, certainty and predictability were the goals of
the new law. Unpleasant as the prospect may be, however, the new law
must eventually accommodate this problem. One can predict public outrage
over egregious cases of clearly violent people mechanically released and
claiming new victims. This is the sort of pressure legislators are unlikely to
overlook.
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Upon reflection, another result of the new law may be to bring home to
the legislature the magnitude of the task it has assumed in taking control of
criminal sentencing. Whether due to longer terms or increased readiness to
sentence to state prison, the prison population is likely to increase. The
problem of prison overcrowding never directly presented itself under the
indeterminate sentence law. California had almost the same number of
persons in prison in 1977 as it did in 1960, despite large increases in state
population and in the crime rate. The increasing use of probation during this
period doubtlessly had a lot to do with this anomaly, but it is significant that
the parole board was always there to act as a safety valve for prison
overcrowding; whether or not this was a conscious consideration of the
board. If more defendants receive prison terms rather than probation, and
particularly if prison terms are increased, overcrowding will become a
growing and intransigent problem forcing the legislature into some unpleas-
ant choices. More prisons to relieve the problem mean more taxes. On the
other hand, inaction may allow prison populations to increase and condi-
tions to deteriorate to the level which in Florida and Alabama caused drastic
measures to be taken-closing prisons by court order, refusal by prison
authorities to accept new prisoners, or the exercise of executive clemency to
relieve the pressure. 681 In the same way that it may be forced into a
rehabilitation test for mentally disordered violent offenders, the legislature
may find it necessary to create a board or commission capable of adjusting
terms or parole to reflect changing social attitudes and the physical capacity
of the state to house prisoners. One thing is certain-this determinate
sentence law has a most indeterminate future.
Finally, we may modify what we so cheerfully stated in our introduction
about the ultimate comprehensibility of the new law. It takes a heroic effort
to understand the complex provisions of this legislation which ought to be
dubbed the "Lawyer's Relief Act of 1976." There is some solace in the fact
that things always look bleak on this end of a landmark change in law. After
five or ten years of litigation, the new law of sentencing and parole-like the
new procedures forced by Morrissey-will surely settle into manageable
proportion.
Until then, think of it as job security.
681. James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Costello
v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, vacated, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 1191
(1977).
